Protecting Rights in the Anthropocene
How the Inter‑American Court’s Right to a Healthy Climate Pushes the Boundaries of Human Rights Law
On July 3, 2025, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) issued its long-awaited Advisory Opinion No. 32 (AO-32/25) on the “Climate Emergency and Human Rights” (the official English translation can be found here; for an overview of the decision’s key elements, see here). A broad group of States, communities, Indigenous communities, legal practitioners, civil society movements and academics, many of whom influenced the decision through their written and oral arguments, watched as the IACtHR broke new legal ground in the Anthropocene. With its opinion, the IACtHR became the first human rights monitoring body to recognize that a healthy climate is an autonomous and justiciable human right. This blog post traces the emergence of this new right within the Inter-American Human Rights System (IAHRS) and highlights its most transformative elements for theory and practice.
Building the Right to a Healthy Climate
The emergence of the right to a healthy climate (RtHC) in AO-32/25 has been twenty-years in the making. As early as 2005, Sheila Watt-Cloutier filed a petition on behalf of the Inuit people against the U.S. before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) for human rights violations arising from a lack of adequate greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions. However, the petition was dismissed before the proceedings could even gain momentum. According to the IACHR, “the information provided does not enable us to determine whether the alleged facts would tend to characterize a violation of rights protected by the American Declaration.”
More than a decade later, the IACtHR issued its advisory opinion on the “Environment and Human Rights” (AO-23/17). In that opinion, the IACtHR innovatively fused international environmental law principles with human rights law through an evolutive interpretation of the rights to life and personal integrity under the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR). However, there were methodological inconsistencies, doctrinal ruptures, and division amongst the Court’s members, reflected in two concurring opinions (on the decision, see here, here and here). While climate change formed only a peripheral aspect of the decision, AO-23/17 paved the way for the direct justiciability of the right to a healthy environment (RtHE) derived from Art. 26 ACHR (para. 57). The IACtHR found a violation of the RtHE for the first time 3 years later in Lhaka Honhat Association (Our Land) v. Argentina (paras. 202 ff.).
AO-23/17 also signaled an ecocentric turn in the IACtHR’s jurisprudence, as the RtHE was defined as a “universal value” owed to present and future generations, which protected the components of the environment as legal interests in themselves, “even in the absence of the certainty or evidence of risk to individuals” (paras. 59, 62). Notably, the IACtHR found that this right “protects nature and the environment, not only because of the benefits they provide to humanity or the effects that their degradation may have on other human rights”, but also due to “their importance to the other living organisms with which we share the planet that also merit protection in their own right” (para. 62).
AO-23/17 served as a fundamental stepping stone for further developments in the progressive environmentalization of Inter-American human rights law. This was also referenced in the IACHR’s 2021 resolution titled “Climate Emergency: Scope of Inter-American Human Rights Obligations” that emphasized States’ “obligation to cooperate in good faith in order to prevent pollution of the planet, which entails reducing their emissions to ensure a safe climate that enables the exercise of rights” (para. 11). In 2019, the right to a safe climate had already been recognized by then United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment, David Boyd.
The last relevant development in the emergence of the RtHC in the IAHRS took place in 2023 in La Oroya Population v. Peru, where the IACtHR for the first time specified the substantive elements of the RtHE, which besides air, water, food and ecosystems also included the climate (para. 118). Importantly, the IACtHR defined the rights to clean air and water as sub-rights of the RtHE. Already in 2024, the authors had pointed to the possibility of a right to a safe climate arising from the RtHE in the realm of AO No. 32.1)
In AO-32/25, the IACtHR finally recognized the RtHC as an independent right derived from the RtHE, consolidating a legal base that enables identifying human rights obligations in relation to the climate crisis and demanding their compliance “independently of other duties related to environmental protection” (para. 300). While derivative in character, the right is still construed as an autonomous, stand-alone right, whose denomination resembles and explicitly connects to its “mother right” in the utilization of the adjective “healthy”. Notably, the IACtHR rejected the adjective “safe” and referenced the variability inherent to the climate system, a distinction that possibly relates to what could be reasonably foreseeable and preventable by States.
We will now proceed to highlight some of the distinctive features of the RtHC as developed by the IACtHR.
More than Human Rights
Much like the RtHE, the RtHC is composed of individual and collective dimensions. The former “protects the possibility of each individual being able to live in a climate system free of dangerous anthropogenic interference” (para. 303). The latter protects “collective interest of present and future generations of human beings and other species in preserving a climate system that is suitable for ensuring their well-being and the equilibrium between them vis-à-vis the severe existential threats from the effects of the climate emergency” (para. 302).
According to the IACtHR, climate change “affects and will continue to affect numerous natural components and systems increasingly” that do not only impact human beings, but also “cause profound alterations in the life cycles, processes and forms that Nature comprises,” which demands that we recognize “humanity […] as just one more manifestation of Nature’s interdependent network” (para. 314).
Extending the protective function of the RtHC to nature is based on its life-guaranteeing function that requires safeguarding ecosystems’ integrity (para. 315). Through the clarification that a healthy climate constitutes a legitimate interest of both human and ahuman beings, elements of nature move from mere objects of exploitation and human commodities to subjects with needs, who deserve protection and justice in their own right (see also para. 280).
