To Uniformity and Beyond

The Hungarian judiciary has already faced controversy over the preliminary reference procedure under Article 267 TFEU: in the question phase, the autonomy of the referring judge to submit a request for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) was challenged (IS). Now, a new tension has emerged. The supreme judicial body in Hungary, entrusted with ensuring the uniformity of national jurisprudence, seeks to intervene not in the formulation of the reference, but rather in the answer phase of the procedure – aiming to shape the referring court’s interpretation and application of the CJEU’s ruling.

These dynamics foreshadow an institutional conflict over how the Hungarian judiciary internalizes and operationalizes the jurisprudence of the CJEU. At stake is not merely a technical matter of judicial interpretation, but rather the fulfillment of the principle of sincere cooperation enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU.

Efforts to unify divergent judicial practices across democracies

Within their own legal systems, many EU Member States have set up mechanisms to ensure that courts interpret and apply law consistently across different regions and levels. Many jurisdictions use precedent systems, Supreme Courts issue binding judgments to unify the interpretation of constitutional law and important statutory rules or use various techniques such as plenary sessions or grand chambers. In several jurisdictions, national judicial councils or institutes provide training to ensure consistent legal reasoning. In many systems, parties or the Prosecutor General can appeal to the Supreme Court to “correct” divergent lower-court interpretations. In theory, these efforts have seemingly little to do with the supremacy of EU law.

The CJEU premilinary reference procedure

In the context of a preliminary ruling procedure, questions concerning interpretation of European Union law are referred to the CJEU during what may be termed the “question” phase. In due course, in the “answer” phase, the CJEU provides a binding interpretation to the referring national court. In principle, national judges of the given case retain full independence both in formulating the reference for a preliminary ruling and in interpreting the CJEU’s response within the domestic proceedings.

The answer phase according to EU jurisprudence and principles

According to the Simmenthal doctrine, where a provision of national law is incompatible with EU law, national courts are not only authorized but obliged to disapply the conflicting national provision. Crucially, such disapplication occurs automatically and does not require the prior annulment of the national measure through a separate legal procedure. The doctrine thus reinforces the role of national courts as decentralized enforcers of EU law, requiring them to give precedence to EU norms and to ensure their uniform application across all Member States. The CJEU has clarified that in the context of a preliminary reference procedure any obstacle to the immediate application of its judgment – such as procedural barriers or binding national precedents – would undermine the effet utile of EU law (see Simmenthal, para. 22).

The applicability of this principle to conflicts between EU law and the case-law of national courts has been reaffirmed in recent CJEU jurisprudence. Specifically regarding domestic judicial precedents, the CJEU recently confirmed this interpretation in the Global Ink Trade Kft. judgement, delivered in response to a preliminary reference from a Hungarian court. In this decision, the CJEU held that national courts must possess the authority to disregard a binding decision of a higher domestic court if that decision is deemed incompatible with EU law, as interpreted by the CJEU. The ruling thus underscores the supremacy of EU law not only over legislative acts but also over conflicting judicial decisions within the Member States.

The application by national courts of rulings delivered under the Article 267 TFEU preliminary reference procedure is a concrete manifestation of the principle of sincere cooperation enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU. Once the CJEU has provided its authoritative interpretation of Union law, the referring court is under a duty to give full effect to that interpretation in resolving the dispute before it. This obligation does not merely flow from the binding character of the preliminary ruling but is anchored in the broader constitutional requirement that Member States ensure the effectiveness and uniformity of EU law. By internalizing and applying the CJEU’s interpretation, the national court functions as a decentralised yet indispensable component of the Union’s judicial architecture. Based on both Simmenthal (para. 22) and Köbler (para. 33) any attempt by a central judicial body to redirect the authority of the CJEU’s preliminary ruling away from the referring judge undermines this judicial architecture. While Köbler (para. 34) concerned the question phase, it applies in the answer phase too. In RS, the CJEU confirmed the obligation of national judges to apply in full the provisions of EU law with direct effect even by disapplying national rules or practices contrary to EU law.

Having clarified the law, let us clarify the facts on the ground.

Hungary’s domestic rules in the interest of uniform interpretation

In 2011, legal reform in Hungary established a four-tier judicial system, with the Kúria (the Supreme Court) at its apex. The main task of the Kúria is to guarantee the uniform application of the law, a duty it fulfils through the uniformity complaint panel (“UCP”). The UCP is composed of the President and Vice President of the Kúria together with 40 senior civil, criminal, and administrative judges, and it issues binding uniformity decisions (“UD”).

In 2020, Hungary implemented a precedent system. Under this system, in addition to UDs, all Kúria decisions issued in individual cases may acquire precedential force as case-law decisions (“CLD”), provided they are published in the Collection of Judicial Decisions (“BHGy”) (UDs and CLDs are hereinafter called “Precedents”).

