Prize and Premiership
Since the beginning of November, Italy has been discussing a constitutional reform that aims to radically change the Italian governmental system. The bill provides that the Prime Minister (more correctly: the President of the Council of Ministers) is elected by universal suffrage in a popular vote concurrent with the Chamber of Deputies and Senate elections. This move is often referred to in journalism as ‘Premiership’ (Premierato). n this post, I would like to focus less on the characteristics of the alleged ‘Premiership’ and more on the attempt to incorporate detailed electoral rules into the constitution. First, a brief history of the ‘majority prize’ will help the reader to better understand the context in which this reform was born. This will be followed by a critique of the proposal to enshrine the ‘majority prize’ in the constitution. I argue that, as currently drafted, the reform bill risks leading to an unconstitutional constitutional amendment.
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Between Recalibration and Distortion
In its current form, the project to change the form of government that the Italian government headed by Ms Giorgia Meloni is preparing to present to the Senate seems difficult to accept. The project claims to address the issue of unstable and short-term cabinets in Italy (65 in 75 years, one every 12 months from 1948 through 1994 when a new electoral law was applied; still one every 21 months thereafter). Unfortunately, it is both poorly drafted and contains contradictions that make it not only impracticable but of dubious functionality with respect to the very objectives it proposes to achieve. However, as it has been decades since the problem the draft says it wants to tackle has been acknowledged, I shall assume its proponents' good intentions and suugest how the text could be improved. Below I briefly describe the project, trace its distant and recent origins, indicate what it is lacking and how it should be changed.
Continue reading >>The Political Process in Search of a Judge
It must be acknowledged: in Italy, a judgment such as that delivered by the German Federal Constitutional Court on 24 January 2023 on party financing is currently constitutional science fiction. The Italian constitutional judges have never theorised, unlike their German colleagues, the need for closer scrutiny in certain matters where a ‘conflict of interest’ of the legislature can be discerned. This also partly reflects a different understanding of their own role within the constitutional system.
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No Institutional Upheaval in Sight in Italy
Will the new right-wing government in Italy under Giorgia Meloni attack the constitutional institutions? The program of the coalition and the numbers in Parliament both make that seem rather unlikely.
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Coping Strategies of the Hungarian Constitutional Court since 2010
The very first step of Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party after its 2010 electoral victory towards an ‘illiberal’ constitutional regime was to substantially limit the once very broad review powers of the Constitutional Court. The Fidesz government also started to pack the formerly activist Court with loyalist. By 2013 was appointed by Fidesz. Before 2013, the Court used some cautious strategies to keep a certain autonomy in the midst of threats to lose its independent status altogether by becoming part of the Supreme Court.
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All Needs to Stay As It Is so All Can Change
The terms of office of Italian President Sergio Mattarella and German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier will end within few weeks from one another. Yet the two countries could not experience the two deadlines more differently. While the German President's re-election in the first round is certain, in Italy a sort of collective psychodrama has been going on for months.
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