In AO-32/25, the IACtHR recognized ecosystems as complex and interdependent systems, in which each element assumes an important function for the whole and where disturbances may involve cascading negative effects to the detriment of all species (para. 279). While an anthropocentric coloring still shines through when the IACtHR highlighted how the “rights of nature” recognition guarantees “the availability of crucial resources for present and future generations,” the Court also emphasized that the recognition of ecosystems’ own rights plays an essential role in “the protection of their long-term integrity and functionality […] to prevent existential harm before the latter becomes irreversible” (para. 279). It comes as little surprise that the IACtHR, as a human rights court, connects the recognition of nature’s rights to its function for the realization of human rights, thereby connecting the principles of pro natura and pro persona (paras. 280 f., 315).
Besides the general recognition of nature as a subject of rights, the IACtHR neither explicitly confers specific rights on nature, ecosystems, or their individual elements under the ACHR, nor does it oblige States to standardize nature’s rights in their national legal frameworks. Nonetheless, it underscored that States “have the positive obligation to adopt measures to guarantee the protection, restoration and regeneration of ecosystems ” (para. 283). In addition, the IACtHR observed that “the promotion by States […] of legal concepts and protection mechanisms […] which transcend the traditional anthropocentric approach and recognize Nature and its components – including the climate system – as entities entitled to autonomous legal protection, strengthens the State response to the challenges posed by the climate emergency” (para. 316). The effective protection of interrelated and interdependent interests of human and nonhuman beings under the RtHC requires, therefore, an integrative and systemic legal approach (para. 315).
Whether nature, specific ecosystems, or species could claim a violation of their rights in the realm of the RtHE or the RtHC under the ACHR could be tested in future contentious cases. Regarding the RtHC, such litigation could be based on the statement that the entitlement to its collective dimension “belongs indivisibly and non-exclusively to the groups composed of those who share in this collective interest,” which includes nature itself (paras. 302, 304). As the protection of nature is further considered as a public interest (para. 281), human individuals, groups, or Indigenous communities could claim a violation of both their own RtHC and nature’s rights under the RtHC. This is where public interest litigation and claiming a violation of nature’s rights through legal representation of nature converge.
The Intertemporal Dimension of the RtHC
The IACtHR’s recognition of a distinct RtHC operationalizes intergenerational justice in the Americas. Drawing on the reasoning of the German Constitutional Court in Neubauer, the IACtHR embeds intergenerational human‑rights proportionality into mitigation obligations, so that any omission, regression, or delay must withstand a strict proportionality test (para. 310). In this way, the decision demands that States ensure “an equitable distribution of the burdens arising from climate action and climate impacts,” avoiding “disproportionate burdens on […] future […] generations” which can occur “if climate action is unjustifiably postponed” (para. 310). Read together with obligations of mitigation, which are guided by the principles of non-regression and progressive ambition, States must qualitatively demonstrate how their emission reduction targets will not impose disproportionate burdens upon new generations (para. 310).
Intergenerational equity should also be factored into environmental impact assessments. As the IACtHR puts it, climate change’s impacts are “progressive, intensify over time, and fall more severely on certain age groups,” disproportionately affecting “those who, today, are very young and who must live their whole lives in a climate environment that is increasingly adverse” (para. 312). It makes sense then that States must consider not only short-term impacts of projects and activities, which may harm the climate system and human rights, but also their medium- and long-term, partly irreversible, impacts on future generations (para. 359).
Finally, the recognition of the RtHC may potentially strengthen legal claims rooted in intergenerational equity. Under the ACHR, States (including the legislative, executive, and judiciary) have an ex-officio obligation to ensure their conduct (policies, regulations, and judicial interpretation) is in line with the treaty and its authorised interpretation by the IACtHR (conventionality control). Furthermore, AO-32/25 instructs domestic systems to admit collective, public, or popular actions without requiring proof of individualized harm. Youth movements may thus immediately use AO-32/25 as legal footing to, for example, challenge weak Nationally Determined Contributions or new fossil fuel permits as prima facie violations of the RtHC due to their disproportionate burden on the rights of future generations (paras. 300, 292, 326, 363).
Conclusion
With the recognition of the RtHC, the IACtHR has sparked a watershed in human rights history, the effects of which will likely extend beyond the Americas. This revolution stands in stark contrast to global climate inaction and the stalemated UNFCCC process. That progress has now been initiated in the Global South should come as no surprise, as its individuals, groups, communities, and States are located in spaces that are shaped by a deterritorialized geography of capitalism’s externalities and (neo)colonial experiences and disproportionately affected by the detrimental effects of climate change. Simultaneously, the region has been at the vanguard of environmental human rights jurisprudence.
AO-32/25 can be critically viewed for pushing human rights law beyond its temporal and anthropocentric boundaries. Yet, confronted with a crisis that most severely impacts those whom history has perpetually racialized, gendered, commodified, or otherwise marginalized, a transformation of human rights law aimed at restoring planetary equilibrium is a logical and indispensable step to secure the well-being of present and future generations of all kinds. Together, advocates, legal experts, and communities can now turn this theoretical breakthrough into meaningful progress to ensure a healthy climate for all.