Martijn van den Brink
Little CJEU case law has been as fiercely criticised as that relating to the right to be free from religious discrimination. However, the CJEU recently found a sympathiser in Ronan McCrea. He argues that the approach is one of “justifiable caution”. Despite my disagreements with him, I believe that we must take McCrea’s position seriously to be able to develop a more fine-grained view of when caution is warranted. At the same time, I still firmly believe that the case law on religious clothing reveals deeply troubling attitudes toward Muslim women that have no place under anti-discrimination law.
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Hans Michael Heinig, Frank Schorkopf
“Doomsday” did not occur. The ghastly fascination with this legal conflict, shared by some observers in the media and in legal scholarship, has not been given new fuel. With its long-awaited order in the Egenberger case, the German Federal Constitutional Court has delivered a prudent and balanced decision. It has neither musealized ecclesiastical labour law and abandoned its established case law, nor initiated a trial of strength with the Court of Justice of the European Union by denying the primacy of Union law.
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Mattias Wendel, Sarah Geiger
The Egenberger decision is not only about church labour law, but touches on fundamental issues of national and European constitutional law. By integrating the requirements of EU law while maintaining domestic specificities, the decision provides a valuable example of how to manage different layers of fundamental rights. Nevertheless, the Egenberger decision carries an element of surprise. The FCC performed a Solange test, elaborating on the question of whether the relevant European standard falls short of the minimum standard required under German law and therefore justifies an exception to the primacy of EU law.
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Lucy Vickers
The latest decision in Egenberger illustrates both the importance of the EU framework for protecting against discrimination on the grounds of religion, and at the same time its fragility. Since the CJEU decision, two German courts have taken turns at assessing the proportionality of the Church’s refusal to employ Ms Egenberger, with different results. The fact that two courts could consider the same facts and reach opposite conclusions without either seeming to have misapplied the law shows how flexible the law can be.
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Matthias Mahlmann
Up to now, religious communities in Germany could require religious affiliation for almost all kinds of employment. Following the CJEU’s intervention, the FCC in November 2025 changed this decades-long practice and thus accorded greater constitutional weight to equality and non-discrimination vis-à-vis religious self-determination. Yet it did more than that: it also reinforced the protection of religious freedom itself. Finally, the decision affirmed the supremacy of EU law in times of fundamental challenges to the transnational rule of law. Egenberger thus constitutes a substantial, well-justified, fundamental-rights-friendly, and welcome shift.
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Kristin Henrard
The jurisprudence of the CJEU on Article 17 TFEU and the EU’s duty to respect the status of churches and religions under national law has changed significantly over time. Early case law reflected a narrow interpretation of Article 17 TFEU, emphasizing strong protection of religious freedom. More recent decisions demonstrate a broader reading which goes hand in hand with a wide margin of appreciation. With the latter, the CJEU effectively adopts a low level of scrutiny, thereby stepping back and giving way to the vindications of national sovereignty.
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Paul Blokker
Struggles around sexual and reproductive rights pit more liberally, progressive-oriented or “frontlash” actors against other, including non-liberal, often radical-conservative “backlash” organizations. In the actions of the latter, religion is an explicit and core dimension. This struggle is about a political and religious backlash to a largely secular, progressive cultural and human rights revolution. It confronts opposing sides of (transnational) civil society, who both make moral, “sacred” claims, while profaning the opponent.
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Maria Francesca Cavalcanti
In contemporary Europe, the protection of religious minorities continues to rest predominantly on the constitutional architecture of religious freedom and non-discrimination. Yet this framework often proves insufficient to capture the specific vulnerabilities and identity-based claims of minority communities. Protecting minorities therefore demands recognising the specific forms of vulnerability produced by their social and constitutional position.
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Peter Bußjäger
On 11 December 2025, the Austrian National Council adopted a headscarf ban for students under 14 in the name of protecting children’s freedom of development and fulfillment. A first attempt of banning headscarves in 2019 was overturned by the Constitutional Court. The legislator has to a large extent taken the requirements of the Constitutional Court into account. However, two crucial aspects have been overlooked: the resulting stigmatisation and the underlying patriarchal structures.
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Michael Lysander Fremuth
From September 2026 onwards, girls up to the age of 14 will be prohibited from wearing Islamic headscarves in Austrian public and private schools. The girls’ freedom of religion, as well as the principle of equality and neutrality, pose significant obstacles to the constitutionality of such a selective restriction. However, in view of many reports from teachers and sociologists stating that the autonomy and determination of many girls’ identities in schools are increasingly threatened by societal forces, the Constitutional Court might reassess its jurisprudence and adapt it accordingly.
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Erica Howard
To date, the CJEU has decided 6 cases concerning women who wanted to wear a headscarf at work. All judgments suggest that considerations of neutrality can trump religious freedom. Although the CJEU made some general and abstract comments about the importance of freedom of religion, it did not really address what the bans, in practice, meant for the individual women involved, neither did engage with the possibility that these neutrality rules could constitute sex, race and/or intersectional discrimination. The CJEU thus provide little protection for the rights of headscarf wearing Muslim women.
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Andrea Pin
The Court of Justice’s narrow understanding of religious freedom under EU law is playing with fire. In the name of anti-discrimination and neutrality, it risks undermining religious freedom in ways that are particularly detrimental to Muslim minorities. At the same time, the Court proceeds as if European constitutional systems were roughly homogeneous, disregarding the profound diversity of church–state relations. This double-blind spot makes the CJEU’s approach not only normatively troubling, but structurally ill-suited to the realities it seeks to address.
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Ronan McCrea
Religion in the workplace brings together two areas of law in which the CJEU has taken markedly different approaches. This has left the Court torn between following its assertive approach in relation to discrimination in the workplace and its deferential approach in relation to religion’s role in society. This sets wide but meaningful boundaries on Member State autonomy regarding religion’s place in their societies. While this caution has been heavily criticised, in the context of the rapid and unprecedented religious change in Europe, it is the most prudent and politically sustainable approach for the time being.
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Jakob Gašperin Wischhoff, Till Stadtbäumer
Debates over the role of religion in contemporary European constitutional orders have increasingly shifted from the national to the European level, placing EU law and the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice under sharper scrutiny. In our view, despite imperfections in the CJEU’s case law, the external and differentiated role of the Court and of EU law can challenge claims of self-referential sufficiency. EU law provides a mirror and necessitates a dialogue in which these convictions are tested and, where necessary, redefined.
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