A State Without Statehood

One year after New Caledonia was tormented by violent demonstrations, resulting in the deaths of 14 people and causing over 2 billion euros worth of damage, representatives of New Caledonia and the French State signed the Bougival Accord to bring an end to the situation and pave the way for peace. While Emmanuel Macron hails the Accord as “historic”, the overseas minister Manuel Valls celebrates it as “the best response to the fear”. However, a closer look at the agreement reveals that the Accord continues to entrench the French hold on the island and renders New Caledonian independence more elusive than ever.

Settler colonialism and the politics of demographic engineering

The demonstrations were the result of the indigenous population of New Caledonia (the Kanak) struggling for independence. For a detailed account of this process, see the blog post on this topic. For decades, their efforts have been undermined by French settler colonialism. During that time, the French state strategically sent white settlers to New Caledonia to alter the island’s demographic composition and suppress Kanak nationalism. According to the most recent census, conducted in 2019, the Kanak account for only 41% of the population, while the majority comprises French and European settlers (known as the Caldoche), as well as other Polynesians and Asians.

In 2024, a French parliamentary electoral reform bill sparked the most recent Kanak uprising by expanding the provincial election electorate in New Caledonia to include all citizens who had been residents for at least 10 years. Prior to this, the electorate was limited to those who had registered during a consultation in 1998 (see the Nouméa Accord of 1998). The Nouméa Accord had thus frozen the electorate to long-term residents to preserve the political weight of indigenous communities.

This constitutional reform effectively ended any hope of Kanak independence, as it allowed new immigrants, who were most likely to vote with the loyalists, to participate in the elections. In response to the demonstrations, France declared a state of emergency, imposed curfews and bans on firearms and assemblies, and deployed up to 3,500 security personnel, including armed vehicles and special forces. In October 2024, then Prime Minister Michel Barnier scrapped the controversial voting reform to restore peace and confidence. Still, the curfew was only officially lifted on 2 December 2024, marking the end of the unrest. In early 2025, French Interior Minister Manuel Valls facilitated negotiations between pro- and anti-independence groups in Paris and Nouméa that laid the foundation for a new political framework. These negotiations were intended to serve as a basis for future institutional reform.

Creating an empty state

The final agreement aspiring to solve the conflict is the Bougival Accord, which was signed 15 km outside Paris. Officially named the “Agreement Project of the Future of New Caledonia”, the 14-page document sets out to establish and officially recognise a “State of New Caledonia”. The Accord is a masterpiece of ambiguous diplomacy: while it appears to be a significant step towards Kanak independence, a closer examination reveals that it effectively stalls the process by postponing any essential decisions.

In pompous and lofty words, the preamble sets out to constitute a new stage in the decolonisation and emancipation process of New Caledonia. However, the constitutional framework intended to facilitate this goal will disappoint most proponents of Kanak independence. The “State of New Caledonia” that the Kanak people have fought for decades to establish will indeed be formalised, but not as they might have wished. Rather than living in an independent state, the people of New Caledonia will be part of a sui generis state that is firmly inscribed in and integrated into the French Constitution (Chapters XII and XIII). Although the Accord claims that the “State of New Caledonia” may be recognised by the international community (see Chapter I, para. 2), it does not address how this will be achieved. However, according to Art. 4 of the UN Charter, only “states” can be members of the UN. This is generally understood to refer to sovereign and independent states (see Fastenrath/Riznik in Simma/Khan/Nolte/Paulus, The Charter of the United Nations, Art. 4, para. 15). Non-independent territories can only participate with observer status, as with Palestine or the Holy See. The explicit prospect of recognition by the international community appears to be an empty promise.

Furthermore, the insubstantial nature of the “State of New Caledonia” is exemplified by the distribution of competencies. According to Chapter III of the Accord, the competences remain the same as before, meaning that the vast majority of sovereign domains remain under French control. This applies to diplomacy, defence, justice, security, and currency — the areas that typically characterise a sovereign state. The only compromise achieved concerns international relations, where competence has been transferred to New Caledonian institutions.

