Game, Set, Review

The long-standing tension between private sports arbitration and the EU’s system of fundamental rights came to a head on 1 August 2025, when the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgment in RFC Seraing v. FIFA (C‑600/23). The case addresses whether arbitral awards rendered by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) can be insulated from review by EU national courts when EU law is at stake. The judgment represents a restrained but meaningful intervention by the CJEU into the autonomy of sports arbitration, seeking to balance the authority of CAS with the imperative of protective fundamentals rights under EU law.

Factual background

In 2015, the Belgian football club RFC Seraing entered into third-party ownership (TPO) agreements with the investment fund Doyen Sports, granting the fund economic rights over players in exchange for financial support. These agreements violated FIFA’s ban on TPO arrangements under Article 18ter of its Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players. FIFA sanctioned the club with a fine and a transfer ban, a decision upheld – though slightly modified – by the CAS in 2017. Seraing challenged the CAS award before the Swiss Federal Tribunal, which rejected the appeal. Parallel proceedings in Belgian courts raised questions about the compatibility of FIFA’s rules and the CAS arbitration process with EU law – particularly competition law, free movement, and effective judicial protection under Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR). The Belgian Court of Cassation referred key questions to the CJEU, which prompted Advocate General (AG) Tamara Ćapeta to deliver an opinion in January 2025. She concluded that mandatory arbitration under the FIFA/CAS framework, when seated outside the EU and insulated from full judicial review by EU Member State courts, could infringe fundamental EU rights. She emphasized that such arbitration must not deprive parties of access to effective remedies under EU law, and that national courts should not treat CAS awards as res judicata where they preclude EU law scrutiny. This suggestion by the AG set the stage for a much-anticipated ruling – one that would test the balance between arbitration autonomy and the EU’s commitment to fundamental rights.

Key legal findings

The CJEU’s judgment draws heavily on prior case law – including Mutu & Pechstein v. Switzerland – to underline the relevance of fundamental rights in the context of sports arbitration. Like the European Court on Human Rights in Mutu & Pechstein, the CJEU also clearly distinguishes between voluntary arbitration and arbitration imposed by regulatory bodies. At the core of the Court’s reasoning is the principle that EU rights cannot be contractually waived. Arbitration under FIFA’s framework is not the result of party autonomy, but rather of regulatory compulsion (paras. 80–81). Clubs and players must accept CAS jurisdiction as a condition of participation in organized football, which renders the arbitration clause effectively non-negotiable.

Against this backdrop, the CJEU held that imposed recourse to arbitration may be warranted in principle. This is especially the case considering the legal autonomy enjoyed by international sports associations and their pursuit of legitimate objectives (para. 94). Nevertheless, such legal autonomy cannot justify limiting individuals’ ability to invoke rights conferred on them by EU law (para. 95). In particular, the Court underscored that parties cannot use arbitration to bypass EU public policy, which includes competition law (Articles 101 and 102 TFEU) and fundamental freedoms (Articles 45, 56, and 63 TFEU) (paras. 87–89).

In this light, the CJEU held that EU national courts must be able to review CAS arbitral awards when fundamental EU rights are at stake (especially Article 47 CFR).  While such review may be limited in scope – focusing on compliance with public policy – it must always be possible for individuals to obtain judicial review by a court capable of making a reference to the CJEU (paras. 84–85). National laws thus cannot grant CAS awards finality (res judicata) or automatic evidentiary value without judicial review. National courts must disapply such national rules if they deny effective judicial protection (paras. 104–105).

Additionally, the Court emphasized that national courts must be empowered to grant interim relief to ensure the full effectiveness of future judgments, especially in cases involving indirect challenges to CAS awards (para. 106). This possibility must extend to any court with jurisdiction to assess, for example, the validity of sports association rules or compensation claims (para 107).

Therefore, individuals must have the ability to seek indirect review of a CAS award, even where no direct remedy exists. National courts must be able to determine whether the award complies with EU public policy, with the assistance of the CJEU (through the tool of preliminary ruling) where appropriate (paras 108, 122). In short, while the CJEU did not call into question the legitimacy of CAS, it insisted on a minimum level of judicial supervision to uphold the rule of law within the EU.

