The Pacific is becoming the most important geostrategic hotspot in the world. The US is threatening to resume nuclear weapons testing and increasing its military presence across Pacific Islands, while Russia, perhaps bluffing, is reenacting nuclear deterrence strategies through its Pacific fleet of nuclear submarines. European powers are struggling to keep up, and have recently deployed naval forces to contain China. Yet, given the Polynesia’s nuclear past, where France conducted decades of nuclear weapon testing and hundreds of thousands of EU citizens still await compensation for radioactive fallout, addressing this legacy and providing adequate redress to affected military and civilian population is mandatory for any French or European attempts to legitimise their presence in the Pacific. As compensation remains limited and opaque, the ECtHR’ case law offers a potential path forward. France should disclose classified data on radiation and amend the evidentiary requirements for linking specific health conditions to radiation exposure. Only with a fairer and more effective compensation system in place can France and Europe restore their ties with Pacific Islanders.

France’s nuclear past and present

France became a nuclear power on the backs of Algerians and Polynesians. Between 1966 and 1996, it conducted 210 nuclear tests, including 193 in the Moruroa and Fangataufa atolls in French Polynesia. These tests exposed approximately 150,000 civilian and military personnel who participated in the nuclear campaigns, 125,000 local Polynesians, and 40,000 Algerians to radioactive fallout. As a French overseas collectivity, French Polynesia is associated to the EU through Annex II TFEU. Polynesians are French nationals and consequently, EU citizens. Therefore, as the situation stands, hundreds of thousands of French EU citizens affected by radioactive fallout have not received adequate redress or compensation. All attempted compensation schemes have fallen short. Conversely, the 1990 US Radiation Exposure Compensation Act quite effectively provided monetary compensation to those who were unwittingly exposed to radiation from nuclear weapon testing. Despite its shortcomings, the US compensation system has been more effective than all of France’s attempts.

The 2010 Morin law marked a first step to address this legacy. Without mentioning State responsibility, it established a compensation framework requiring claimants to prove residence in French Polynesia between 1960 to 1998, and to have developed one of the 23 cancers listed by Council of State decree. Following a 98,7% rejection rate, the EROM law introduced a presumption aimed to benefit military veterans, but it came at the cost of imposing procedural hurdles to potentially affected civilians. Claims can be denied if applicants cannot prove they were exposed to at least 1 millisievert (mSv) of radiation in any year of testing, as determined by the Compensation Committee for Victims of Nuclear Tests (CIVEN). Two elements have emerged as particularly controversial in this already controversial framework. First, claimants that may have been exposed to radiation but have not developed a qualifying cancer are ineligible. Second, even Polynesians diagnosed with a listed cancer may still be denied compensation if they fail to satisfy the 1 mSv exposure threshold imposed by CIVEN.

Claimants face serious adversity proving their cases, as most information connected to nuclear testing remains part of “defense secrets”. It was not until 2013 that 182 documents were finally declassified by the French state, as reported by Phillipe and Statius. Radiation levels are still extracted from the 2006 report on radiation levels by the Commissariat à l’énergie atomique (CEA), and validated by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). However, neither the raw data reviewed by the IAEA nor CIVEN’s compensation database have been made publicly available.

Conversely, the publicly accessible data on compensation speaks volumes. According to CIVEN’s 2023 activity report, only 2,846 compensation claims have been filed, with just 1,026 individuals (607 from mainland France, 417 Polynesians, and 2 Algerians) recognised as victims. In May 2023, the National Institute for Health and Medical Research (Inserm) reported that links between radioactive fallout and radiation-induced-pathologies remain inconclusive, and recommended updated estimates of exposure among the Polynesian population. Furthermore, in their 2021 scientific paper, Philippe, Schoenberger, and Ahmed, estimate that 90% of French Polynesia’s population in 1974 may have received radiation doses greater than 1 mSv/year. The study advocates for a “pure presumption” of exposure for all 125.000 residents during that period.

As a result, a sense of injustice permeates the civil and political society in French Polynesia, eroding public trust in state institutions. Civil society organisations like Muroroa e Taotou, Association 193 and AVEN, have been particularly active in keeping this nuclear legacy in the collective conscience. Their advocacy encouraged the French National Assembly to conduct a Parliamentary Enquiry that culminated in its Final rapport (No 1558, of 10 June 2025), spearheaded by deputies Didier Le Gac and Mereana Reid-Arbelot. The report identifies systemic underestimation of the health risks associated to nuclear fallout, a lack of transparency in dissemination of crucial information, and scientific conservativism in compensation administration.

The European Court of Human Rights as a way forward?

Most elements of this stalemate are eminently political (list of pathologies, the 1 mSv threshold, disclosure of exposure data) and require a political answer. Nevertheless, as nuclear weapon testing intersects both human rights and environmental law, the ECHR and its Court may offer legal avenues out of the deadlock. The Court classifies such testing as a “hazardous industrial activity” attributable to the state (L.C.B v. United Kingdom, and Brincat and Others v. Malta, para 80). Such activities impose a positive obligation to protect life (Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy paras. 384-392). That is, France must address nuclear radiation fallout as any other environmentally harmful activity, and reject the notion of nuclear exposure as a distinct legal or epistemological category.

