When Permanent Turns Temporary
Recent Developments in Swedish Migration Policy
In late September 2025, a Swedish government commission of inquiry presented a proposal that would fundamentally alter the legal position of thousands of people with protection status: a new law revoking permanent residence permits previously granted on asylum-related grounds. The law, intended to enter into force on 1 January 2027, would require affected individuals to obtain Swedish citizenship, qualify for a temporary residence permit, or ultimately leave the country. Although the proposal is only at the beginning of the legislative chain, it has already stirred attention due to its retroactive nature and the potential impact on large groups of individuals. Retroactive revocation effectively turns “permanent” into “until further notice”, destabilising the legal status of non-citizens and reflecting a prioritisation of state control over individual rights.
This contribution provides a brief account of the proposal and situates it within the ongoing paradigm shift in Swedish asylum and migration policy. It highlights concerns regarding legal certainty, predictability, and proportionality.
The proposal in short
The primary aim of the proposal is to ”establish a system under which asylum-related residence permits, including residence permits granted to asylum seekers who are not in need of protection, are temporary and lead to Swedish citizenship, return, or repatriation” (p. 77) but also ”to induce more of the individuals concerned to want to acquire Swedish citizenship” (p. 15).
To achieve this, the proposal would revoke permanent residence permits granted on asylum-related grounds and permits for dependants. It would replace them with temporary residence permits if the individuals meet the requirements in the Aliens Act or the Aliens Ordinance. The question of a temporary permit is to be raised ex officio when the permanent residence permit is revoked. ”Asylum-related residence permits” is to be interpreted broadly, including refugee status, subsidiary protection status, resettlement, humanitarian grounds, certain impediments to enforcement of expulsion decisions, non-nationals who have been granted permanent residence permits in accordance with equivalent older provisions, as well as those having been granted permanent residence permits based on various temporary legislation. The proposal also applies to long-term residents under the EU Long-Term Residents Directive.
The proposal lists three exceptions to the main rule of revocation:
- The person in question has an application or notification of intent to become a Swedish citizen registered with the Swedish Migration Agency on or before 31 December 2026 which has not been finally decided upo
- Exceptional reasons exist against revocation, and for applicants aged 15 or older, no doubt exists that they should retain a permanent permit.
- The Migration Agency has previously made a revocation decision under this particular act, and that decision has gained legal force.
If none of these conditions apply, and the person cannot or does not wish to apply for citizenship, and they are not eligible for a temporary permit, they lose legal grounds to remain in Sweden. Authorities would expect them to leave within a few months of the decision becoming final. Decisions may be appealed to a migration court. All expulsions must comply with Sweden’s public international law obligations as well as applicable EU law. It is estimated in the Inquiry’s report that up to 185,000 people could be affected by the new rules, about 16,800 of whom are children (pp. 168-169).
Background and rationale of the proposal
The proposal comes amid broader reforms in Swedish migration policy. The so-called refugee crisis of 2015/2016 was a watershed moment, triggering a shift from a relatively generous migration policy to a substantially more restrictive one. The primary aim of these policy changes was to make Sweden less attractive as a country of asylum. Measures introduced included granting relatively short temporary residence permits to successful asylum seekers instead of the permanent residence permits previously issued, as well as limiting access to family reunification.
Sweden has since, like the rest of the Nordics, continued along this path. In 2022, Swedish migration policy entered a new phase with the collaboration agreement between the then newly formed conservative-liberal government coalition with the right-wing populist Sweden Democrats. Migration and integration are key areas of collaboration. A core objective of the reforms is to ensure that Swedish asylum law does not exceed EU or international minimum obligations. The government argues that stricter rules are necessary to tackle problems with failed integration, parallel societies, and crime, which it attributes to decades of a generous migration policy. Since 2022, around 40 legislative proposals have been presented in this direction. These concern a vast array of areas and individual topics, including naturalisation, revocation of residence permits, detention, return, deportation, duration of re-entry-bans, ”good character” assessments, incentive structures for voluntary repatriation as well as the EU migration pact. While many of the proposals have attracted substantial criticism from stakeholders, so far the critique appears to have had limited effect on the government’s (and their support party’s) migration project. The Social Democrats, the largest opposition party and the architects of the 2015/2016 policy changes, now advocate a similar migration policy.
