Do Sanctions Work?

This contribution to the symposium on ‘Unmasking the Intractable: Exploring Anti-Racism and the Law’ explores sanctions in Rhodesia from a personal historical perspective. A longer version will be published on the africanlegalstudies.blog.

Article 41 of the UN Charter defines sanctions as non-military means of getting compliance with Security Council Resolutions. These can take many forms including “complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.”

But do sanctions work? The answer is: it depends on the goal or aim of the sanctions and which state is sanctioned and by whom. Sanctions may aim to cripple the economy as a means of pressuring the country to stop the offensive behaviours or to rethink its stance on a particular issue such as with Iran. Or are they to signal disapproval, to raise awareness and to radiate solidarity with those who are suffering, such as with South Africa during the apartheid regime? Their efficacy is very much dependent on those enforcing the sanctions.

The evidence shows that where the interests of economically and politically powerful states align in support of sanctions there is a greater likelihood of the sanctions having an impact. Their efficacy is increasingly tested in a global world where some countries may oppose or remain neutral on the issue and may not want to enforce the sanctions. This provides an outlet for the sanctioned country to export its goods and services. The refuseniks often benefit from cheaper prices and the formation or reaffirmation of strategic partnerships for their future benefit.

Historical Context: The Case of Rhodesia

On Armistice Day in 1965, the minority Rhodesian regime under Ian Smith issued a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI). Until then, the territory known as Southern Rhodesia had been under British control. Reflecting the decolonisation demands being made in other parts of the continent, the black African population could no longer be placated with community development schemes and promises of political self-governance in the future. The majority of white Rhodesians and their leaders were resistant to accept even modest proposals set out in a 1961 Constitution. These would have permitted fifteen seats out of sixty-five to be held by Africans in the Assembly. They regarded these as a threat to their economic and political dominance. The Rhodesians modelled themselves on South Africa. The 1965 UDI Constitution thus retained and reinforced white minority rule. The UN was swift in its condemnation of UDI passing a resolution a day after UDI which called on states not to recognise the ‘racist minority regime’ or to offer it any assistance. The British government tried to reason with the regime but to no avail. It imposed sanctions against the rebel regime to bring the Rhodesians back to Constitutional rule.

UN Imposes Sanctions

A week after UDI, the UN again weighed in, adopting Security Council Resolution 217. This required states not to recognise the illegal Rhodesian regime or to give it any support, “in particular, to desist from providing it with arms, equipment and military material, and to do their utmost in order to break all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products.” The Resolution left it to individual states to police themselves. The sanctions were strengthened in further resolutions, which reiterated the prohibition of states maintaining any diplomatic or economic relationship with the regime. Importantly, Resolution 253 called on states to “render moral and material assistance to the people of Southern Rhodesia in their struggle to achieve their freedom and independence.”

Did the sanctions work? The British government thought it important to remain in dialogue with Rhodesia and interpreted the assistance provision to exclude the use of violence or ‘terrorism.’ Other states saw it differently. The Rhodesian Attorney General told Parliament that the sanctions would not have an immediate effect but had already started to bite. He noted that exports “have fallen from £165 million in 1965 to £100 million in 1967.”

According to a declassified CIA report from June 19686 the sanctions were not having a significant effect. US economic figures showed that the regime had prepared for sanctions and was weathering them well. This was in part because of support provided to Rhodesia by several countries including South Africa and Portugal. It also noted that neighbouring states relied on Rhodesian infrastructure for food imports and other resources including electricity to fire the Zambian copper mines and coal for the Katanga mines in Congo.

Living through sanctions

My childhood memories are of living through a civil war for Black liberation which the regime sold as a fight against terrorism. Despite sanctions, the Rhodesians were well armed with helicopters, tanks and guns coming through South Africa, while the freedom fighters were supplied with arms and training by the Soviet Union and China with backup support provided by states such as Cuba. The Frontline states including Zambia together with Tanzania, allowed guerilla camps and provided both infrastructure and money on their territory. Cold War considerations were important in deciding which horse to back and when.

