27 September 2022
Coping Strategies of the Hungarian Constitutional Court since 2010
The very first step of Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party after its 2010 electoral victory towards an ‘illiberal’ constitutional regime was to substantially limit the once very broad review powers of the Constitutional Court. The Fidesz government also started to pack the formerly activist Court with loyalist. By 2013 was appointed by Fidesz. Before 2013, the Court used some cautious strategies to keep a certain autonomy in the midst of threats to lose its independent status altogether by becoming part of the Supreme Court. Continue reading >>
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07 April 2022
The Blame for Defeat and the Morality of Politics
The increased support of Fidesz by the majority of voters, who casted votes on 3 April despite Orbán’s immoral stance towards Putin’s war, and also these voters’ little appreciation of freedom and almost none for limiting power, raises the question whether, besides the autocrat, the opposition, and the elite, we cannot blame also the ‘people’ for the opposition’s defeat and Fidesz’s victory. Continue reading >>13 December 2021
Restoring Constitutionalism in Hungary
Even if the opposition will win the 2022 election in Hungary, it is very unlikely that the new governing parties will reach the two-third majority which according to the current rules is necessary to enact a brand new constitution or even to amend Fidesz’s ‘illiberal’ constitution. Yet, amending Hungary's Fundamental Law by a simple majority would be an unacceptable but also unnecessary break of legality. But it should also be avoided that a new democratic government would have to govern in the long run within the framework of the present ‘illiberal’ Fundamental Law. Continue reading >>
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02 July 2021
So that the Name Hungarian Regain its Dignity
We believe that the replacement of the Fundamental Law is necessary, with a rule of law constitution that restores freedom. The new document should be one created by a democratic constituent power according to newly enacted rules, making every effort to avoid civil war and its usually accompanying violence. In its process of drafting the role of the 1989 round table can be a model, even if we cannot count on the acceptance of its new constitutional draft by 2/3 of the parliament elected in 2022. Continue reading >>
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20 November 2020
So It Goes – Part II
This week, the Hungarian and Polish governments vetoed the critical elements of the European Multi-Annual Financial Framework and Recovery Fund that required the unanimous consent of European Union Member States. Prime Minister Orbán had been threatening this veto ever since the European Commission proposed to link the distribution of these funds to comply with the rule of law. The Brussels veto this week coincided with a domestic legal blitz in Budapest as a major constitutional amendment, and a flurry of new laws and decrees appeared all at once. The two legal events are related. Continue reading >>
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19 November 2020
So It Goes – Part I
The Hungarian government is now so routinely using unconstitutional emergency powers to circumvent constitutional constraints that one must conclude that the government’s main aim is to govern outside the very constitution that it wrote for itself a mere decade ago. At this point, it seems irrelevant whether this limitless power is achieved with or without the declaration of a constitutionally authorized state of emergency. Government unconstrained by the constitution in Hungary has become the norm and not the exception. Continue reading >>
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30 May 2020
From Emergency to Disaster
This week, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s government put before the Hungarian Parliament two draft laws that, if passed, would end the state of emergency and create a new legal framework for handing the pandemic from here on out. In doing so, the government was responding to those who criticized the unlimited power that the government had been given in the law creating a pandemic emergency, the Enabling Act of 30 March 2020. That law allowed the government to override any law by decree, a power that was unlimited in both scope and time and that violated Fidesz’ own “illiberal” constitution the Fundamental Law.The new laws are no better, and may even be worse. One of the draft laws is less than one page long accompanied by two pages of justification. It purports to repeal the initial Enabling Act (about which, more below). The other one is called the law on “transitional provisions” and at first it seems only to provide lots of technical answers to questions that arise about how to reset deadlines for various legal processes that were delayed when the economy stopped. The new laws are no better, and may even be worse. Continue reading >>
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30 April 2020
Orbán is Still the Sole Judge of his Own Law
Our 22 April post on the Verfassungblog about Viktor Orbán’s state of emergency generated a thoughtful reply from Dr. Dániel Karsai, a well-respected Hungarian lawyer. We appreciate the chance to respond to his criticisms, alleging that we made some factual errors about the operation of Hungarian law. Continue reading >>
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22 April 2020
Don’t Be Fooled by Autocrats!
On 9 April, Vera Jourová, Vice President of the European Commission for values and transparency with lead responsibility for rule of law, gave an interview to Euronews on democracy in the pandemic. A journalist asked whether she believes that Hungary still qualifies as a democracy after the Enabling Act creating an indefinite state of emergency was enacted by the Hungarian Parliament on 30 March. Her answer was not reassuring. Continue reading >>
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25 November 2019
The Tyranny of Values or the Tyranny of One-Party States?
In his contribution ‘Fundamentals on Defending European Values,’ Armin von Bogdandy counsels caution. His arguments are wise in normal times. But we no longer live in normal times. The current governments of at least two EU Member States, Hungary and Poland, are engaged in normative freelancing with the explicit aim of making future democratic rotation impossible. The rogue governments we see today are undermining the values of the European Union when the EU is more popular in these Member States than their own governments are. Continue reading >>
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