Respect for International Law in Gaza

Since October 2023 – the month of the massive Hamas assault on Israel – a group of eminent Israeli international law scholars¹⁾ has written numerous letters and memos expressing concerns over many aspects of the Gaza war from the perspective of international law, particularly International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Most of these documents have been signed by several of these scholars personally (although the list of signatories varies from letter to letter), while a few were drafted within the framework of the Israeli Law Professors’ Forum for Democracy (ILPFD), which is a much wider group working mostly against the judicial overhaul advanced by the Israeli government in recent years. Some members of the group were also involved in a petition to the Supreme Court (High Court of Justice, HCJ) against recent legislation which bars the entry of persons to Israel who “express” support of international criminal proceedings (see here).

Right after the attack of October 7, 2023, some in this group drafted a letter analysing Hamas’ conduct from the perspective of IHL and International (Criminal) Law, which subsequently was signed by a high number of international lawyers from other countries, including this author (see here). The letters and memos written since have been addressed to the Attorney General of Israel (AG), the Military Advocate General, the Minister of Defence, and other politicians as well as to media representatives and the HCJ; a few have also been released as public statements or were circulated on social media before. So far only one of the letters, namely the last one of 10 July 2025 addressing the proposal to establish a “Humanitarian City” in the South of Gaza, has been “officially” published (see here, and also here). As of today, none of the letters have received a substantive response.

Given the importance of these documents both in doctrinal and historical terms, as well as in highlighting the work of these colleagues, we have asked to publish them and are very pleased to now publish a further 17 in Verfassungsblog (for a chronological table of all 18 documents see here). Thus, in the following these documents are presented in a systematic form under the topics/issues they deal with, pointing out the key issues and arguments treated in each one respectively.²⁾ Readers interested in more detail can access the full text of the respective documents, which are hyperlinked and archived on Verfassungsblog, in English translations provided by the authors (the original language being Hebrew).

These documents not only show the high expertise of their authors but also the unconditional commitment of and engagement with international law, especially IHL. It is fair to say that this commitment has always been shown by the great majority of Israel’s international law scholars, notwithstanding the different views any legal analysis entails. This attitude is especially important in these challenging times where international law is attacked on various fronts and needs our full support as (international) lawyers (see here), but also as citizens. At the same time, any form of boycott of our academic colleagues and friends in Israel would be counterproductive, doing a disservice to the rule of law in Israel and at the international level. Indeed, we publish these documents also to make clear that we – as international lawyers – are all together in the struggle for international law, in Gaza and beyond.

(Northern) Gaza: evacuation and return of residents, humanitarian obligations

The first document of January 2024 (here) provides a legal opinion on the evacuation and possible return of residents of Northern Gaza from an IHL perspective. The analysis concludes that such an evacuation “must be temporary and …. tightly be linked to a lawful justification.” It may be based on military necessity as an overarching principle of IHL but this necessity “must be concrete, specific, and limited in scope; civilians cannot be evacuated or prevented from returning based on general or abstract considerations.” This principle is then analysed in the first section of the letter. It is stressed that this principle needs to be balanced with humanitarian considerations but “does not have absolute or a priori precedence”. Its sole purpose is to weaken the enemy’s military capacity, but it does not allow for “considerations such as revenge or the desire to reestablish settlements in a given area”. Even if military necessity exists, the HCJ held that “the means used to achieve it must comply with the principle of proportionality” (para 36, President Barak). Thus, there is no permission under IHL to evacuate or prevent civilians from return pursuant to military necessity alone.

The second section then looks more closely at the two more specific IHL grounds of a civilian evacuation, i.e., as a precautionary measure against the effects of attacks and for reasons of the security of the population or imperative military reasons. As to the former ground, it is important to stress that an advance warning “does not create a legal obligation for civilians to evacuate” nor does it prevent them from returning. As to the latter ground, the respective Art. 49(2) of the Fourth Geneva Convention (GC IV) must be interpreted narrowly to prevent abuse, i.e. to use an evacuation for an illegitimate purpose (e.g. ethnic cleansing). Also, the hostilities must be continuously assessed in temporal and geographical terms, i.e., it must be evaluated if a return after a certain time to a certain area is possible.

