The Opposition Erdoğan Can Tolerate

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is remaking Turkey’s opposition – not by defeating it outright, but by replacing it. His latest strategy appears to sideline the secular Republican People’s Party (CHP) and elevate the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM) as a more fragmented, controllable rival. This calculated manoeuvre could fracture the anti-Erdoğan bloc ahead of the 2028 elections while projecting an image of democratic pluralism. But it is not just domestic politics at play. This shift unfolds amid a volatile regional backdrop – from the war in Ukraine and escalating instability in the Middle East to Erdoğan’s confrontational stance toward the West. As Turkey repositions itself globally, its internal power struggle may well be a preview of the country’s next great political transformation.

Amid the crises in the Middle East, Russia’s war against Ukraine, and Trump’s return to the White House, Turkey’s political landscape has undergone significant shifts in the past six months – from renewed overtures toward the Kurds to imprisoned Abdullah Öcalan’s call for the disarmament of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The most recent striking development is the jailing of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, a key figure in the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the main rival that can challenge President Erdoğan. These events point to a deeper strategic realignment in Turkish politics. Erdoğan is preparing to sideline the CHP and replace it with another party.

The CHP’s historical role against the Kurds and Kurdistan

Since its founding by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) in 1923, the CHP has played a central role in shaping Turkey’s nationalist policies, including the systematic denial of Kurdish identity, Kurdistan, and the suppression of Kurdish political aspirations. Successive governments –regardless of ideology – have exploited anti-Kurdish sentiment to rally nationalist support and maintain power. However, the CHP now faces a dilemma: if it hopes to win the 2028 general elections, it must secure Kurdish votes. This signals a potential shift in its traditional stance on Kurds, rendering it less effective as a vehicle for nationalist mobilization. İmamoğlu, in particular, owes his victory in 2019 and 2024 Istanbul mayoral elections in part to Kurdish voters persuaded by the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM), underscoring their growing influence in Turkish politics. Most of the Kurdish residents in Istanbul were forcibly evacuated from over 3,000 Kurdish villages in the eastern and southeastern regions in the 1990s by the Turkish state to dilute the Kurdish presence in those areas.

Pro-Kurdish DEM as a strategic alternative for Erdoğan

Erdoğan and his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) also recognize the strategic importance of the Kurdish vote. However, his closest ally, the ultranationalist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), has lost the ability to effectively stir nationalist fervour. For Erdoğan to extend his rule beyond 2028, he needs a controlled opposition that can fragment the anti- Erdoğan/AKP vote without threatening his grip on power. DEM could serve this role.

Rapprochement and ceasefire: calculated moves

Crucially, DEM endorsed Abdullah Öcalan’s 27 February 2025 call for PKK disarmament – an announcement that followed a handshake between an MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli and DEM’s co-chair Tuncer Bakırhan in October 2024. This suggests Erdoğan is fostering a rapprochement between the state and the pro-Kurdish party, potentially positioning DEM as a state-sanctioned opposition to serve his own strategic interests. This manoeuvre aims to create divisions between CHP and DEM, further weakening the broader opposition against him. In response to its founder, the PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire on March 1, yet Turkey has continued bombing PKK positions in the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq and the areas under the Kurdish Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), in Syria. The Turkish state has yet to take any concrete action regarding these calls.

Erdoğan may see DEM as a more manageable opposition compared to CHP because it lacks the broad national appeal and institutional strength of the CHP. While the pro-Kurdish party has a strong base in the Kurdish regions, its influence remains confined, making it less likely to pose a direct challenge to Erdoğan’s rule. By subtly legitimizing DEM and allowing it to operate within a controlled political space, Erdoğan can present a façade of democratic pluralism while ensuring that the opposition remains fragmented.

