Caring for Rights
OC-31/25 and the Recognition of Care in Inter-American Human Rights Law
On August 7, 2025, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) issued its Advisory Opinion OC-31/25, responding to a request submitted by Argentina on whether care should be recognized as an autonomous human right, and, if so, what its scope should be within the framework of the American Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention”).
Once again, the IACtHR confirmed its commitment to addressing contemporary and enduring challenges of modern societies. The Court provided a comprehensive interpretation of the right to care as implicitly embedded in the Convention, connected to other conventional rights, and multifaceted in nature. Care thus becomes an essential component of multiple rights protected by the Convention and binding upon the signing States. This implies that soon we might witness the proliferation of norms – and/or litigation – at the domestic level, based on the Advisory Opinion, pushing the States to fulfil the right to respect and guarantee the right to care.
The interpretive approach
In January 2023, the Argentinian Ministry of Women, Gender and Diversity, the National Secretariat for Human Rights of the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade submitted the request as an opportunity to address the foundations of gender inequality and foster more equitable standards. They stated that care work includes tasks aimed at ensuring the daily well-being of people, materially, economically, morally, and emotionally, ranging from the provision of essential goods for life to the support and transmission of knowledge, social values, customs, and habits. Nevertheless, the unequal distribution of these essential tasks, falling upon women in over ¾ of the cases, reinforces socio-economic and gender cleavages while impacting negatively on economic growth and the work market.
The IACtHR followed again its “systematic, evolutionary, and pro persona interpretation of the rights enshrined in the Convention” which is key to understanding the outcome of the Opinion (see particularly sections 108-121). This approach led it to state that
“there is an autonomous right to care, derived from a combined reading of Articles 4, 5, 7, 11, 17, 19, 24, 26, and 1.1 of the American Convention” (section 112).
Such rights include the right to a dignified life (Article 4.1), personal integrity (Article 5.1), personal liberty (Article 7), private and family life (Article 11), health, work, and social security (Article 26), equality and non-discrimination (Article 24), as well as the protection of family (Article 17) and children (Article 19).
However, the Court not only recognizes that the right to care shall be inferred from the aforementioned rights, but also, with reverse reasoning, adds that the protection and effective exercise of such rights postulate the recognition of care itself as a right (see sections 108-111). In this way, it acknowledges that care is an essential component of multiple rights protected by the American Convention and that it plays an instrumental role in the full exercise of those rights (section 112).
Three underlying principles
The second feature of the right to care is its autonomous standing, based on three key principles: shared responsibility, equality, and solidarity.
The first principle is divided into social co-responsibility and family co-responsibility. Social co-responsibility entails care as a task shared between individuals, families, communities, civil society, businesses, and the State. Family co-responsibility covers the gender dimension, which is paramount in this field, and implies that men and women have equal responsibilities for care within the family (section 119).
The second principle is that of equality and non-discrimination, which again requires reducing and eliminating inequality in the performance and reception of care work, particularly between men and women (section 132).
The third is the principle of solidarity, construed on the idea of common humanity and interdependence of all members of society. This way, solidarity reinforces the principles of social co-responsibility and equality, establishing a twofold responsibility: on the one hand, to assist, support, and care for those who are dependent, to some degree; and, on the other hand, to support those who perform these tasks, ensuring that they enjoy the necessary conditions to provide care properly, that their work is recognized, and that they have support to reduce the burdens that these tasks entail (section 120).
A multifaceted right to be enforced by the States
OC-31/25 defines the right to care in section 113 as the right of every person to have the time, space, and resources necessary to provide, receive, or establish conditions that ensure their overall well-being and allow for the free development of their life project, in accordance with their abilities and stage of life.
The dimensions of care show that it is a multifaceted right, including the right to care, to be cared for, and to self-care (sections 115-118). This nature also derives from its abovementioned interdependence and instrumental role vis-à-vis other rights and due to co-responsibility, demanding the participation of various actors.
First, the right to care ensures that every person with any degree of dependency receives qualitatively acceptable, sufficient, and appropriate care to live with dignity, according to their stage of life, degree of dependency, and specific needs (section 116). This care must be provided with full respect for their rights, particularly their privacy, autonomy, and decision-making capacity, without discrimination, and with the participation of the persons receiving care in all decisions affecting them. States therefore have the duty to progressively guarantee effective access to care services, in accordance with the principle of co-responsibility.
Second, the right to care recognizes that every person can provide care, whether paid or unpaid, in decent conditions, without discrimination, and with respect for their rights and their overall well-being (section 117). This dimension obliges States to adopt progressive measures of work-life conciliation, provide adequate means for safe care, and ensure unpaid caregivers access to health care, employment, and social security. From a different perspective, recognizing this right requires preventing and punishing violence, harassment, or discrimination for assuming these tasks, and guaranteeing equal rights with respect to other workers.
Third, the Court analyzes the right to self-care and warns that it only rules on those who provide and receive care (section 115). The right to self-care recognizes that both caregivers and those cared for have the right to seek their own well-being and attend to their physical, mental, emotional, spiritual, and cultural needs. It implies having the time, space, and resources to exercise autonomy and live with dignity. This last dimension imposes on States the duty to adopt progressive measures that allow for self-care actions, especially considering historically discriminated groups, such as female caregivers and the elderly, in accordance with the principles of social and family co-responsibility (section 118).
In line with this approach, the Opinion establishes a series of State obligations (section 122), including: a) to respect and guarantee the right to care, adopting legislative and other measures for its full effectiveness; b) to refrain from acts that violate this right; c) to organize administration and infrastructure to ensure its free and full exercise; d) to adapt domestic regulations, passing or repealing the necessary provisions to guarantee its effectiveness and scope; and finally e) to recognize the right of all persons to care and to be cared for.
Implications and significance of the Opinion
As has happened in the past with other pressing social issues, such as presidential reelection (OC-28/21) or gender identity and non-discrimination of same-sex couples (OC-24/17), OC-31/25 places the right to care at the center of the Inter-American agenda. The interpretive value of the advisory function of the IACtHR does not diminish its legal or political importance; on the contrary, it provides the Court with a wide margin of maneuver when drafting standards for constituents, legislators, judges, and policymakers in all jurisdictions of the Inter-American system.
We consider that incorporating the principles the Court has additionally strengthened the normative character of the right to care, as they provide the legal foundations to guide its interpretation, fill potential regulatory gaps, and establish a common standard for the States parties. Domestic recognition of the right to care in the region, in fact, is still uneven, if not absent (Dossier “The right to care in Latin America and the Caribbean: progress on the regulatory front” by CEPAL), and the establishment by the IACtHR of a new obligation will open up a phase of claims, litigation, and regulation involving constitutional and legal reforms. These principles will therefore be useful for institutional design and public policies, providing yardsticks to assess the international responsibility of States.
The elaboration of the threefold dimension of care provides guidelines for the recognition and implementation of the right at the State level. It distinguishes the right-holder for each dimension, differentiating between the person with some degree of dependency, every subject and (within the right to self-care) both the caregiver and those being cared for. The consequent distinction of State obligations for each dimension clarifies the role of public authority in this respect, preventing policies from focusing only on dependent people and ignoring, for example, caregivers. This can create social pressure to regulate access to care, work-life balance, caregivers’ protection, as well tackle gender discrimination in this realm and systemic inequity vis-à-vis certain groups – especially against women.