Further, under occupation law, the military commander’s obligation to restore public order and civil life “includes a good-faith, positive obligation to facilitate return as soon as possible”. In this context, the authors stress that effective control suffices to assume a situation of occupation, and this is not excluded by continued fighting and enemy resistance. Where such control, even a partial one, exists – a fact implicitly assumed by the authors at the time of writing with regard to northern Gaza – positive duties of the occupying power arise, including “not to impose a blanket prohibition on return”. Neither can such a prohibition be justified with the fact that “enemy combatants may disguise themselves as civilians”. Otherwise, an originally lawful evacuation may turn into a forcible transfer (which is either a crime against humanity under Art. 7(1)(d) or a war crime under Art. 8(2)(a)(vii), (b)(viii) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court [ICC Statute]). Last but not least, the return to an evacuated area does not constitute, as such, a direct participation in hostilities and thus lethal force must not be employed against returnees.

The letter of 14 January 2024 (here) warns of “an imminent risk of severe famine” in Gaza and recalls Israel’s humanitarian obligations (still) exercising effective control in Northern Gaza, turning the legal situation into one of “belligerent occupation” (notwithstanding ongoing hostilities). It is argued that, on the one hand, “the [negative] duty to permit third-party humanitarian assistance requires additional measures — such as opening more entry points closer to northern Gaza and extending the operating hours of existing entry points” as well as “allowing the entry of humanitarian aid through Israeli ports”. On the other hand, as occupying power Israel has the (positive) duty to “actively ensure the basic needs of the civilian population” and “the operation of hospitals and medical services”.

The legal opinion of 1 April 2024 (here) reinforces the above finding regarding Israel’s effective control “at least in the north of the Gaza Strip”. The authors reach this finding based on the following factors: “The massive ground invasion by IDF [Israel Defence Forces] troops into the area; the elimination of Hamas’s civilian control in the area; the fact that the IDF is preventing any other civilian entity from ruling; the presence of a large number of IDF troops in or around the area, or, alternatively, the presence of that are forces in a position to enter the area rapidly; the encirclement of the area using a road and the creation of a buffer zone; the fact that these factors supplement preexisting elements of control.” Given this effective control the (already mentioned) positive obligations as to humanitarian relief – under the more general obligation of the law of belligerent occupation to ensure public order in the occupied territory – arise, i.e., Israel “must actively ensure the local population has sufficient access to the supplies needed for its survival.” Absent such an effective control only negative duties apply, namely to “refrain from interfering with humanitarian relief provided by third parties, subject to the party’s rights to ensure that the aid is not diverted to benefit the enemy and to stipulate technical arrangements for its transfer.”

The letter of 25 October 2024 (here) expresses concerns as to the possible mass evacuation of all residents of northern Gaza, especially considering official statements pointing to an expulsion and without a clear official commitment to their return after the end of military operations. The authors again recall that such a mass evacuation is only permitted for reasons of “significant military necessity” or for the protection of the respective civilians but such reasons have not been shown; to the contrary, the available statements point to a forced expulsion (subjecting the civilians who refuse to evacuate to starvation and attack) and a prevention of their return. Thus, these actions do not only violate IHL but may also amount to the – already above mentioned – war crime of forcible transfer and deportation.

The ILPFD statement of 19 May 2025 (here) summarizes – after recalling that Hamas’ hostage taking constitutes a war crime – major IHL concerns already expressed previously. As to the evacuation of a civilian population, it repeats that it is only permissible for its protection and for imperative military necessity. The “evacuation and concentration” as a goal of Operation “Gideon’s Chariots”, combined with Prime Minister Netanjahu’s sayings in a cabinet meeting concerning widespread house demolitions and the intent to “encourage” emigration, indicates that these measures “are themselves an unlawful aim”. Nor does an evacuation justify the “flattening” or destruction of the evacuated area since that would make a return of the population impossible. In fact, this conduct may amount to the war crime of extensive destruction of property without military necessity (cf. Art. 8(2)(b)(xiii) and (2)(e)(xii) ICC Statute). Also, any emigration under coercive circumstances as they exist in Gaza cannot be considered voluntarily; an encouragement or plan to that effect is therefore unlawful. In conclusion, it is stressed that the respective IHL obligations also exist in Israeli domestic law and that their violations “may lead to Israel’s isolation and endanger its very existence.” The latter is a remarkable statement given the Israeli government’s position that security can be achieved by military force alone (see e.g here).

