There can be little doubt that the US and Israeli attacks on Iran, which commenced on 28 February, contravene the prohibition on the use of force under jus ad bellum – a position shared, with few exceptions, by the vast majority of international law scholars and commentators – while Iran’s retaliation goes beyond what would be permissible under the right to self-defence.

There are also ample grounds for concern that all parties to the conflict have been disregarding fundamental rules of international humanitarian law (IHL) – for example, the prohibitions against directing attacks against civilians or civilian objects instead of military objectives, carrying out indiscriminate attacks or attacks that violate the principle of proportionality, and acts of violence aimed at spreading terror among the civilian population, in addition to the obligations to take constant care to spare the civilian population in military operations and to take precautions in attack. The mass killing, injury, arrest, and torture of thousands of protesters at the hands of the Iranian State since January is also unlawful – and abhorrent – and may amount to crimes against humanity.

While the German government has – rightfully – criticised Iran’s violent crackdown on the demonstrations and was quick to denounce its retaliatory attacks across the region, no such condemnation has been forthcoming with respect to the US and Israel. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz proclaimed that now was not the time “to lecture our partners and allies,” many of whose objectives Germany shares “despite all doubts.” Photographs soon emerged of Merz in Washington, smiling next to President Trump in the Oval Office. Asked by a TV reporter whether he raised questions of international law during his visit, Merz said that the legal basis of the intervention was discussed, acknowledging “a certain dilemma.”

As a self-proclaimed guardian of the rules-based order, the German government’s recent approach to international law is both hypocritical and an abdication of historical responsibility. It is also strategically short-sighted and dangerous.

A broader trajectory of ambivalence

Over the last decades, Germany has positioned itself as a strong supporter of international law and institutions – partly motivated, no doubt, by the desire to atone for the horrors of the Second World War and the Holocaust. Some 30 years ago, the German government championed the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC), as it does now setting up a special tribunal on aggression against Ukraine. German courts have carried out numerous prosecutions for international crimes on the basis of universal jurisdiction – including the first for systematic State torture in Syria – and Germany intervened alongside other European States and Canada in the proceedings instituted by The Gambia against Myanmar concerning alleged violations of the Genocide Convention vis-à-vis the Rohingya.

In September 2023, in an emblematic piece for the German Foreign Office marking 50 years of German UN membership, then-Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock reiterated Germany’s “commitment to the principles of the UN Charter, to a world that relies on the strength of the law and not the tyranny of the strong,” pledging support for “the universal conviction that all states and all human beings have equal rights, regardless of how powerful they are, and that no state must ever again be allowed to attack a neighbour.”

Still, Merz’ seeming departure from such laudable stances is not without precedent, at least when it comes to certain geopolitical contexts. As international criticism was growing over the conduct of Israeli forces during the hostilities in Gaza, the German government maintained for a long time that Israel was complying with IHL, criticising the case brought by South Africa against Israel before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) over alleged violations of the Genocide Convention in Gaza. In September 2024, Germany abstained from a General Assembly resolution adopted in the wake of the ICJ’s landmark Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024, which found that “Israel’s continued presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is unlawful” and must be brought to an end “as rapidly as possible” (paras 285(3) and (4)). Moreover, the German government has long opposed measures at EU level such as a (partial) suspension of the EU-Israel Association Agreement. Following the ICC’s issuance of arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant, both the Scholz and Merz administrations expressed reluctance to extradite Netanyahu should he set foot on German soil. Germany denied Nicaragua’s allegations that it was violating its obligations under the Genocide Convention and to ensure respect for IHL by continuing to provide various forms of assistance to Israel (the ICJ declined to order provisional measures). Only in the summer of 2025, amidst the looming Gaza City offensive and catastrophic humanitarian conditions, did the government adopt an openly critical stance and halt the sale of certain weapons to Israel, which swiftly recommenced with the entry into force of the fragile ceasefire.

