Animals and the EU Charter

The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights does not currently include any explicit reference to animal rights. While Article 37 of the Charter calls for a high level of environmental protection in line with the principle of sustainable development, it has rarely been interpreted to encompass duties toward animals or their welfare. This omission stands in contrast to a growing global trend: an increasing number of constitutions now explicitly enshrine the protection of animals. Incorporating animal rights and welfare into the EU’s foundational values and the Charter would not only align the Union with this global development but also strengthen the long-term credibility of the EU project by shifting its integration model away from an overly anthropocentric focus. Importantly, the EU already recognises animals as sentient beings under Article 13 TFEU, which entails a duty of respect. Moreover, the Union has the legal tools within its current framework to further embed these protections into its legal order. Failing to do so risks entrenching patterns of domination over non-human life and undermining the EU’s normative standing, both within Europe and on the global stage.

An Animal Turn in EU Law?

In EU law, animals are recognized as sentient beings, as stated in Article 13 TFEU. However, while political philosophers continue to debate the scope of animal rights and their role in contemporary society, EU law often frames animal welfare in the context of environmental protection, rather than treating animals as right holders.This environmentalist position commonly focuses on aspects of bio-diversity and the plurality of species, while neglecting the rights of individual animals or the duties of the EU, its Member States or bystander humans have in regards to them. While Article 13 TFEU has been hailed as groundbreaking for recognising animals as sentient beings and requiring their welfare to be respected, concerns persist about its weak enforcement and the lack of political will to adopt robust animal welfare legislation. Paradoxically, Article 13 TFEU does not exempt animal sentience from deference to Member States’ cultural traditions and religious rites, even though the EU is meant to give full regard to animal welfare.

As for the Charter, while it currently does not explicitly recognise animal rights as mentioned above, it already plays an important role in protecting animal welfare at a minimum. For example, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) has banned religious slaughter without stunning by referring to the Charter as a living instrument (Case-336/19). Specifically, the CJEU stated that:

“Like the ECHR, the Charter is a living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions and of the ideas prevailing in democratic States…Animal welfare, as a value to which contemporary democratic societies have attached increasing importance for a number of years, may, in the light of changes in society, be taken into account to a greater extent…”

Moreover, although the EU Charter remains structurally anthropocentric – reflecting a human-centred paradigm of dominance over nature (see also De Vido) – it is nonetheless imperative for the EU to assume a leading role in advancing animal welfare. This includes interpreting the Charter’s obligations as encompassing responsibilities toward animals, even under non-ideal legal conditions in which animals continue to be largely instrumentalised.

On Dignity and Liberty

How could an EU turn succeed in legal practice? One promising approach is to recognise animals as subjects of dignity. In his recent book on human dignity, Colin Bird has suggested an understanding of dignity as a living concept. He argues that while animals cannot possess human dignity, they do have a right to dignified relations with nature. Similarly, Visa Kurki suggests that the notion of dignity is significant for animals because it expresses a duty of respect toward them. It is helpful to refer to dignity as an overall concept rather than the more narrow definition of human dignity (for a critique of dignity here). In the Charter, dignity anchors a core set of rights (Articles 1-5), including the right to life, prohibition of torture and the ban of forced labour and trafficking. Furthermore, dignity is an explicit EU value under Article 2 TEU and in the Charter’s preamble.

Charter rights such as protections against trafficking, slavery and the assurance of a dignified existence are arguably rights that many people would agree should apply to animals and are highly relevant to their welfare. Extending the concept of dignity with regard to the right to life, on the other hand, faces an immediate practical hurdle: animals’ right to life is rarely protected in practice. Pet owners may have animals euthanised for financial reasons when the vet bill is too expensive, while livestock are routinely killed for consumption.

Another approach centres on the value of liberty. The Charter guarantees the right to liberty and security (Article 6). While the right to security is relatively straightforward to extend to animals – for example, ensuring that horses have secure paddocks and safe stables, or that pets are protected from poisonous foods – the right to liberty is more complex because it is unclear what “liberty” precisely implies for animals. For example, Alistair Cochrane has suggested  that unlike human slaves, animals do not necessarily have an interest in complete freedom if they are treated well and with respect, but this difference may well vary between species. For example, some animals – such as dogs, cats, and horses – have long been favored for their affinity with humans and cooperative dispositions, traits that humans have selectively reinforced through deliberate breeding interventions.

Reciprocity and rights

A further complication of incorporating animals into a human rights regime arises from a debate in animal law theory about reciprocity. Traditionally, rights are grounded in reciprocal social relations. Animals cannot participate in society as humans do – they do not deliberate, vote, or belong to the political community in the same sense. Yet they still require representation, as they are frequent victims of human exploitation and remain highly vulnerable to human domination. EU instruments such as the Habitats Directive, EU biodiversity laws, the EU Green Deal with emphasis on improving the welfare of animals, and its sustainability framework are all relevant with regards to this vulnerability (see Wolthuis and De Vido in this symposium). Another interesting venue for securing the protection of animals is a turn to the EU constitutional principles of sustainability and solidarity. These principles can and should be interpreted to fully include animals’ welfare and interests.