DEM’s vulnerabilities and the limits of representation

Unlike CHP, which has a long-established political network, DEM is more vulnerable to state pressure. Formerly known as the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), DEM has navigated Turkey’s hostile political climate by rebranding itself multiple times. It entered the 2023 elections under the Green Left Party (YSP) banner to evade potential closure, then rebranded as the Peoples’ Equality and Democratic Party (HEDEP) and then DEM in October 2023. Despite sustained repression – including mass arrests of candidates and the ongoing removal of elected Kurdish mayors – DEM has maintained a political foothold; it has surpassed the 7% electoral threshold (lowered from 10%, yet still among the highest in the OSCE region), retained a presence in parliament and local governments, and reclaimed control of Kurdish-majority municipalities in 2014, 2019, and 2024.

The party’s past experiences with arrests and party bans have made it more cautious and pragmatic in its dealings with the government. Erdoğan can exploit this by offering limited concessions – such as selective cultural rights or reduced political repression – to maintain the party’s cooperation without allowing it to grow strong enough to mount a real challenge. While DEM has served as a voice for the Kurds, its influence in parliament remains limited and inadequate to achieve meaningful political gains for them due to its relatively small number of seats. Erdoğan and the AKP calculate that a weakened but somewhat supported pro-Kurdish opposition could serve their interests by dividing the opposition vote while appearing to embrace a new, more inclusive political stance.

Kurdish votes as the political pivot

At the same time, the CHP and AKP are both seeking to manipulate Kurdish aspirations for their own electoral gain, evident in their recent outreach to Kurdish voters, including recent Newroz (Kurdish New Year 2725) greetings. This competition underscores the central role the Kurdish electorate will play in shaping Turkey’s political future. DEM might see this option as a chance to gain some incremental gains – such as the restoration of elected mayors, the release of former HDP co-chairs Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ, or modest cultural concessions. However, there is a risk that DEM could become a co-opted or “loyal opposition”, serving as a controlled outlet for Kurdish grievances without posing a real threat to Erdoğan’s grip on power. By engaging in dialogue with DEM while simultaneously suppressing Kurdish elements, Erdoğan attempts to neutralize Kurdish political mobilization in a way that benefits his long-term rule.

Toward 2028 – fragmentation or transformation

Erdoğan’s long-term strategy may involve sidelining the CHP by empowering DEM, through just enough to fracture the opposition without threatening his rule. This represents merely another tactical manoeuvre. The AKP will adjust its course – as seen with his earlier rapprochement with the Gülen movement before their dramatic falling out in 2016 – if it perceives that this strategy no longer serves its interests, particularly if Kurdish voters lose trust in DEM for seeming aligned with Erdoğan’s agenda. Significantly, the recent meeting between the DEM delegation and Erdoğan – marking the first direct engagement in over 13 years since the collapse of the PKK-Turkish government “peace” talks in 2015 – points to a calculated thaw in relations during ongoing economic turmoil, Erdoğan’s declining domestic approval, and growing political polarization. Fearing the HDP’s growing popularity after the 2015 parliamentary elections, Erdoğan terminated the peace process in July 2015 – a move that helped him consolidate power by rallying nationalist support for the AKP ahead of the snap elections later that year. During this period, most of the then-HDP deputies were stripped of their parliamentary immunity through a special legislative process and subsequently imprisoned following the 2016 coup attempt. Many faced politically motivated charges stemming from their use of terms like “Kurds” and “Kurdistan,” their intermediary roles in earlier dialogues with the AKP, and their advocacy for democratic autonomy in the Kurdish region.

While the public optics suggest a gesture of openness, the underlying dynamics reflect Erdoğan’s interest in redefining the contours of acceptable Kurdish political representation. Whether this foreshadows the beginning of a new phase of engagement or amounts to a short-term ploy to manage public perception remains to be seen. However, one thing is certain: the Kurds will play a significant role in shaping Turkey’s political trajectory leading up to 2028. This voting bloc is seen not only as a swing constituency but as a strategic kingmaker; whoever secures this bloc stands a far better chance at national leadership in 2028.