The European Union and Climate Security

Climate security—i.e. the effects of climate change on peace and security—is a topic that is globally warming. NATO held the first meeting of its climate change envoys in June 2024 to discuss the impacts of climate change on security, while the US and the European Union (hereafter EU or Union) started an ‘informal dialogue’ on the relation between climate change and security. The debates at the UN Security Council have shown the tensions around considering climate change as a security matter, and how much of a geopolitical stake it is.

As these examples demonstrate, many international organizations and States regard climate change as a threat or a ‘threat multiplier’ (see also here). They recognize a wide diversity of adverse consequences of climate change, from the aggravation of conflicts to political and social unrest in the broader sense. Yet, just a few months ago, the European Environmental Agency published its first climate risk assessment. It concluded that Europe is insufficiently prepared for several of the identified risks—including those concerning food and energy security, financial stability, and health.

The EU has been one of the organizations supporting this climate security discourse for quite some time, and has pushed for multilateral cooperation both on security aspects and on the fight against climate change itself. Despite its strengths, the EU’s action on climate security faces significant difficulties. The main one is the lack of concrete measures on the matter. Ultimately, the core of EU action remains focused on environmental law and policy, independently of security issues. This is, of course, an important preventive dimension and it is to be encouraged. At least, the European Union is acting on the sources of the security problem, and is not just focusing on the consequences. In the end, however, the Union’s concrete action has been quite minimal. The current political constellations, the structure of the international order itself, and the realities of military institutions also undermine the plea for climate security.

As I will demonstrate in this post, the EU has increasingly positioned itself at the international level as an actor with a focus on international peace and security. Further, I will show that, despite important efforts for action, for mitigation, for cooperation, all highly relevant to addressing the climate crisis, the Union’s action remains insufficient to take enough concrete measures. But as both issues—safeguarding the environment and security—have become urgent matters that policy-makers must address swiftly, reconciling security concerns with action against climate change will be key for European security in the twenty-first century, which is at the core of this symposium.

The EU’s commitment to climate security

Over the years, the Union has adopted several policy instruments on climate security, including recent ones (see here, here, or here). As in the Climate Change and Defence Roadmap of 2020, their content pertains to three different categories: 1) operational dimension, including the adaptation of military and humanitarian operations, 2) development of capabilities—in particular research and innovation activities, 3) strengthening the partnerships with international organizations and third countries, which is perhaps the most fundamental aspect of the Union’s action on this matter. Two reports have also been adopted, evaluating the implementation of the Roadmap, the first one by the European Parliament (here), the second one by the European External Action Service (EEAS) (here), which is a key body shaping how the EU’s security and defence policy unfolds.

To give a few concrete examples of the European measures on climate security, one can mention, first, that the European Union includes environmental advisers in its peace operations, deployed under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Secondly, it also aims at providing European mediators with an expertise in environment and climate (see also here). Lastly, the EU wishes to adapt the training of personnel—internally for the EEAS and in Member States for their military institutions.

These policies heavily rely on EU law, in particular the Green Deal. They try to support the idea of a coherent, mutually reinforcing action between the Union’s environmental and climate norms, on the one hand, and the defence sector, on the other. The Union frequently refers to various elements of its environmental policy, and most of all to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions (as in the Roadmap and the Concept for an Integrated Approach on Climate Change and Security, for example). In the Union’s perspective, all of these actions and frameworks contribute to the fight against climate change and its effects, and therefore to climate security.

The Roadmap and the Concept, in particular, also call on the Union to maintain its international action for ambitious global climate treaties. They largely refer to international climate and environmental law, and especially to the Paris Agreement, which the EU has largely supported. The efforts for climate security link to general climate diplomacy.

A focus on international security

The Union’s climate diplomacy is also part of its strategy for ‘global leadership’ in climate security matters: it is seeking to position itself at the international level as an important player; and Brussels likes to recall its active role in environmental issues. Overall, the Union’s discourse on climate is particularly oriented towards international security, and reflects current geostrategic concerns—for example, energy independence. The objective is also to encourage other States to take action on climate security, and more broadly against climate change, since general mitigation measures are, ultimately, a way of preventing conflicts (see here and here).

