Anatomy of a Liberal Fall

Less than two years ago, in late 2023, when the right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) government lost power, a wave of optimism swept through liberal-democratic circles in Poland. The defeat was seen – similarly as in the USA in 2020 – as evidence that illiberal political projects could be reversed through civic engagement and democratic mobilization.

That optimism has since disappeared in both countries. In Poland, just one week ago, Karol Nawrocki – a virtually unknown, PiS-backed candidate with a murky past – surprisingly defeated Rafał Trzaskowski, deputy leader of the centrist Civic Platform, mayor of Warsaw, and former presidential contender in 2020. How could such a random figure triumph over an experienced and popular politician? How is it that between the 2023 parliamentary elections and the first round of the 2025 presidential race, candidates from governing parties lost nearly three million votes? And lastly, does this outcome signal a decisive shift to the right in Polish society?

In this commentary, I argue that Trzaskowski’s defeat was no accident, but the latest chapter in a longer political story – one shaped by public frustration, broken promises, the emptiness of Polish liberalism, and anti-elitist sentiment present in the society.

The original always wins

The so-called “15 October Coalition” – an alliance of the liberal Civic Platform (PO), the Left, and the conservative Third Way – came to power in late 2023 in the atmosphere of democratic awakening and civic mobilization. Yet, despite its progressive commitments, the government soon shifted to the right. Key demands from its electoral base – including abortion reform and legal recognition of civil partnerships – were quietly sidelined. More tellingly, the coalition maintained several PiS-era policies, particularly its hardline stance on migration at the Belarusian border, effectively mirroring the very approach it had vocally condemned. The latter was heavily criticized by Agnieszka Holland, director of Green Border, which was released just before the October 2023 election. She accused the liberal government of manipulating Polish society and embracing a fascist far-right agenda.

Trzaskowski’s campaign mirrored this unexpected trajectory. Though long associated with the PO’s most progressive wing, he sought to appeal to conservative voters – not only those supporting the government but also to disillusioned PiS voters and even parts of the far-right Konfederacja electorate. At one point, he suggested opportunistically that unemployed Ukrainian nationals should be stripped of child benefits. Despite being a LGBT ally in the past, during one of debates he refused to accept a LGBT flag given by Karol Nawrocki and emphasized that he would never support adoption rights for same-sex couples. He also accepted austerity language of Konfederacja and dismissed pressure coming from the left to raise social spendings.

Trzaskowski in a right-winger’s hat felt clumsy and unconvincing. In debates, his awkward body language and forced nervous smiles betrayed the discomfort of defending views he clearly did not believe in. For progressive voters who during 2020 presidential elections appreciated his principled stance on civil liberties, this shift felt like a betrayal. For conservatives, it was unauthentic. Right-wing commentators continued to mock him as “Rainbow Rafał-boy”, stressing his earlier unlimited support for LGBT rights. Others – including moderate conservatives supporting the government – never forgave his symbolic decision to remove crosses from public offices during his mayoralty. If PO’s internal polling concluded that no openly progressive candidate could win in socially conservative Poland, one must at least ask: why not choose someone who would not have to pretend? Especially given that Trzaskowski had a contender in the nomination, a foreign affair minister in Tusk’s government, Radosław Sikorski, coming from the more conservative wing of the party.

In any case, the outcome was predictable and mirrored Kamala Harris’s 2024 campaign mistakes: Trzaskowski failed to win over conservatives while demobilizing much of his progressive base. Some progressives shifted their support to left-wing candidates; others simply abstained. Even more damaging, by echoing far-right rhetoric, Trzaskowski helped normalize it. It is now a well-established fact within political science that given the choice between the right-wing original and its liberal imitation, voters tend to choose the original. This dynamic not only explains Nawrocki’s victory but also the strong support of other far-right figures in the first round like third Sławomir Mentzen (14,81%) and fourth Grzegorz Braun (6,34%).

Busy doing nothing

Before losing power in late 2023, PiS officially warned that the opposition coalition would prove inefficient and chaotic as ideologically incoherent and comprising with too many parties. Back then, many liberal commentators dismissed the claim as mere political spin. I myself argued in a Polish outlet that political plurality is the essence of parliamentary democracy. In that light, the newly formed coalition seemed to offer a chance to restore rational governance – especially in contrast to the often erratic and anti-institutional rule of the preceding populist government.

PiS’s warnings proved prophetic, however. The coalition’s three major partners – as in other countries run by “colorful” coalitions – frequently neutralized one another, ending up doing nothing. Social spending proposals coming from the Left were blocked by the economic conservatives coming from two other coalition partners. Similarly, progressive reforms, particularly on reproductive rights and civil partnerships, were sidelined to avoid triggering populist backlash. Meanwhile, PO concentrated on rule of law restoration and holding PiS politicians accountable, with Minister of Justice Adam Bodnar being a main actor in this regard – these goals were largely unattainable without a cooperative president.

Yet in the official narrative, responsibility for inaction was placed solely on President Duda and his veto power, even though he did not have too many opportunities to make use of it. Most of the bills were never drafted. At the same time, Duda’s presidency was increasingly dismissed as a mere formality, a temporary obstacle that would soon be overcome. Government officials spoke not of whether, but when they would regain the loyal president.