Apartheid South Africa proved to be a dependable ally, and their trade relation increased. South Africa also helped to repackage Rhodesian goods to hide their provenance (UN SC Resolution 333 and UN SC Resolution 388). Despite the sanctions, petrol continued to flow from South Africa and Mozambican ports in Beira and Lourenco Marques. This was facilitated by Portugal, which was named and shamed in the UN along with South Africa. While there was rationing, I remember my mother having a monthly allocation of petrol coupons, with more being available ‘informally’. I do not recall a time when the fuel ran out. The lesson was, where there is money to be made or saved, countries will breach sanctions. Considerations about complicity in violations of human rights or sanctions were not barriers to trade.

Civilian life continued. Rhodesian ‘ingenuity’ became a matter of pride, with backs against the wall, this plucky little nation was going to show the world what defiance looked like: make do and mend became the mantra. Nothing was thrown away. Leisure was not ignored; sporting fixtures against South Africa continued. Keen to show off its European cultural roots, the Rhodesian regime adopted a new national anthem, “Rise O Voices of Rhodesia” set to the Fourth Movement of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony. With a slightly different arrangement, Europeans may still recognise it as the Ode to Joy- the European anthem adopted in 1972. The Rhodesian anthem spoke of sharing God’s bounty, but clearly not with the Black owners, reminding one of the writer Doris Lessing’s observation that while white colonialists came to love the land, they never thought to love its people. The anthem’s call for God to lead them to wise decisions clearly fell on deaf ears.

Integrity v. Self-Interest

Western states were inconsistent in their application of sanctions. Reluctant to lose its access to the supply of South African gold and minerals, Britain continued trading with South Africa and protected it from external pressure. The US played both sides of the fence: publicly condemning the Rhodesian regime, while privately continuing to support South Africa in full knowledge of the centrality of its role in buttressing the regime.

The US’s self-interest was made plain in the 1972 case of Diggs v. Shultz, which was brought in a District court in America challenging the import of Rhodesian chrome in defiance of sanctions. This mineral was needed for manufacturing and so formed part of a Nixon era US import exemption enacted in the Byrd Amendment which allowed Congress to suspend or digress from its international obligations including UN resolutions.

Chrome had been on the list of sanctioned goods.

The US Court of Appeals agreed that the case could be heard. However, the appellants lost on the key point challenging the legality of the Byrd Amendment. This was because of a doctrine in US constitutional law called “the last-in-time doctrine,” where if there is a conflict between a treaty and an act of Congress, the domestic court is required to apply the latter statute even though it would be a blatant treaty violation.

The Byrd Amendment in US law led to UN Security Council Resolution 314 requested by Guinea, Somalia and Sudan. The Resolution noted that any law passed by a country “with a view to permitting, directly or indirectly, the importation from Southern Rhodesia of any commodity falling within the scope of the obligations imposed (by the 1968 resolution), including chrome ore, would undermine sanctions and would be contrary to the obligations of States.”

Efficacy – Do Sanctions Work?

Nancy Kacungira identified four different contexts in which sanctions were used with variable impact. In the 1940s the USA suspended post-war aid for the Netherlands after it arrested pro-independence leaders in the Dutch East Indies who wanted independence from Dutch colonisation. The Dutch relented and Indonesia was granted independence in 1949. Iran was sanctioned for its development of a nuclear programme and support for proscribed terrorist groups. Although the sanctions have had some impact, Iran’s diverse economy and friendship with states such as China have helped it to withstand the worst of the sanctions. By way of contrast, the global condemnation of the South African regime and the imposition of economic, sporting and other sanctions contributed to the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990 and the holding of democratic elections in 1994.