The reported objectives to “move and concentrate” the population and “encourage migration” during operation “Gideon’s Chariots” have subsequently been qualified by Benvenisti and Gans as a crime against humanity and war crime in a blog post, relying inter alia on definitions found in an Israeli Law of 1950.³⁾ The government’s stated plan to set up a “’humanitarian city’ on the ruins of Rafah” which constitutes, arguably, a continuation of “Gideon’s Chariots”, has been sharply criticized in the same post (“morally and legally unconscionable”) and by Israeli scholars in a letter of 10 July 2025 (“clear and explicit illegality”) (the original letter is also here). This (legal) critique has prompted about 1700 members of the Israeli academia, including Nobel laureates, university presidents and deans, to call upon the Israeli government not to pursue this plan.

The authors of the letter of 10 July 2025 “feel a professional and moral duty to warn against” several fundamental issues which in part have already been dealt with above but are further elaborated. First, the evacuation of population entailed by such a plan does not comply with the IHL requirements of a lawful evacuation (legitimate purpose, safety and adequate living conditions in the respective area, temporariness and proportionality) but amounts to a forceful transfer and deportation. Second, any emigration “encouraged” in such a coercive environment as Gaza would not be voluntary. As a result, the implementation of this plan would amount to forceful transfer and deportation as a war crime and crime against humanity as well as further crimes against humanity (severe deprivation of liberty, persecution and perhaps even extermination, cf. Art. 7 ICC Statute). In addition, it may be interpreted, considering the humanitarian situation, as the genocidal conduct of imposing “conditions of life calculated to bring about” the “physical destruction in whole or in part” of a protected group; the authors also refer to statements of ministers and Members of Knesset which may be interpreted as expressing the intent to do so (on a possible genocide in Gaza see here and here).⁴⁾ As a consequence, any order or directive to implement this plan would be “manifestly illegal” and thus “must not be followed”; it could not offer a valid defence within the meaning of Art. 33 ICC Statute.

Total blockade of humanitarian aid

In a letter of 4 May 2025 (here) the Israeli scholars take issue with the government’s decision of 2 March 2025 to completely stop the entry of humanitarian aid into Gaza (a decision that was rescinded by Israel in May 2025 only to establish a new controversial system discussed by the authors in a later letter analysed in the last section below). The decision was taken shortly before the HCJ ruled that the authorities are under a duty “to permit and facilitate the transfer of aid necessary for meeting the essential needs of the civilian population in the Strip, with all that this entails” (Gisha v. Government of Israel, HCJ 2280/24, para. 56; for a partial translation see here; for an analysis here and here). While the HCJ rejected the petitioners’ claim, it did not (and could not) take into account the new development as of 2 March 2025. Thus, in the authors’ view, no inference can be drawn from the HCJ’s decision as to the lawfulness of this subsequent development.

At any rate the authors first stress arguendo that even assuming the absence of effective control and thus belligerent occupation (as the HCJ controversially ruled regarding Gaza) the negative obligation – namely to permit and/or facilitate the entry of humanitarian aid by third parties subject to the right to control with a view to avoid abuse and deviation – continues to apply. The halting of aid to avoid a “definitive advantage” to the enemy (Art. 23 GC IV) must comply with the principle of proportionality, i.e., it needs to be examined whether “the harm to the civilian population due to denial of aid is excessive in relation to the expected military advantage from the harm to Hamas.” In the authors’ view, this is undoubtedly the case “[U]nder the current [March 2025] circumstances, with Israel encircling Gaza from all sides, and given the immense distress …”.

This also follows from Art. 70 of the First Additional Protocol (AP I) to the GC which does not contain the exception concerning the enemy’s use of aid in order to avoid “to completely empty the obligation to permit humanitarian aid of its content, merely by pointing to some economic benefit that may accrue to the other side.”⁵⁾ In fact, Art. 70 (1) AP I requires the facilitation of aid if the civilian population “is not adequately provided” with it. In the authors’ view, this is the case (“it is not seriously arguable that the population is adequately provided” [emphasis omitted]).

