20 August 2026
Constitutional Politics in Action – Part II
In August 2026, the Hungarian Constitutional Court rejected the petitions challenging the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Amendments to the Fundamental Law. The petitions concerned the dismantling of the public-interest asset management foundations performing public duty, the termination of the mandate of the President of the Republic, the introduction of an age limit affecting sitting CC judges, and limits on eligibility for parliamentary office. In each case, the Court held that the petition in substance sought a prohibited substantive review of a constitutional amendment. Continue reading >>
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20 August 2026
Constitutional Politics in Action – Part I
The Fidesz-KDNP parliamentary group submitted petitions to the Constitutional Court in July 2026 challenging Hungary’s newly adopted Sixteenth and Seventeenth Amendments. The petitions demonstrate how constitutional doctrine can be strategically reconfigured when political actors move from exercising constitutional power to challenging its exercise by others. After losing control of constitutional power, Fidesz strategically reconfigures elements of domestic doctrine that had been used to resist its own autocratization. Continue reading >>
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15 July 2026
The New Constitutional Amendment and the Removal of the President
On 13 July 2026, the Hungarian Parliament enacted the 17th Amendment to the Hungarian Fundamental Law. In line with the TISZA Party’s election manifesto, the Amendment ends the current President of the Republic’s, Tamás Sulyok’s, term of office. This is undoubtedly an extraordinary measure. Given the President’s apparent partiality and his failure to respond consistently to earlier illiberal constitutional developments, I consider the exceptional and temporary constitutional change to be justified as part of the broader effort to lay the foundations of a renewed constitutional order. Continue reading >>
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03 July 2026
The Constitution Always Speaks in the Present
The newly elected Hungarian Parliament approved the Sixteenth Amendment to the Fundamental Law of Hungary on 15 June 2026, now awaiting the President’s signature before entering into force. Specifically, the Amendment limits the prime Minister’s term of office to eight years, calculated from 1990 onwards. Effectively, this change prevents Orbán from returning to the office. I argue that the Amendment may be justified in the specific Hungarian context to prevent the consolidation of power of one-man. Moreover, I contest that the Amendment is retroactive and, for that reason, ad personam. Continue reading >>
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09 June 2026
The Removal of Key Office Holders
After the deadline that Prime Minister Péter Magyar set for the key constitutional actors to resign passed, he reiterated the government’s intention to remove them by a single constitutional amendment. They are all Orbán appointees. However, one must first reconcile and overcome the anticipatory obstruction paradox and the procedural self-entrenchment paradox. This goes only while acknowledging that these are in themselves constitutional wrongdoings that must be confronted rather than concealed, and thus subjecting them to the highest possible standards of public justification and deliberation. Continue reading >>21 April 2026
A Second-Class Right
The Spanish Government has recently approved a project for a constitutional amendment to protect the right to a voluntary termination of pregnancy (abortion). This amendment would add a new paragraph to Article 43, on the right to healthcare. While the discussion of constitutional reform is welcome, the current amendment falls short of its promises. Continue reading >>
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12 March 2026
New Old Kazakhstan
On 15th March 2026, Kazakhstan will hold a nationwide referendum in which voters will decide whether to adopt a new Constitution proposed by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. The proposed Constitution marks a significant departure from the current 1995 one: amendments affect 77 articles, or over 80% of the current Constitution. The official reason for the amendments is to move away from consolidated presidential governance; however, the proposed Constitution might have the opposite effect. Continue reading >>
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20 October 2025
No Skyfall
On 26 September 2025, the Slovak parliament adopted the 23rd amendment to the Constitution, introducing an explicit “national identity” clause and a series of provisions presented as measures to “protect the family”. The Venice Commission issued an Opinion two days earlier highlighting both procedural irregularities and substantive concerns. Yet, despite the alarm it has caused, the amendment’s immediate impact is likely to be limited: most of its provisions remain largely symbolic without accompanying legislation or supportive judicial interpretation. Instead, the real battleground will unfold in legal disputes over the amendment’s meaning and reach – with the Constitutional Court expected to play a decisive role. Continue reading >>
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24 September 2025
Untying Ulysses From The Mast
The first months of the new President of the Republic of Poland’s term leave little room for doubt. Karol Nawrocki is not only planning to initiate the adoption of a new constitution by 2030 – he is already changing the current one, adopted in 1997. In light of this political declaration, one might ask: Why does Poland need a new constitution? But the question doesn’t end there. Regarding President Nawrocki’s proposed constitutional changes we must also ask: What kind of constitution does he have in mind, and what does he seek to achieve through the adoption of a new one? Continue reading >>
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23 June 2025
Haunted by Text
Slovak PM Fico renewed his attempts to amend Slovakia’s Constitution. The most controversial provisions are a “national identity safeguard” limiting the effect of international and supranational law, and a definition of sex as strictly binary. After securing backing from some opposition members, his cabinet has submitted the amendment to parliament for debate and a vote. While public mobilisation against the proposed amendment proposal is important, legal scholars and NGOs should avoid using language that might reinforce the perception that the formally powerful Constitutional Court lacks the authority to strike down or reinterpret such changes in line with constitutional values. Continue reading >>
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