08 October 2025
EU Sanctions and the Mirage of Unanimity
The EU’s sanctions framework is meant to work in two steps: unanimity for decisions defining the Union’s approach to “a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature” under Article 29 TEU, and qualified majority voting for the necessary measures implementing these decisions under Article 215 TFEU. In reality, the two steps are collapsed into one, which magnifies the leverage of a single veto. This post makes the case for resequencing this practice which would realign decision-making with the Treaties’ design, reduce the risk of impasse, and improve speed and flexibility. Continue reading >>
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19 July 2025
Suspension of EU Association Agreements Does Not Require Unanimity
In its meeting on 15 July 2025, the Council of the EU failed to adopt concrete measures vis-à-vis Israel, limiting itself to an “exchange of views on an inventory of possible follow-up measures”. This hesitant approach stands in contrast to clear indications that Israel is in breach of its human rights obligations under Article 2 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement (AA), and to the EU’s own obligation to work towards consolidating human rights and the principles of public international law pursuant to Article 21 TEU. While a suspension of the entire AA was never really foreseeable, an important question relates to the voting threshold within the Council that would apply to such a decision relating to the AA. Continue reading >>04 December 2020