Further, Art. 54 AP I provides for an absolute prohibition of the use of starvation as a method of warfare. This prohibition is violated if the halting of aid serves the purpose “to generate pressure on the other side by harming its civilians.” While Israel has the right to take measures to prevent the possibility that Hamas exploits the aid to its benefit, “this right does not grant permission to prohibit the entry of aid when there is a fear of famine among the civilian population.” The authors recall the ICC’s arrest warrants and the ICJ’s order of 26 January 2024, and raise the concern that the complete halting of aid will be regarded as the genocidal conduct of creating “conditions of life” for the protected group “calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part” (Art. II (c) Genocide Convention).

The ILPFD statement of 19 May 2025 (here) reaffirms Israel’s obligation “to allow the passage of humanitarian aid to the civilian population”, referring to the ICJ provisional measures and the HCJ’s Gisha judgement. Any exceptions to this obligation “cannot justify a blanket denial and are subject to the requirement of proportionality relative to the severity of civilian harm”.

Analysis of ICJ orders in South Africa v. Israel

The fourth document of 14 February 2024 (here) is a (more extensive) legal opinion analyzing the ICJ’s first provisional measures order of 26 January 2024 in the South Africa v. Israel genocide proceedings. The authors identify three elements of this decision which “may have significant implications” for Israel: (i) the Court’s affirmation of jurisdiction and of a “plausible risk” that Israel violates its obligations under the Genocide Convention; (ii) the six measures imposed by the Court which are binding upon Israel; (iii) the Court’s “ongoing supervision” of Israel’s conduct in Gaza. The authors pursue two goals with their analysis: (i) to assess the (six) provisional measures with a focus on the consequences for Israel and (ii) “to offer comments that may influence how Israel responds to the main proceedings”. The authors’ main concern is the humanitarian crisis extensively addressed by the Court; they also mention the “harm” for Israel’s international standing if it does not react adequately to the decision.

Undertaking an individual analysis of each measure imposed by the Court, the authors conclude that Israel “cannot remain passive” but must “do more” in every area addressed by the Court, i.e., with regard to the protection of civilians, the prevention of violations by its forces on the ground, the prevention of incitement to genocide and the delivery of humanitarian aid. Otherwise, Israel will, apart from the already mentioned reputational damage, face “significant and foreseeable” legal risks. A few findings with regard to the (first five) individual measures deserve to be highlighted:

• As to Israel’s obligation to prevent the commission of genocidal acts within Art. II of the Genocide Convention, it is stressed that a possible failure to do so “may be interpreted as direct state violations” given that Israel acts with its own forces (the IDF). The duty to prevent includes “the need to prevent further deterioration” of the humanitarian situation. It is recalled that the Court links the humanitarian crisis with the risk of genocide.
• As to Israel’s obligation not to commit any genocidal acts, an “enhanced duty” exists to make forces aware of the respective legal obligations and to punish violations. Yet, the authors are concerned that the IDF’s legal advisory system “may be disconnected from field-level decision-making”, i.e., that legal directives from the Military Advocate General’s Office do not reach all operational units. Most importantly, the authors argue that “Israel is responsible for the actions of all its military units and all its soldiers” [emphasis added] notwithstanding the actual intentions of the political and military leadership (even if it “does not intend to destroy the Palestinian people”). Insofar the authors refer to Judge Georg Nolte’s Declaration (para. 13-15), where he warned that, despite not being persuaded that the IDF’s campaign was “as such” carried out with genocidal intent, certain statements by Israeli officials may entail the violations of the rights protected by the Genocide Convention. Further, in the authors’ view, the Court will not see the Gaza operation “as a single event” but examine “a range of incidents”. In this regard, compliance with IHL “will undermine claims of genocidal intent”.⁶⁾
• As to Israel’s obligation to prevent and punish the incitement to genocide, it should first be noted that the Court adopted this measure with 16 votes to one (disposition, para. 86 (3)), including Israeli ad hoc Judge Barak voting with the majority. The authors stress that Israel must show “due diligence” that “it is acting with all means at its disposal to prevent and punish” any genocidal incitement. In this regard, it is insufficient to generally state that incitement allegations are “examined”.
• As to Israel’s obligation to improve basic services and humanitarian assistance, the authors stress the “concrete action” required and the utmost importance of this measure. Yet, the authors see a “legal dilemma” if one adopted the “starting point of analysis” that at the time, the southern part of Gaza was not occupied. If this was the case, Israel was only obligated under IHL (negative obligation, as already discussed above) to permit the entry of aid by third parties while at the same time making sure that the aid does not contain material to be used by the enemy or reach the enemy instead of civilians. In the authors’ view, the Court disregards the difficult nature of the conflict and the – at that time – still widespread control of Hamas of parts of Gaza. At any rate, the authors conclude that while Israel is entitled to make sure that aid does not reach Hamas, it must permit the entry of aid in larger volumes and, on the basis of the ICJ’s orders, ensure its effective distribution.
• As to the obligation to prevent the destruction and ensure the preservation of evidence, the authors stress that “unaddressed suspicions of war crimes will reinforce the genocide allegation.”