No need to prove specific health outcome if exposed to life-threatening risks

As regards the cancer list and radiation threshold, the Court does not require proof of any specific health outcomes if individuals were obviously exposed to life-threatening risks (Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, paras.151-155 and 191; Budayeva and Others v. Russia, para. 146). Exposure alone suffices as long as the risk to life was “serious” (Brincat, para. 82), “real and immediate” (Fadeyeva v. Russia; Ledyayeva and Others v. Russia). By “real risk”, the Court requires the existence of a serious, genuine and ascertainable threat to life, with physical (Verein KlimaSeniorinnen v. Switzerland, paras. 472 and 512) or temporal proximity (Cannavacciuolo, paras. 377 and 390). In Cannavacciuolo, applicants were not required to prove a direct link between exposure and illness or death, but the case involved circumstances hardly replicable. Authorities had acknowledged an ongoing environmental pollution phenomenon that was ongoing, omnipresent and unavoidable, that posed an “imminent” risk to applicants. These applicants had resided in municipalities officially identified by the state as still being affected by this hazard (Cannavacciuolo, para. 390). These specific conditions may limit its exact applicability in the French Polynesian context.

Radioactive fallout as a violation of Article 8

As nuclear testing is considered a dangerous activity, even if no violation of article 2 ECHR (right to life) is found. Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) might provide an alternative pathway. This was the case of individuals who had been exposed to asbestos at a workplace run by a public organization without developing any diseases or life-threatening conditions (Brincat, paras. 81, 84-85). In the specific case of France, in 2019 its Supreme Court expanded compensation for asbestos-related cases to include psychological “prejudice of anxiety” as a sufficient health outcome (Cass soc, 11 May 2010, and joined appeals). A similar procedure should be considered for nuclear testing cases.

Nuclear radiation exposition can constitute an interference in one’s private life (Article 8) on account of an environmental hazard (McGinley and Egan v. United Kingdom, paras. 96-97 and 99; Ivan Atanasov v. Bulgaria, para. 75), as long as it meets a minimum level of severity. (Furlepa v. Poland; Calancea and Others v. Republic of Moldova, para. 28; Thibaut v. France, paras. 40-48). To assess the severity to exposure, the Court may take into account official medical certificates and expert reports. For example, servicemen ordered to line up in open air with their backs to the explosion with eyes closed, was considered enough to surpass this threshold (McGinley, para. 99) Similar claims have been made by workers in Fangataufa and Moruroa.

Redress mechanisms must be effective

As regards the current faulty compensation framework, the Court requires States to put in place a legislative and administrative framework to provide effective deterrence against the threats to the right to life. In cases involving life-threatening harm or death, States must also provide an effective judicial mechanism capable of establishing the facts and delivering appropriate redress (Istanbullu and Ayden v. Turkey, para. 32; Erdal Muhammet Arslan and Others v. Türkiye, para. 126). This system must be effective in practice, not just in theory (Istanbullu, para. 34; Arslan, para. 151). This implies that France must take all appropriate steps to amend a compensation framework that imposes undue burdens on its potentially affected civilian claimants.

Access to information is crucial for claimants seeking redress. Claimants not receiving access to their health-related documentation may constitute a violation of Article 6.1 ECHR, which guarantees the right to a proceeding by people affected by environmental damage. Article 6.1 has been recognised in cases involving the obligation under domestic law to provide information on radioactive waste management (Association Burestop 55 and Others v. France, paras. 64-72), and States must guarantee applicants with access to official records necessary to substantiate claims of radiation exposure during nuclear weapon testing (McGinley, paras. 85-90 and 99). However, McGinley was not a successful case for its applicants. It required of them to exhaust all available domestic legal avenues to obtain such documents, up to the highest judiciary instance, before the Court can consider such a claim admissible.

Publicly available information should be contrasted and verified

Regarding concerns over the reliability of publicly available information on radiation levels, States enjoy a considerable margin of appreciation in environmental cases. (Hatton and Others v. United Kingdom, para. 100). Mainly, the Court defers to findings by domestic courts and competent authorities (Ledyayeva, para. 90; Wałkuska v. Poland), and it is not the Court’s role to put them into question, unless it can be proven that decisions by domestic authorities are inconsistent or contradict each other. Only under such circumstances will the Court assess the evidence in its entirety. (Ledyayeva, para. 90; Dzemyuk v. Ukraine, para. 80). The Court has emphasised that information provided by the State must be reliable, accurate, and allow applicants to review its content and quality in adversarial proceedings (Burestop, para 108). This guarantee is particularly critical in the context of nuclear hazards, given their potential long-term and intergenerational impacts should the risk materialise (Burestop, para. 109). For the French Polynesia case, this could potentially imply the necessity to disclose the classified data on radiation on French Polynesia from 1976 to 1998, the raw data of the 2006 CEA report, and current radiation levels at the Moruroa and Fangataufa atolls, reported annually by the Autorité de sûreté nucléaire (ASRN).

Conclusion

The Pacific is going through a rapid and unprecedented wave of militarization. If France and Europe want to re-legitimise their presence in the Pacific, they must address the legacy of decades of nuclear weapon testing in Polynesia. Hundreds of thousands were exposed to radiation, yet compensation remains limited and opaque. The European Convention of Human Rights and its Court provide legal scaffolding to some of the most contentious issues of this political deadlock, such as proving specific health outcomes, the 1 mSv exposure threshold, or accessing data on health and radiation doses. The Court’s jurisprudence offers ample leeway for all concerned political actors to envisage a fairer and more effective compensation system. Maybe then France and Europe can rebuild their ties with Pacific islanders.