Implications for sports and commercial arbitration in the EU

The judgment has immediate and significant implications for sports arbitration. At the outset, it must be noted that the CJEU did not oppose arbitration per se but sets strict limits when arbitration affects rights guaranteed by EU law. Indeed, the CJEU adopted a balanced position regarding the CAS. While following AG Ćapeta’s opinion in several instances, it underscored that the review of CAS awards by national courts can be limited in scope to public policy matters. The Court made clear that the requirement is not for full appellate review, but for meaningful access to a judicial forum capable of safeguarding EU rights.

In addition, the Court did not endorse AG Ćapeta’s stance about the non-applicability of the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards to CAS awards. By contrast, it referred to the New York Convention to confirm that a form of review for compliance with public policy is warranted also under that Convention (para. 117). Therefore, while the CJEU certainly weakened the CAS’s absolute status as the “last arbiter” in international sports disputes – especially concerning interim relief and national court scrutiny – it also acknowledged the positive role CAS may have in resolving sports disputes. The Court explicitly affirmed that arbitral review can remain limited, provided it permits an assessment of compliance with EU public policy. The judgment thus safeguards arbitration’s utility while ensuring it does not become a shield from legal accountability under Union law.

This is confirmed by the prompt release of a statement by the International Council of Arbitration for Sport (ICAS), the supervisory body of the CAS, highlighting that the CJEU “determined that the potential review of CAS awards by state courts in the EU should be limited to EU public policy” and that “in service to the international sports community, CAS will continue to provide timely and expert dispute resolution worldwide”.

Still, the ruling leaves important questions unresolved. Most notably, it stops short of defining a single EU-wide standard for “effective review”, potentially allowing for diverging practices among national courts. While some may adopt a broad interpretation of EU public policy, others may limit review narrowly, risking fragmentation and undermining legal certainty for international sports bodies. In the near term, all eyes will be on the Belgian courts, which must now assess whether TPO agreements like those in Seraing violate EU public policy. Their approach could set a precedent for how clubs and athletes challenge CAS awards across the Union.

This shifting landscape can also prompt strategic adaptations by international sports bodies. Following the ISU judgment, in which the CJEU confirmed that eligibility rules imposed by international sports federations can fall foul of EU competition law when they unduly restrict athletes’ freedom to participate in alternative competitions, federations like UEFA have already begun modifying their rules to include the possibility of arbitration seated in the EU (e.g. Ireland). Such moves are designed to maintain enforceability of CAS awards within the Union and to reassure national courts that fundamental EU rights can be judicially protected. More federations may follow UEFA’s lead, not only to secure legal certainty but also to signal alignment with the constitutional values of the EU legal order.

As for commercial arbitration more broadly, the judgment is unlikely to have disruptive effects. The Court underscored the sui generis nature of sports arbitration, drawing a clear line between mandatory arbitration imposed by regulatory bodies and genuinely voluntary commercial arbitration agreements. In traditional commercial contexts – where parties freely enter into arbitration clauses – no new compliance issues seem to arise. Still, the judgment reinforces that no arbitral award is beyond the reach of public policy review, especially where fundamental rights under Article 47 CFR or Article 19(1) TEU are implicated.

In the longer term, the Seraing judgment will likely act as a regulatory signal to both sports and commercial actors. While EU law does not oppose arbitration, the CJEU insisted that no private order – however global or self-contained – is exempt from meaningful judicial oversight. Arbitration may remain a cornerstone of dispute resolution, but it must now coexist more transparently with EU constitutional guarantees.

A carefully calibrated intervention

The RFC Seraing judgment represents a carefully calibrated intervention in the private governance of international sport. It neither abolishes arbitration nor shields it from public law oversight. Instead, it reinforces a foundational principle of the EU legal order: no private adjudicatory mechanism is exempt from judicial scrutiny where fundamental rights are concerned. By requiring effective review – albeit limited – the Court empowers national courts to act as constitutional gatekeepers. This ensures that even decisions rendered in transnational, private regimes can be tested against the baseline requirements of EU law.

While the judgment is unlikely to trigger an immediate wave of challenges to CAS rulings, it does open the door to greater judicial engagement with the private governance structures of sport. It may prompt sports bodies to revisit their arbitration frameworks, and EU national courts to calibrate the standard of review they apply to awards governed by foreign procedural law but with internal market implications.

One thing is clear: EU fundamental rights cannot be relegated to the sidelines – even when the game is global and the referee is in Lausanne.