From 1 January 2026, a new law will further strengthen the UCP’s role in enforcing the uniformity of case law in civil cases.

The procedures of the uniformity complaint panel

The UCP issues binding decisions in two types of procedure. One is the procedure in the interest of uniformity of law (“PIL”) (“jogegységi eljárás”) and the other is the uniformity complaint procedure (“CP”) (“jogegységi panasz eljárás”).

The PIL is triggered when a Kúria chamber wishes to deviate from a Precedent or when top level officials of Kúria or the Prosecutor General request a UD from the UCP (§§ 32-34 of Act CLXI of 2011). The PIL is a sort of a national preliminary reference procedure with the UCP at its apex.

The CP is an extraordinary remedial procedure. A (losing) party to an individual case may contest a non-appealable decision of the Kúria’s chamber if during the procedure a lower court or the Kúria’s chamber itself deviated from a prior Precedent (§ 41/B of Act CLXI of 2011).

As a result of the precedent system, Hungarian judges are required to adhere to the legal interpretations set out in Precedents. The rules on deviation from Precedents differ for the Kúria’s own chambers and for lower level courts. The former must stay their proceedings and request a UD from the UCP if they wish to deviate. They can only deviate from a Precedent if the UCP so decides in a PIL. The case law of the UCP makes clear that chambers of the Kúria may set aside a Precedent only if the UCP allows them to do so. By contrast, lower courts may deviate from Precedents if they explain why they do not follow the interpretation of legal provisions given by Kúria. However, such deviation is grounds for a CP before the UCP.

If a Precedent was to be set aside without the intervention of the UCP (either by the Kúria or by lower courts), the merits of the case and the justification for disapplication could still be (re)examined through the CP by the UCP.

The UCP’s practice to ensure uniformity

The UCP’s practice makes clear that the above-rules apply also if a Precedent is to be set aside because of a judgement of the CJEU. When the CJEU delivers a judgment under Article 267 TFEU, the Kúria’s chamber that made the reference is required to seek the opinion of the UCP before disapplying a Precedent incompatible with EU law. If a lower court sets aside a Precedent because of a CJEU judgment under Article 267 TFEU, its final decision becomes subject to extraordinary recourse.

According to a recent decision of the UCP, if any new requirements arising from a CJEU judgement may lead to setting aside a Precedent, the Kúria’s own chambers are required to request the ruling of the UCP (para. 25).

Following the NW-PQ judgement of the CJEU, new requirements arose that led to the disapplication of prior Precedents. In the answering phase, the refererring judges – instead of directly applying the judgment to their case – asked for a review of prior Precedents. In response, the UCP evaluated the CJEU’s judgement in the national context and issued a new Precedent providing guidance to the adjudicating chambers. In a dissenting opinion, one UCP member argued that the interpretation of the the NW-PQ judgement did not require UCP involvement (paras. 66-102).

Following the CJEU’s judgment in Case C-630/23, the refererring Chamber P.VI of the Kúria – rather than applying the judgment to their case – requested a prior UCP review of a prior Precedent. This was phrased in the UCP’s decision as follows:

“The P.VI. […] chamber […] submitted a motion for a preliminary ruling (Note: this is how a referral the UCP is called) […] in the proceedings pending before it in case no., concerning the interpretation of Judgment C-630/23 of the CJEU.” [emphasis added]

The UCP then interpreted judgment C-630/23 of the CJEU and revised its previous UD based on the CJEU’s judgment in July 2025. Chamber P.VI is yet to decide the pending case based on the UD or the CEU judgment.

Conclusion

In our view, the current procedural arrangement – under which a chamber of the Kúria must secure prior authorization from the UCP before applying a judgment of the CJEU to the case at hand – is problematic and inconsistent with the Simmenthal doctrine.

Based on Simmenthal, the UCP may of course amend a Precedent in light of a CJEU judgement, but such amendment cannot be a precondition for the national court to apply the CJEU’s ruling. Nor is the national court required to suspend their own procedure and wait while the UCP engages in a substantive examination the CJEU’s judgement. The problem is already known to the EU Commission (Rule of law report 2024, and Rule of law report 2025) and must also be evident to the CJEU, given its judgment in Global Ink Kft. and following preliminary references from Hungarian courts in Gyula (April 2025) and Szeged (May 2025), both of which question the UCP’s right to interpret the CJEU judgements for the Hungarian courts.

The competence conferred upon the UCP to determine whether, and in what manner, a CJEU judgment may be applied obstructs the unmediated application of Union law by domestic courts. In effect, the binding force of the CJEU’s response is filtered through the UCP’s determinations. This procedural displacement interferes with the referring court’s obligations under Art 4(3) of the TEU.