Although the Congress of New Caledonia will be authorized to demand a further transfer of substantial competences, this will effectively only result in the institution of a special committee to study the feasibility of such a transfer. Additionally, another referendum within New Caledonia would also be required (Chapter II.1.c.). Ultimately, the Bougival Accord leaves the new State of New Caledonia with the sole option, as set out in Chapter II.2, to adopt a “Fundamental Law” (Loi Fondamentale), which would allow New Caledonia to modify the state’s identitarian symbols, such as the name, flag, and anthem, and adopt a charter of values inspired by the current Caledonian ethos.

The provision that might prove fatal for the last hopes of Kanak independence is to be found in Chapter II.4.b., which governs the composition of the electoral body for provincial and Congress elections. According to the Agreement, anyone who was inscribed on the electoral list in 1998 will be allowed to vote for the new Congress. Additionally, anyone born in New Caledonia or who has lived there continuously for at least 15 years will also be permitted to participate. This means that the loyalists achieved one of their main goals in the negotiations and, according to most predictions, will be able to influence future referendums in their favour. In doing so, the Accord not only undermines the protective electoral framework established by the Nouméa Accord but also structurally weakens the Kanak people’s ability to assert their political aspirations through democratic means.

Dual nationality, conditional identity

One of the key commitments set out in the 1998 Nouméa Accord was the establishment of New Caledonian citizenship. The successor agreement goes further, containing a whole section devoted to the creation of a New Caledonian nationality. New Caledonian nationality can only be acquired under certain conditions, such as being admitted to participate in the 2026 Congress elections (see above), having resided in New Caledonia for at least 10 years, or proving descent from or marriage to a New Caledonian national (Chapter II.3). However, a closer look reveals a fundamental restriction: New Caledonian nationality is intended to be dual, simultaneously French (and therefore European) and New Caledonian. This implies that renouncing French nationality necessarily entails the loss of New Caledonian nationality (Chapter II.3. para. 5).

However, nationality is supposed to create a legal bond between an individual and a state, recognised under international law, which typically determines a person’s legal rights, protections, and obligations in relation to the state (see Nottebohm Case (second phase), Judgment of April 6th,19jj: I.C.J. Reports1955, p. 23; Dörr, MPEPIL, Nationality, para 3). By instituting a dual nationality system, New Caledonian nationality appears to be a conditional status rather than a sovereign right. As it can only exist within the framework of French nationality, it effectively denies the New Caledonian people an independent identity and self-governing capacity. The provision also appears to be questionable from the perspective of international law: if the imposition of nationality is prohibited and “the acquisition of a new nationality must contain an element of voluntariness on the part of the individual acquiring it” (Weiss, Nationality and statelessness in international law, p.110), then establishing the New Caledonian nationality solely as a derivative of French nationality is at least problematic. The Bougival Accord thus reinforces a colonial dynamic in which identity remains legally subordinate to the very power from which independence is ostensibly being negotiated.

Conclusion

The fate of the “State of New Caledonia” seems unclear at the moment, but the prospects for Kanak independence after the Bougival Accord appear to be rather dim. France’s motivation for such an ambiguous agreement is clear: New Caledonia contains an incredible 30% of the world’s nickel reserves, which are essential for producing batteries and stainless steel. Chapter IV.2 devotes an entire page to provisions that secure French and European control over these resources.

While it is certainly a success to have achieved the signatures of the conflicting parties under one document, and New Caledonia does gain independence in certain areas, ultimately, the island will remain firmly French, regardless of any symbolism. If one doubts the insubstantiality of the concept of a “sui generis” state, one need only look at French Polynesia, which was also labelled a “Pays d’outre-mer” (overseas country) in a loi organique from 2004. However, the Conseil Constitutionnel intervened quickly, stating that, despite this terminology, the denomination had absolutely no legal effect (Decision No. 2004-490 DC, para. 13). It is unlikely it would change its judgement if it were concerned with the “State of New Caledonia”. The Bougival Accord may have calmed the streets and the situation for now, but it didn’t resolve the core conflict: an indigenous people seeking self-determination, and a former colonial power unwilling to let go.