06 July 2026
European Society without European Private Law?
Integration Through Law was and remains, in various forms, the major driver of European integration. Constitutional Pluralism arose out of constitutionalisation, counterbalancing the move to neoliberalism in the new millennium. In Commission v Hungary, the Court recognised European society “in which pluralism prevails” as a legal concept. The Court radiates judicial authority at a time when Europe is again in crisis, politically through populism, economically through competitiveness and sustainability, and technologically through dependence on US companies. Continue reading >>
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06 July 2026
Private International Law and European Society
Can one speak of a European society without speaking about private relations? Recent scholarship on European society has largely approached the concept through the lens of public law. Yet societies are constituted at least as much by the horizontal relations between individuals and groups as by public institutions. This blogpost turns to EU private international law (PIL) and will argue that EU PIL brings into view the importance of coordination frameworks for organising a mode of integration based not on unification, but on interdependence. Continue reading >>
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03 July 2026
A European Society of Constitutional Interpreters
On 21 April 2026, the full court wrote history, finding for the first time a separate infringement of Article 2 TEU. This landmark decision Commission v Hungary is the outcome of a long, public, and controversial process. The activation of Article 2 TEU is much less an act of self‑empowerment than a collective interpretation of the Court, Commission, Member States, civil society, and legal scholarship. Borrowing from Peter Häberle, we can see a European society of constitutional interpreters at work. The contribution tells their story. Continue reading >>03 July 2026
European Society in the Digital Sphere
The judgment in Commission v Hungary facilitates European society in a negative, boundary-setting sense: it identifies what cannot be accommodated within the European framework of shared values. EU digital regulation, by contrast, facilitates European society in a positive, practice-structuring sense: it translates its values into regulatory duties, procedures, and institutional practices. In my intervention, I show how digital regulation can facilitate the circulation of the values underpinning European society and identify the obstacles to building shared European values in the digital sphere. Continue reading >>
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02 July 2026
Lines and Limits of Collective Singularism in European Public Law
The EU needs to position itself amid rough geopolitical currents and withstand inner contestations. A concept such as European society, which aims to foster a better sense of belonging, deserves support. But pushing things forward via legal engineering may cause questionable shifts. This contribution contrasts previous historical episodes of collective singularism with the latest efforts to judge and write the EU into a new era of constitutionalism. In particular, I show that they reach a natural limit: primary law’s other basic norms. Continue reading >>
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01 July 2026
Fundamental Rights Protecting European Society
The central question of the justiciability of Article 2 TEU following Commission v Hungary is inevitably linked to the issue of protection of fundamental rights in the EU legal order. In fact, the judgment could extend the review of EU fundamental rights beyond the scope of Article 51(1) of the EU Charter, as the application of the values set out in Article 2 TEU is not limited to the “implementation of Union law”. In this contribution, I link Commission v Hungary to the debate on Reverse Solange. Continue reading >>30 June 2026
Envisioning a Gender-Equal European Society
Among the manifold analyses of Commission v Hungary and a flourishing debate on the realization of a European society based on values, the question of gender has been largely overlooked. We argue that the understanding of a European society which aims to uphold the values of Art. 2 TEU has to be anti-patriarchal. In the following contribution, we apply a feminist methodology – feminist re-writing/re-reading – to the Court’s arguments to carve out hypothetical future orientations for creating a non-patriarchal European society. Continue reading >>
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29 June 2026
A Society of Trust
This contribution investigates a still underexplored element of Commission v Hungary. The judgment undoubtedly matters in terms of the enforceability of Article 2 TEU. Yet its significance reaches further. The Court also recalled that the Union’s common values are linked to one of the central mechanisms of EU law: the principle of mutual trust. I submit that mutual trust should not be understood merely as a technical rule of inter-state recognition but as the horizontal institutional grammar of interdependence within European society. Continue reading >>
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29 June 2026
On Red (Funding) Lines
One of the conceptually most significant innovations by the Court of Justice in Commission v. Hungary is its invocation of European society as a normative referent of the EU legal order, and the characterisation of that society through pluralism. This conceptual step has consequences that reach well beyond the judgement. I argue that it could place the Court on a potential collision course with the European Commission’s recent proposal to explicitly link EU civil society funding to compliance with the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU. Continue reading >>
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26 June 2026
The Dangerous Idea of a European Society Based on Common Values
The CJEU began to treat the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU as justiciable legal norms in its ASJP judgment from 2018. In its 2026 judgment in Commission v Hungary, it took the further step of treating those values as justiciable stand-alone norms and justified that step by invoking the existence of a European society. This contribution approaches the matter from a social-science point of view. I argue that the Article-2-TEU claim of a European society is theoretically unconvincing, empirically untenable, and politically dangerous. Continue reading >>
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