In the already above quoted legal opinion of 1 April 2024 the authors refer (para. 10-12) to the ICJ’s second order of 28 March 2024 where the Court orders (para. 51 (2)(a)), unanimously (including ad hoc Judge Barak), Israel to “[T]ake all necessary and effective measures to ensure, without delay … the unhindered provision … of urgently needed basic services and humanitarian assistance …” [emphasis added]. The authors rightly observe that the use of the term “ensure” points to positive / active obligations with regard to humanitarian aid – in contrast to mere negative obligations (as already explained above).

Statements, inter alia, inciting to commit genocide

Following-up on the above mentioned ICJ decision of 26 January 2024, which, inter alia, orders Israel to prevent and punish any incitement to genocide (disposition, para. 86 (3)) the Israeli scholars refer in a letter of 30 April 2024 (here), addressed to the AG and the Chief Prosecutor, and a letter of 24 February 2025 (here), addressed to the AG, to two statements of important Israeli politicians, namely Minister Smotrich and Deputy Knesset speaker Nissim Vaturi. Smotrich allegedly stated that “there is no half-baked work … total annihilation. Wipe out the memory of Amalek …”, Vaturi said the following:

“Who is innocent in Gaza? Civilians went out and slaughtered people in cold blood. We need to separate the children and women and kill the adults in Gaza; we are being too considerate.”

The authors qualify these statements as – apart from incitement to violence or terrorism as an offence under Israeli law and the inducement to a war crime – incitement to genocide (pursuant to Section 3(a)(2) of the 1950 Israeli Genocide Act and Art. 25(3)(e) ICC Statute). Recalling earlier statements by the AG that such statements may constitute criminal offences and that in the case of similar statements by Arab politicians regarding Jews, “the authorities would have responded swiftly and decisively” (letter of 24 February 2025), an immediate and effective investigation is demanded.

Call on Israeli media

The third letter of 24 January 2024 (here) expresses “deep concern” that certain Israeli media allow public figures to call for actions contrary to both IHL and International Criminal Law (ICL). Against this background, four principles are recalled. First, the fact that the great majority of people living in Gaza are civilians and thus are not lawful targets in line with the principle of distinction. An alleged support of Hamas does not remove the protected status from a civilian unless this civilian participates actively in hostilities. Secondly, the starvation of civilians is prohibited and the respective rule (Art. 54(1) AP I) constitutes customary international law. Thus, any blockade of supply of food and water with the alleged purpose to pressure Hamas is contrary to IHL. A “siege”, even if “intended to induce the enemy’s forces to surrender”, is always unlawful if it causes “disproportionate incidental harm to civilians”. Third, as already said in the first two letters, Israel has a duty to allow humanitarian aid given its “effective control over certain areas in northern Gaza”. While the IDF may undertake measures to prevent the deviation of aid by/to Hamas or other illegal groups, the respective control measures must not “prevent the aid from reaching those in need.” Being “fully aware” of the challenges faced by the IDF in their fight against Hamas, the authors stress that “Israel is a state governed by the rule of law” and its leaders have repeatedly declared to act in accordance with international law, including before the ICJ. Thus, Israel must adhere to this standard. Fourth, the media has a special responsibility in a situation of armed conflict, namely to inform objectively and truthfully so that “democratic principles and the rule of law are not trampled under the cover of war.” Given the participation of almost all citizens in the war effort the lawful conduct of the IDF “is a fundamental issue” for Israel’s democratic society.