On retroactivity, predictability and proportionality
There is some research indicating that encouraging permanent residents to acquire citizenship could support integration, although the causal effects remain debated. The proposal, however, raises several concerns. First, it applies retroactively, effectively revoking longstanding administrative decisions that previously benefited individuals. A decision granting a permanent residence permit is of great significance for people’s life choices and sense of security. Revocation creates insecurity and instability, forcing some to leave a country in which they may have lived for decades or to live under the uncertainty of short-term residence permits with all that that entails. Children may face negative effects, including mental health challenges.
Revocation also challenges fundamental rule of law principles, including predictability, legality, and legal certainty. Legal certainty requires laws to be clear, non-arbitrary and, ideally, non-retroactive so that people can organise their lives accordingly in a long-term perspective.
The government commission of inquiry acknowledges that Swedish administrative law and EU law generally prevent altering favorable decisions to an individual’s disadvantage (p. 47). It, however, also argues that neither law prohibits retroactive legislation in this context (p. 53). Moreover, the commission of inquiry holds that EU principles on legitimate expectations do not apply because the relevant directives (the Qualification Directive, the Long-Term Residents Directive) do not mandate permanent permits. It seems clear that in order to justify the revocation, the proposal reflects a controversially narrow interpretation of key rule of law principles and also takes the stance that what is not prohibited is permissible, an interpretation tailored to accommodate the interests of the state.
A second, related point of concern is the proportionality of the measures suggested. European and Swedish law require that measures be suitable, necessary, and balanced in their benefits and harms. Revocation of a permanent residence permit, even if it can be replaced by citizenship or a temporary residence permit, is a very intrusive measure with potentially considerable negative personal, social and economic consequences for the individual as well as for the collective. It could result in family separation, threatening the right to private and family life. For such a measure to be necessary, and the harm caused proportionate in relation to the gains, the objective and the interests it satisfies must be of considerable importance. The government’s interest in enforcing stricter migration rules may not justify such wide-ranging impacts on up to 185,000 people.
A third concern raised is that, although the proposal is framed as a way of encouraging more people to become Swedish citizens, it will in practice be very difficult for certain groups. This is because the requirements for obtaining citizenship are simultaneously intended to be tightened, including those relating to financial self-sufficiency and language skills. Another example concerns individuals who are unable to meet the requirement of verified identity for citizenship, which is the case for many Afghans and Somalis with permanent residence in Sweden. This raises the question of whether the true aim of the proposal to revoke permanent residence permits is, rather than increasing incentives to acquire citizenship, to destabilise the legal status of refugees and others in need of protection.
Next steps
Reforms in Swedish migration policy have progressed rapidly in the past three years. Sweden’s government seemingly aims to implement as much as possible of the Tidö Agreement agenda before the general elections held in September 2026. The government is thus on a short deadline, which would also apply to those affected by the proposal. Affected individuals would have less than a year to fulfil the conditions of the first exception clause (registration of an application for Swedish citizenship).
The proposal demonstrates how time serves as a tool to govern and control migration. Abolishing the possibility for certain groups to be granted a permanent residence permit, revoking existing permits and imposing long waiting periods for family reunification or eligibility for citizenship are just a few examples of how time can be operationalised to make a country less attractive for migrants, including asylum seekers, and even to encourage individuals already living in Sweden to leave.
This retroactive revocation is a clear example of how state interests in controlling migration is considered to override the interests of individuals. Finally, regardless of whether the revocation law becomes reality, it signals to residents on asylum-related grounds: you are not welcome to stay.



