23 June 2023
Can the Hungarian Council Presidency be Postponed – Legally?
By now, it is commonly agreed that Hungary is no longer a democracy. I will offer in this blogpost some legal underpinnings to the argument that occupying the Council presidency must rotate only among those states that are in compliance with Article 2 TEU values including the rule of law, those that are fully fledged representative democracies in line with Article 10 TEU, that have been in line with Article 49 TEU at the time of accession and never regressed. Continue reading >>
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07 June 2023
An Inconvenient Constraint
On 1 July 2024, Hungary is set to take over the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. The European Parliament and the Meijers Committee issued reports questioning whether Hungary should be blocked from doing that. These proposals raise questions of political feasibility, however, especially as one may doubt if a Hungarian Council Presidency can do much practical damage to the EU. In addition, they also raise questions of legal feasibility. A logical prerequisite for preventing Hungary from holding the Presidency as long as it breaches the rule of law is that doing so is consistent with the EU’s own rule of law. I doubt it is. Continue reading >>03 November 2021
A(nother) lost opportunity?
The October meeting of the European Council (EUCO) was its first occasion to react to the declaration by the Polish “Constitutional Tribunal” that several provisions of the Treaty on European Union are incompatible with Poland’s Constitution and consequently inapplicable to the country. The express denunciation of fundamental provisions of EU primary law by one of its members (with the support of another), while insisting on his country remaining part of the Union, is a situation the EUCO could hardly overlook. And yet, not a word about the unfolding constitutional crisis was included in the EUCO Conclusions. Various elements may explain the restraint. However, the complete muteness from the EU crisis-manager-in-chief is more questionable and may carry a disquieting message. Continue reading >>
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14 October 2021
A Closing of Ranks
On 11 and 12 October the Court of Justice of the European Union sat in Full Court composition (a rarity) to hear Hungary’s and Poland’s challenge of the legality of the rule of law conditionality regulation. Its ruling will follow (hopefully shortly) the Advocate-General’s Opinion announced for 2 December 2021. It will most likely reconfirm that the Union legal order is based on clear and binding rule of law norms, and that these must, of legal necessity, apply across all EU policy fields, including the EU budget. It will be a judgment of great significance about the very nature and purpose of the EU. Continue reading >>04 December 2020
Sue and Let Sue
On member states taking member states to court, and other topical rule of law affairs Continue reading >>
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23 January 2020
EU Rule of Law Dialogues: Risks – in Context
On January 16, 2020 the European Parliament passed a resolution about the state of the Article 7(1) TEU hearings with Hungary and Poland, noting with concern that “the reports and statements by the Commission and international bodies, such as the UN, OSCE and the Council of Europe, indicate that the situation in both Poland and Hungary has deteriorated since the triggering of Article 7(1) of the TEU”. The resolution is a plea for a structured and more meaningful process in which each EU institution would exercise its existing powers in a meaningful and cooperative manner. The resolution emphasizes that the Article 7(1) TEU preventive process is one of risk assessment and one that may have actual – including budgetary – consequences. Continue reading >>
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13 January 2020
1460 Days Later: Rule of Law in Poland R.I.P. (Part I)
On 13 January 2016, exactly four years ago today, the Commission activated its rule of law framework for the very first time with respect to Poland. This (two-part) post will highlight the main developments, primarily from the point of view of EU law, which took place in 2019. Continue reading >>31 December 2019
The Supranational Rule of Law: Thinking the Future
Writing at the end of 2019 it must be clear that art. 7 TEU is not a viable political option at all. However, the Treaties do contain legal mechanisms to enforce the rule of law against the member states. Art. 7 is not, and must not, be the center of the rule of law world in the EU. Poland’s refusal to obey the Court’s judgments and its readiness to do everything possible to circumvent it strike at the very heart of the EU rule of law. The challenge is to use what is legally available rather than keep finding excuses for not using the mechanisms already in place. Continue reading >>
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08 December 2019
The European Parliament Sidelined
When the Council adopted the first set of procedural rules governing Article 7(1) TEU hearings in July 2019, it unilaterally decided to make the Commission the proxy for the Parliament. This post will show how the Council’s differential treatment of the Commission and the Parliament as activating bodies under Article 7(1) is not compatible with EU primary law and goes against in particular the principle of institutional balance. Continue reading >>
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13 November 2019
From “Nuclear Option” to Damp Squib?
To date, three Article 7(1) TEU hearings have been held in respect of Poland (26 June, 18 September and 11 December 2018) and one in respect of Hungary (16 September 2019). The trouble starts with having to obtain the related documents via repeated freedom of information requests. Analysing those documents, however, reveals further significant shortcomings of the procedure. Continue reading >>
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