In a letter of 21 March 2025 (here) the scholars express their “serious legal concerns” regarding a statement by Israel Defense Minister Katz issuing a “final warning” to the civilian population in Gaza and threatening that it will “pay the full price” for Hamas’ actions and face “total destruction”. The authors feel “professionally obligated” to recall four points: (i) such statements violate the IHL principle of distinction and constitute a prohibited intimidation against a civilian population during armed conflict; (ii) evacuation of a civilian population is only permitted (as repeatedly stated, see above) for their own security or urgent military necessity but it “cannot be used as a means of pressure for any political purpose” and is, at any rate, subject to the principle of proportionality; (iii) IHL requires a conflict party (as repeatedly stated, see above) to allow the delivery of humanitarian aid to the civilian population, subject to security inspections; (iv) violating any of these principles exposes senior political and military officials to “significant legal risks” of (criminal) liability.

Abuse and Death of Palestinian Detainees

A document of 17 May 2024 (here) addresses reports of abuses and an “unusual number” of deaths of Palestinian detainees in military detention facilities since October 2023 (see e.g. here and here). The authors stress the “absolute legal prohibition” of such abuses or “engaging in cruelty for its own sake” (notwithstanding similar abuses by Hamas or other irregular groups). They see “serious suspicions of torture, cruel treatment, and … severe physical harm”, acts possibly amounting to crimes against humanity and war crimes as well as to serious offenses under Israeli law. Such possible abuses not only trigger a duty to investigate and (better) monitor detention conditions but also “damage Israel’s core values, the rule of law, the duty to respect human rights, and the international standing of the State of Israel”.

The situation of Palestinian detainees is also the object of the statement of 6 May 2025 (here). Here, the ILPFD recalls the Israeli State’s obligation to allow the visits by representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to security detention facilities. This obligation does not only follow from international law (which is not based on reciprocity, i.e., operates independent of Hamas’ non-compliance) but also from the Israeli Law on Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants of 2002. The Forum “sharply criticizes” the government’s repeated delays of the respective HCJ proceedings by, inter alia, repeatedly requesting the extension of the deadline to submit its response.

(Further) war crimes and duty to investigate

A letter of 22 December 2024 (here) takes up reports of IDF commanders and soldiers according to which a series of acts (“deliberate and widespread harm to civilians [including classifying killed civilians as combatants], excessive use of force, destruction of homes and infrastructure without military necessity, forced displacement or transfer of civilians from the north to the south of the Strip, the deliberate deterioration of humanitarian conditions, and the detention of individuals in inhumane conditions”) have been committed in Gaza. Given that these acts may amount to war crimes and serious crimes under Israeli law, a duty to investigate arises in line with the international standards and the recommendations of the (Israeli) Turkel Commission,⁷⁾ i.e., to investigate independently, effectively, promptly, and transparently. A failure to comply with this duty may give rise to criminal responsibility “for commanders at all levels of the chain of command” and State responsibility, especially with regard to violations of the right to life.

The same duty to investigate arises with regard to an IDF attack on 18 March 2025, object of a letter of 1 April 2025 (here), addressed to the AG and Military Advocate General. Pursuant to reports of the IDF and the Gaza Ministry of Health as well as of credible media sources (inter alia The New York Times, Haaretz, and CNN), the attack took place in the early hours of 18 March 2025 in a residential area with entire families in the respective buildings and temporary shelters. The attack was aimed at (ten) senior Hamas operatives (militants and members of the political wing) and resulted in a total of 436 people killed, including 183 children, 94 women, and 34 adults over 65 years. As to the factual accuracy of this information it is stated that “there are no significant differences between the number of fatalities according to the Gaza Ministry of Health and the numbers according to the IDF, even if there is no consensus regarding the number of Hamas fighters among the fatalities.” At any rate, there is a “reasonable suspicion … that hundreds of people were killed in the attacks, the vast majority of whom were civilians, including many children.”