Does this mixed picture mean that sanctions are not worth the paper on which they are written? In personal correspondence, Lutz Oette writes, “there has been a broad consensus that economic sanctions have been ineffective as targeted governments have found ways to undermine them, insulate themselves, or use sanctions for a rally around the flag propaganda. These considerations are behind the turn to targeted sanctions in the late 1990s” (L. Oette email to F. Banda 25 May 2024). He goes on to distinguish those movements or issues which manage to generate international sympathy, such as the South African case from those which do not. In the latter category are sanctions against Iraq following the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussain and the war that followed. While solidarity and sympathy kept South Africa in the headlines, the relative indifference to Iraq meant that the plight of the Iraqi people was not as visible.

Pragmatism and Political Pressure

The increasing pressure on South Africa had an indirect effect on the Rhodesian story. Uncertain about its own future, and under pressure to relinquish control over South-West Africa/Namibia, the South African government could not continue to take on the added burden of supporting Rhodesia. It therefore exerted pressure on the Rhodesian government to reach a settlement with the liberation leaders. Additionally, Portugal decided to agree to independence and hence majority rule in Mozambique and Angola which left the minority white run Southern African states exposed to further pressure and condemnation.

Despite the equivocation of the UK and the US, it is clear that the Rhodesian case had broader international and organisational support evidenced by the swiftness and consistency of UN resolutions condemning the Rhodesian regime and recording invitations to Black nationalist leaders to speak before the UN. The UK was encouraged to work towards resolving the Rhodesian crisis. The Commonwealth also kept up the pressure as did the Organisation of African Unity. The Southern African question encompassing South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe was kept under review as were Angola and Mozambique. The Pan Africanist vision required their freedom as a precursor to the realisation of African unity.

Sanctions as the Price to be Paid for Freedom

The Rhodesian case study is also an example of the ‘empire biting back’, for it marked a time when newly independent states used the language of self-determination, dignity and equality to demand for themselves what the ‘West’ had proclaimed as the birthright of all humanity in the adoption of the UN Declaration on Human Rights. They were as keen on UN Charter sovereignty as some colonial states were resistant to relinquishing their privileges. It helped that liberation movements had explicitly said that they were prepared to endure the suffering that sanctions may bring. Impactful was the invocation of religion and specifically Christianity to call out the hypocrisy of those who proclaimed themselves Christians, but who sought to deny human rights, dignity and equality to others by maintaining a daily regime of suppression and oppression of Black people. The hurt of the people impacted was deployed to profound effect. Also highlighted was the inconsistency of the US whose public proclamations of its rule of law-based order and adherence to principles of equality for all before the law, was directly contradicted by its actions.

Sanctions as Solidarity Building

It is clear that if the aim of sanctions is to raise public awareness, then yes, they can be impactful. International solidarity can be a powerful thing, pressuring governments to change or alter course, including ceasing or limiting trade with recalcitrant states.

Sanctions or boycotts may be highly effective in pressuring non-state actors. In particular, threats of boycott of companies who have assets or who conduct business in targeted states. The aim of the threats is to encourage companies to divest or to cease trading in those states.

Travel and cultural boycotts including not travelling to the sanctioned country and not participating in events sponsored by companies that have links with the targeted country may be impactful.. These actions also show that ‘ordinary people’ are in solidarity with the oppressed.

States can use sanctions to show that they take a principled, rather than rhetorical, commitment to human rights. The most important effect is the affirmation for those who are at the receiving end of oppression. Hearing and seeing that you are not alone, or that others are outraged, can be affirming. Having your humanity and dignity recognized and validated is important. With the right advocacy, sanctions can bring this about. Despite the cynicism shown by some states, human rights matter.

Conclusion

The Rhodesian example shows that, on their own, sanctions may not be sufficient to bring about immediate change. However, as part of a broader nexus of measures including advocacy, pressure on corporations and public shaming, they can have an impact. Most importantly, sanctions reinforce the symbolic importance of human rights even when they are not strictly adhered to.

The contributions to this blog debate are published simultaneously on the africanlegalstudies.blog and Verfassungsblog.