Sustainability and Solidarity

Beyond the EU’s precautionary principle – which rightly mandates a risk-sensitive approach to the treatment of animals, aimed at minimising their suffering in light of enduring ethical and epistemic uncertainty – other EU constitutional principles also come into play. The principles of sustainability and solidarity provide additional constitutional grounds for strengthening animal protection. These principles offer a broader normative foundation for embedding animal welfare into EU law and policy. More specifically, the EU sustainability framework and the European Green Deal could serve as potentially important measures for animal welfare to flourish. Indeed, one of the criticisms of sustainability is that it has not included non-human animals sufficiently yet.

While the EU has various animal protection laws in place, there is still a lack of constitutional law research exploring how animal rights could be understood as part of the EU’s fundamental values and sustainability goals. In addition, the dimension of solidarity – both among Member States and in relation to the EU – deserves closer examination in the context of animal welfare policy. Although the notion of solidarity appears multiple times in the EU Treaties and the Charter, primarily as part of the Union’s values and in relation to free movement, its conceptual scope is clearly broader than its technical legal uses suggest. As a constitutional value and concept in EU law, solidarity already resonates with the idea of protecting animal welfare and promoting respect for animals as part of a shared European commitment.

An interesting test case in the context of both sustainability and solidarity is that of the equestrian sport (see also Kjaer and here). A series of recent scandals involving animal cruelty – such as the misuse of bits and whipping practices – has raised the pressing question of whether the equestrian sport is undergoing sufficient reform to enhance animal welfare.The equestrian sport has a whole variety of dimensions to it: animal welfare, animal-human relations, and gender equality, being the only sport where men and women compete in the same competitions. But it is also an area where there is a tension between sports autonomy, ethics in sports and animal welfare. Especially the misuse of the bit and bridle has been a hot topic in the equestrian world during the past year – particularly in the dressage, where signs such as a gaping mouth and excessive foaming often indicate discomfort or stress caused by ill-fitting tack. Yet these expressions of equine distress are frequently overlooked by judges, reflecting a troubling gap between animal welfare concerns and prevailing evaluation standards. In a recent emergency meeting on animal welfare, the International Federation of Equestrian sport (FEI) concluded (on 17-18 June 2025) “Prohibited Methods”, for equine welfare reasons. In this report the FEI sports authority states that:

“It is strictly forbidden to use any type of substance/product inside or around the Horse’s mouth and/or tongue that may (i) imitate, induce or cause foaming; and/or (ii) coat or otherwise cover, or partially cover the bit. … Contravening this rule will entail a Yellow Warning Card and Elimination.”

Although it is excellent that the FEI is active, it is highly questionable why these efforts should be left to sports organisations only (similar arguments here). In EU law, fairness in sport is very important, and that must include a high level of animal protection if animals should be allowed to compete at all. Moreover, it appears increasingly incoherent that corporations – or even rivers – can be vested with rights and legal standing, while the same remains uncertain for animals. In such cases, the commonly invoked reciprocity argument – that animals cannot hold rights because they are not members of the political community – seems especially tenuous.

Waiting for the CJEU?

Courts in South America and the USA have already recognized that animals can be “interested persons” or even have Habeas corpus rights. The EU Charter could play a significant role in advancing animal welfare and rights in the EU. Typically, it is the CJEU that initiates such developments, and, as noted above, the Court has already invoked the Charter as a living instrument in cases concerning slaughter methods. It is also worth recalling that the EU was founded as a peace project, which connects sustainability goals, justice, peace, and inclusiveness to our broader aspiration to live in harmony – with each other and with nature.

While this piece has focused mainly on domesticated animals and animals in our vicinity, the gap in rights protection between humans and non-humans is striking. This is not a call to liberate animals from all forms of anthropocentric legislation, but rather a call to recognise their sentience and affirm their right to live in dignity alongside nature – a vision to which the EU Charter could lend important symbolic and normative force. Animals deserve greater recognition and respectful treatment – an aspiration already embedded in EU constitutional principles such as solidarity and sustainability. These principles call for a deeper sense of responsibility toward our fellow creatures, and suggest that the value of solidarity should extend across species boundaries. Explicitly incorporating a duty to respect and promote animal welfare into the EU Charter is therefore both a legal and political imperative. In conclusion, there is a genuine opportunity for an “animal turn” in EU law – one that should evolve in parallel with broader ethical and political debates about how we treat and conceptualise non-human life.