22 May 2026
The Missing Dimension
Public discourse on the repair of constitutional democracy tends to focus on its political dimensions. The Fidesz period, however, demonstrated that markets and democratic governance are deeply interconnected. The restoration of constitutional democracy, which will inevitably involve the reorganisation of the economy, should therefore prompt reflection in public law discourse on the ways in which markets ought to be structured in democratic societies. Public law scholars must engage seriously with the role that competition law reform can play in this process. Continue reading >>
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13 May 2026
The Big Lie of Two Thirds Majority
This is the fifth election in a row in which a party has gained a two-thirds majority. A two-thirds majority has long been the magic of Hungarian politics. Namely, it means domestically unlimited power. But the magic of the two-thirds majority is based on an assumption that has turned out to be a lie: that such a special majority guarantees compromise. As a first step towards a truly functioning pluralist democracy, it is time to disenchant the two-thirds majority. Continue reading >>
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09 May 2026
Constitutional Repair!
In this post I shall attempt to map some of the most important points where constitutional repair is necessary as well as the limits of such repair that follow from common European standards. This text is emphatically not a summary of a comprehensive constitutional reform, nor is it a proposal at the level of legislative text. Rather, it outlines fundamental issues which, following discussions and the taking of fundamental political decisions, could lead to a proposal for a correction that needs to be adopted within a short timeframe. Continue reading >>
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01 May 2026
Péter Magyar’s Cincinnatus Moment
The big question for Hungary’s democracy is whether Magyar and Tisza will establish a system that is pluralistic and avoids the risks and temptations of two-thirds majorities. Cincinnatus is the hero of Roman legend who saved his country from peril and, once done, returned to his fields. Magyar could become Hungary’s Cincinnatus if he constructed a pluralistic democracy in which many political currents have their space, in which majorities can rule and make decisions and in which courts and independent institutions ensure the rules of the game. Continue reading >>
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29 April 2026
Ein Mandat zur Selbstbegrenzung
Der Wahlsieg der TISZA in Ungarn ist historisch. Gerade deshalb verlangt er politische Zurückhaltung. Denn auch die von TISZA errungene Zweidrittelmehrheit ist nicht einfach Ausdruck eines schrankenlosen gesellschaftlichen Konsenses, sondern Ergebnis eines Wahlrechts, das bereits in vergangenen Wahlzyklen die jeweils stärkste politische Kraft unverhältnismäßig stark belohnte. Wie es zu diesem Umstand kam, verrät ein Blick in die Geschichte der ungarischen Wahlgesetze seit dem Systemwechsel von 1989/90. Continue reading >>21 April 2026
Verordnete Werte
Der Europäische Gerichtshof hat am 21. April 2026 ein ungarisches Gesetz für unionsrechtswidrig erklärt, das in die Rechte nicht-heterosexueller Menschen eingreift. Erstmals bejaht das Gericht einen eigenständigen Verstoß gegen Art. 2 EUV, eine Norm, die die Werte aufzählt, auf denen die Union ruht. Damit baut das Gericht die Reichweite seiner Wertejudikatur erheblich aus und verschiebt die Statik des europäischen Verfassungsverbunds zulasten der Mitgliedstaaten. Das kann weder dogmatisch noch legitimatorisch überzeugen. Continue reading >>20 April 2026
Two Defeats, One Winner
In the last week, across two continents, two authoritarian governments faced significant blows, not by courts, not by international pressure, not by the slow grind of institutional resistance, but by oppositions that chose, against their fractious instincts, to act unitedly. Together, the two episodes highlight how oppositional party politics play important constitutional and democratic functions, and must find crucial space in the study of comparative constitutional law. Continue reading >>
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09 April 2026
Beating (Authoritarian) Populism with (Democratic) Populism
Viktor Orbán, Hungary’s prime minister since 2010, is set to lose the parliamentary elections on 12 April 2026. According to recent polls, Fidesz’ main rival, centre-right Tisza, seems to be within reach of attaining a two-thirds constitutional majority. While this may provide conditions for re-establishing democratic institutions, it also implies that Tisza would not be constrained by any meaningful democratic controls. Avoiding the double trap of meeting populist expectations and stabilizing institutionally unconstrained powers are two major tasks the new government needs to perform. Continue reading >>
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09 July 2025
A Legal Scalpel Instead of an Axe
Hungary appears to be assuming the role of a Trojan horse in the European Union, advancing the interests of foreign powers. Of particular concern is Hungary’s conduct in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, especially in light of its obstruction of EU sanctions against Russia. Thus far, the EU’s conventional instruments have proven insufficient in curbing Hungary’s veto strategy. For this reason, I propose a path that is both legally feasible and politically realistic: a reinterpretation of Article 7 TEU that would allow for a targeted use of the instrument. Continue reading >>
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21 May 2025
A Threat to the Core
On May 13, 2025, just before midnight, a FIDESZ deputy tabled a new bill before the Hungarian Parliament. The bill seeks to enhance “sovereignty protection measures” by introducing sweeping transparency instruments targeting foreign-funded interference in Hungarian public life. These restrictions purposefully shrink civic space further, roll back protections of fundamental rights and impair the functioning of constitutional democracy in a retrogressive fashion. When adopted, Hungary’s constitutional order will fundamentally regress from the state that existed at the time of its accession to the European Union. Continue reading >>
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