Furthermore, during the June 2025 hostilities between Israel and Iran, Merz infamously surmised in a TV interview that Israel was doing the “dirty work” in the region for the benefit of “all of us.” In January 2026, following the capture of then-Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro by US forces, Merz expressed the view that it would be “complex” to assess the events on the basis of international law.

Hypocritical, short-sighted, and dangerous

Germany not denouncing violations of core principles of international law, especially the prohibition on the use of force enshrined in the UN Charter, carries the weight of history. The very term “United Nations” dates back to the year 1942, when over two dozen countries resolved to join forces to defeat Nazi Germany and its allies. The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, which charged major Nazi leaders with “crimes against peace,” famously referred to aggressive war as “the supreme international crime” that “contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.” (Courtroom 600 at Nuremberg became the birthplace of international criminal law, and one Benjamin Ferencz, the chief prosecutor at the Einsatzgruppen trial, dedicated his life’s work to outlawing aggression, including in the Rome Statute of the ICC.)

The German government’s recent positioning is thus an abdication of historical responsibility and hypocritical given its present role as self-proclaimed guardian of the rules-based order; it is also strategically short-sighted and dangerous. Disagreement with one’s allies – especially close ones – is necessary and must be possible, as it has been in the past. In 2003, the German government opposed the US-led invasion of Iraq, for example, and during Trump’s first term in office, German diplomats meted out strong criticism of US foreign policy positions: “[W]e believe in the force of international law and we do not believe in the force of the strongest. For us, international law is not an à la carte menu.” Double standards in the application and enforcement of international law arguably contributed to the predicament we find ourselves in and only stand to embolden the myriad other actors bent on doing away with the rules-based order – from Russia’s war in Ukraine to the Chinese Communist Party’s designs on Taiwan.

This is not a time to be starry-eyed about international law; its recent track record is bleak. As Uruguayan writer Eduardo Galeano put it so eloquently, “The twenty-first century, which … arrived heralding peace and justice, is following in its predecessor’s footsteps.” International law does have an enforcement problem; it is often ignored or used as a tool in the hands of powerful States; and one can ask difficult questions about what options are legally available – and effective – to halt large-scale human rights violations, crimes against humanity, or genocide.

Still, the world is surely better off with an imperfect legal system lest foreign relations devolve into a global “free-for-all” in which “the strong do” – even more – “what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” Dag Hammarskjöld once famously observed: “It has been said that the United Nations was not created in order to bring us to heaven, but in order to save us from hell.” We should also be careful not to confuse cause and effect, to obfuscate responsibility. States are still the principal subjects of the international legal order. More than any other actor, they can and do shape not just political but also legal reality. Only they can, in the final instance, muster the much-invoked “political will” to ensure the enforcement of international law – and they have various obligations in this regard, especially a country as powerful as Germany vis-à-vis its allies. Furthermore, only they could decide to limit their own sovereignty and hand over such power to a supranational institution. If the German government were genuinely discontent with the state of international law, it could try to strengthen the existing system of collective security, for example by redoubling efforts to achieve a long overdue reform of the UN Security Council, rather than contributing to its hastening demise. This is all the more important in light of Trump’s attempts to set up a rival mechanism via the so-called “Board of Peace” under his chairmanship.

A personal betrayal

It is easy to stand up for international law in times of peace and prosperity, or against one’s geopolitical foes. The real test comes when it is inconvenient, in moments of peril such as this. I am a German citizen working in the field of international law, motivated in large measure by my country’s horrific past. The German government’s seeming abandonment of fundamental norms feels deeply personal and, quite frankly, like betrayal. Other countries – such as Spain and Chile – have charted a more principled course. This is also not a time to surrender to expediency and ill-advised realpolitik – the risks are far too great.

The views expressed in this article reflect the personal opinion of the author and not necessarily those of the organisations with which they are or have been affiliated.

The author wishes to thank Dr. Eitan Diamond for his support and very helpful comments on a draft of this article.