Over the months, the coalition began to resemble the cautious, technocratic liberalism of the pre-2015 era – the very model many blamed for creating the conditions that enabled populism in the first place. Contrary to the government’s official narrative, which blamed inaction on President Duda’s veto power, the public increasingly perceived the failure to pass key reforms as stemming from a lack of internal cohesion within the coalition. By early 2025, public satisfaction had dropped to levels last seen under PiS just before it lost power. The junior partners in the coalition suffered most, weakening the government further. In the months preceding the presidential election, polls indicated that if parliamentary elections were held, PiS and Konfederacja could together form a majority.

With friends like these, who needs enemies?

Despite these early signs that Trzaskowski’s win was far from settled, liberal media and pollsters uncritically reinforced the belief in his inevitable victory. During the whole campaign, liberal commentators mocked Kaczyński’s choice of Nawrocki as a desperate gamble, proof that the PiS leader had lost his once-famous political instinct and feel for public sentiment.

Panic only set in after the first round, when far-right candidates collectively secured over 50% of the vote. Liberal commentators responded sharply, expressing not only moral disdain toward Nawrocki’s voters but also overt class contempt toward right-winger voters, implying their alleged fascist and antisemitic tendencies. Additionally, they scapegoated one of the left candidates for being overly critical of Trzaskowski and by abstaining from officially supporting Trzaskowski betraying broader interests of the democratic camp.

In the weeks leading up to the election, as well as between its rounds, liberal media also intensified their coverage of Nawrocki, accusing him of serious misconduct – including defrauding an elderly man of his apartment, maintaining ties to the criminal underworld, and participating in football hooligan brawls. Additional reports highlighted his alleged hooligan tattoos and use of nicotine products during political debates. Strikingly, Nawrocki offered little in the way of rebuttal, denying only the apartment-related accusation. Instead, he and other PiS-politicians started to present them as evidence of Nawrocki’s toughness, masculinity and life experience – qualities they claimed were indispensable in a time of geopolitical uncertainty, in contrast to the polished, cosmopolitan representative of elites, Trzaskowski.

The more liberals tried to discredit Nawrocki, the more populist mills start to spin and Nawrocki’s appeal grew. Also it had not been obvious for a long time, in retrospect, it seems increasingly plausible that Kaczyński chose him precisely because he could serve as Trzaskowski’s antithesis. Where Trzaskowski embodied elite cosmopolitanism – multilingual, well-educated, rooted in EU institutions – Nawrocki was marketed as “one of us”: a symbol that even a former street hooligan could redeem himself, earn formal credentials, and rise to the presidency.

Liberal politicians, inadvertently, continued to fuel the anti-government and anti-elitist sentiment already heightened by the Trzaskowski–Nawrocki showdown. Donald Tusk, a prime minister, despite his lack of popularity in the electorate, was particularly active during the last days of the campaign. One PO’s MP asked on live television whether Trzaskowski would commit to one of the key demands raised by third-place candidate in the first round, spontaneously replied: “What harm is there in making such a promise?” – a remark widely interpreted as a cynical admission that the promise would not be honoured. Just days before the runoff, another PO parliamentarian – the daughter of a millionaire – posed in a nursing home with a sack of donated potatoes. The photo-op, eagerly circulated by right-wing media, came to symbolize the desperation of a detached liberal elites, clumsily instrumentalizing sparse acts of charity to appear socially sensitive.

As Nawrocki spoke in rather economically conservative language and distanced himself from PiS’s welfare agenda, one commentator, Jacek K. Sokołowski, observed on X: “This election was not about class interest – yet it was about class recognition”. Voters empowered under PiS were no longer content with material gains alone; they now demanded symbolic validation of their social ascent. In other words, right-wing voters acknowledged Nawrocki’s flaws – even his wrongdoings – but insisted that anyone was better than a representative of the elite, who seemed destined to succeed by default. The viral hashtag #ByleNieTrzaskowski (“anyone but Trzaskowski”) captured this sentiment. For many, Nawrocki embodied a demand for dignity and inclusion: We may have a troubled past, we may have made mistakes – but now we, too, have the right to represent and to serve our country.

A recurring failure of liberalism

Does Nawrocki’s victory mark a fundamental shift to the right in Polish society over the past two years? Elections are performative events – and this one will undoubtedly strengthen far-right forces and likely contribute to further political radicalization, perhaps even enabling a right-wing coalition to secure a constitutional supermajority by 2027. However, we should be careful not to confuse the result with the cause.

Polish voters – like voters elsewhere – primarily seek effective governance and a sense of belonging. When the traditional political forces fail to deliver, they look elsewhere. Their turn to a less-than-ideal candidate, albeit one associated with the arguably effective PiS camp, does not necessarily signal an ideological embrace of right-wing worldview. Rather, it reflects disillusionment with a liberalism which, void of any positive values, increasingly seems an instrumentalized ideology to legitimize the rule of allegedly enlightened elites over the despised people.

Responsibility lies, above all, with the Polish liberal elites – and in particular, with their central figure of the past two decades: Prime Minister Donald Tusk. A social democrat by declaration but an indistinct centrist in practice, Tusk’s drive to remain in power seems increasingly detached from any coherent, value-driven political vision. In a democracy, power must be won and deserved, not simply taken for granted. Therefore, Trzaskowski’s defeat was not merely the result of campaign mistakes; it reflected a deeper, recurring failure of the liberal camp to demonstrate that democracy, pluralism, and liberalism can meaningfully deliver – materially, through substantial reforms, and symbolically, by offering a unifying narrative that fosters belonging and gives meaning in an increasingly anxious and fragmented world.