The Union here shows a serious commitment to multilateralism, which is a core idea of the organization: Article 21(1) of the Treaty on European Union compels the EU to seek multilateral solutions to common issues. This encourages an approach mainly based on cooperation efforts with other international organizations (such as NATO, the African Union, and the UN), third countries and, of course, the Member States. It is a positive stand, as it takes into account the real need for cooperation to tackle climate change. The European Union stresses the key role of the international community to prevent the threat that climate change poses to international security and peace. In what some have called a ‘solidaristic discourse’ on international security, the EU seeks to organize the collective effort at defending the international order and its common values.

The human security approach, that puts individuals and communities at the core of the security notion instead of States, is somewhat more discreet in the current EU’s discourse. Even if the EU keeps endorsing human security when it emphasizes the inequalities caused and aggravated by climate change, and the need for a human-rights based approach, the focus on international peace could to some extent hide other concerns.

Persistent insufficiencies

The overall EU’s approach is indeed not enough to address the crisis. First, the international security discourse does not adequately consider all the interests at stake. Secondly, the Union’s action is highly dependent on current factual and political situations. Lastly, security and the environment have always been inherently conflictual.

Brussels’ strategy for climate security is primarily based on the protection of international peace—rather than on individuals. Even then, it could still be blind to other interests: The notion of ecological security suggests a focus on ecosystems as an object of security, in order to include other living beings or future generations in the scope of security and defence. This approach is largely absent from the European discourse, climate security being primarily a matter of international security.

Additionally, political realities complicate European action on climate and environmental issues. There is currently a backlash against important environmental measures. One can already notice a declining level of ambition at the EU level, for example in the agricultural sector (here or here), partly under the pressure of farmers’ protests in Europe (see here). Migrations are also a relevant example. The topic is mentioned in several documents relating to climate security (see here, here and here), framing migration as a climate security issue. This narrative has also been supported by some Member States (for example France, Germany, and Belgium). However, the new agreement on the migration and asylum pact, which is to eventually reform the common asylum and migration policy of the EU, does not even mention climate. Meanwhile, the rules on asylum are largely inadequate and incomplete to address climate-related issues. Yet, there are no plans to significantly adapt EU law in order to include climate security issues: the current objective for many political actors at national and European level is to limit migration in general, not to deal with climate change.

Lastly, the European Union’s policy on climate security attempts to bring together realities that have hardly been compatible. Its ambition is indeed to involve military institutions in climate action. The adaptation of equipment, infrastructures, military, and humanitarian operations to the changing weather conditions is thus intended as an adaptation measure. Mitigation is also considered, with the aim of reducing the energy consumption and CO₂ emissions of the military. Technically, this would mainly be ensured by developing new technologies.

Environmental historians emphasize the detrimental impact of military activities to the current environmental crisis. Defence actors have shown a lack of interest in the environment and in energy consumption. Military technologies and activities had, and have, a high negative impact on the environment and consume large quantities of energy. Even today, the main objective of the military is to ensure security, not to have ‘greener’ weapons (see here). That is why, like for other environmental matters, the technology approach is encouraged: in the Roadmap, for example, the development of new technologies (less polluting, less emitting, more resistant to extreme climate conditions…) is a major measure for climate security. The core of this approach is to hope that technological progress will preserve the status quo, with a (maybe) lesser impact on the environment of future weapon systems.

Conclusion

One can acknowledge and approve the effort of the European Union to put and maintain climate security on the international agenda, and to adopt measures in reaction to climate threats to security and defence. These include continuing negotiations for ambitious European and international climate law, adapting frameworks and operations, and developing partnerships on climate security issues.

However, the EU’s action does not seem sufficient to overcome serious difficulties that undermine that very action, and future perspectives are thus uncertain. The last elections to the European Parliament in May 2024 have shown a rise of right- and far-right-wing parties, which will probably push environmental and climate issues down the agenda—for example on climate targets, these parties could refuse the objective suggested by the Commission of a -90% of greenhouse gases emissions by 2040. Globally, the tendency could rather be a set back of the climate security approach, even more if other states or organizations also change their positions (for example if the US were to withdraw—again—from international climate agreements).

Far from addressing the discussed flaws of climate security discourses, political actors appear to prefer dealing with traditional and/or national security topics—all the more with the wars in Ukraine and in the Middle-East. The priorities seem to have already shifted, with more focus on migration control, border protection, European security and defence in light of the current wars (see here). Even if these new concerns are not always incompatible with climate action— the recent efforts for the EU on energy security for example aim for a development of renewable energies which will also be beneficial to the climate—the risk is to disconnect security matters from climate change; thus hindering the ability to address the very real consequences climate change could have on peace and security.