Against this background, the legal question arises whether this attack constituted the war crime of causing “clearly excessive” civilian harm “in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated” (Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) ICC Statute). The authors assume, to the benefit of the IDF, that all ten Hamas members killed have been legitimate targets (although it is controversial whether political representatives of a non-state actor constitute combatants / persons taking active part in hostilities according to IHL). They doubt, however, (“hard to believe”) that the killing of these Hamas members has really given Israel “a significant military advantage”. More importantly, they have serious concerns regarding the proportionality of the operation given that the collateral damage amounted to 60 civilians killed and about 80 wounded per one killed Hamas member. They refer to the findings of the Strasberg-Cohen Investigative Commission according to which the killing of 13 civilians for one Hamas operative (Salah Shehadeh) “was revealed in retrospect to be disproportionate under the circumstances of the case”. They further refer to the famous judgment in HCJ 769/02 (Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel) of 14 December 2006 where Aharon Barak, then Judge and President of the HCJ, held (para. 46) for the majority that, while the proportionality assessment requires a complex case-by-case balancing, the bombing of a house from the air with “dozen of its residents and passers-by” harmed in order to kill one militant cannot be considered as proportional. Thus, an effective investigation in line with the (above-mentioned) standard set by the Turkel Commission is required, a general reference to “the relevant mechanisms” (as made by an IDF spokesperson) is insufficient.

The letter of 6 April 2025 (here) referred to the widely reported “ambulance incident”, i.e., an IDF attack on several Palestinian rescue vehicles of the Red Crescent killing approximately 15 people (see e.g. here and here). The scholars first point to the “significant discrepancies” between the (first) IDF versions of the event and the actual facts later revealed: the vehicles were clearly marked as rescue vehicles travelling with emergency lights, the soldiers stormed the vehicle (instead of just shooting from a distance), some civilians were killed, according to the autopsy reports, at close range. In addition, the subsequent burial of the bodies and vehicles “raises suspicion of an attempt to conceal evidence”. In legal terms, the alleged post-mortem identification of the victims as Hamas members, even if true, does not make them lawful targets since such a qualification must be undertaken ex ante. Against this background, the scholars call for an effective investigation in line with the Turkel Commission standard (see also here); this standard is not met by a general reference to the “General Staff Fact-Finding Mechanism” (on the results of the IDF investigation see here).

The ILPFD statement of 19 May 2025 (here) also recalls the “extensive harm to civilians from airstrikes” which “raise serious suspicions” of violations of the principle of proportionality.

The letter of 9 June 2025 (here) takes up, “driven by a sense of duty to Israeli society and that the rule of law … also encompasses the conduct of the state during armed conflict”, two major incidents (1 and 3 June 2025) near humanitarian aid distribution points, where several Palestinians have been killed. As is well known, incidents of this kind have become common since the “Gaza Humanitarian Foundation” took over aid distribution (see e.g. here and here). In factual terms, it is stressed that the IDF, while disputing the number of casualties, does not deny having fired in the area and “has not issued any organized response that refutes these claims”.

In legal terms, it is first noted that the IDF, effectively controlling the relevant area, has the obligation to maintain public order, including (negatively) not to harm civilians and (positively) protecting them from third parties. The authors doubt that “the current method of distributing aid … comports with this obligation”. It also contravenes the obligation to permit aid delivery by third parties if the new system is meant “to replace or substantially restrict the international aid system.” The new system also facilitates the concentration of the population in a specific are (where the aid distribution points are located) and thus may amount to a forcible transfer (on that already above).

The killing of civilians approaching the distribution points may constitute a violation of the principle of distinction, for crossing a certain “line” does not justify shooting at these persons as long as they do not actively participate in hostilities. In fact, the management of large crowds in the context of aid distribution is governed by the law enforcement regime which “limits live fire to extreme, life-threatening situations”. Against this background, criminal investigations in line with the Turkel Commission standard are called for; internal IDF inquiries are insufficient in that regard.