24 Oktober 2023
Who Decides What Counts as Disinformation in the EU?
Who decides what counts as “disinformation” in the EU? Not public authorities, because disinformation is not directly sanctioned in the Digital Service Act (DSA) or other secondary legislation. Nor Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs) and Very Large Online Search Engines (VLOSes), which avoid editorial decisions to maintain their legal status as intermediaries with limited liability. Instead, the delicate task of identifying disinformation is being undertaken by other private organisations whose place of administration and activity, purpose, funding and organizational structure appear problematic in terms of the legitimacy and even legality of the fight against disinformation. This blog post maps out the relevant (private) actors, namely the ad industry, fact checking organizations and so-called source-raters. Continue reading >>
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31 Juli 2023
Warum Fehlinformation, Desinformation und Hassrede nicht gleich behandelt werden sollten
Der Umgang mit Fehlinformationen, Desinformationen und Hassrede im Internet ist ein hochaktuelles Thema. Eine im Juni 2023 vorgestellte Politikrichtlinie der UN zielt darauf ab, eben jene Phänomene zu bekämpfen. Es erscheint jedoch nicht sachdienlich Fehlinformationen, Desinformationen und Hassrede ähnlich bzw. gleich zu behandeln, wie es der UN Entwurf momentan vorsieht. Dieser Blogpost vertritt daher die These, dass zumindest Fehlinformationen - also unabsichtlich unrichtige Aussagen - anders behandelt werden müssen als bewusste falsche oder verletzende Äußerungen im Internet. Continue reading >>23 März 2023
Political Advertising and Disinformation
Over a year ago, the European Commission presented its Proposal for a Regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising (COM(2021) 731 final). Recently, the Council presented its General Approach, followed by the position of the European Parliament (EP). While stakeholders are waiting for the trilogue negotiations to shape the final text of the legislation, critical voices are raising concerns. Concerns are that under the future regulation online platforms might have to de-amplify such independent content Continue reading >>17 Februar 2023
Shutting Down the Internet to Shut Down Criticism
In the aftermath of the devastating earthquakes which hit southwestern Turkey, internet connectivity had enabled civil society to provide additional on- and off-site assistance. However, the use of social media is not seen as innocent by Turkish authorities. Immediately after the earthquakes, authorities started to use legal instruments to silence the use of social media platforms even at the expense of utilizing its benefits during catastrophic times. Continue reading >>
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23 Dezember 2022
Ризик тунельного бачення у боротьбі з російською дезінформацією
Протиставлення кінетичної війни, яка розпочалася після повномасштабного вторгнення Росії в Україну 24 лютого 2022 року, та зіткнень у цифровому просторі показує, що обидві арени війни мали різні наслідки для країн-членів НАТО та ЄС. Якщо західні держави змогли значною мірою утриматися від фізичних бойових дій, обмеживши свою участь наданням зброї та військових матеріалів українським силам, то в цифровій сфері таке утримання виявилося неможливим. Continue reading >>
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23 Dezember 2022
The Risk of Tunnel Vision in Targeting Russian Disinformation
Contrasting the kinetic warfare that broke out after Russia’s full-fledged invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 with confrontations in the digital space shows that both war arenas came with different implications for NATO and EU member states. While Western powers were able to largely abstain from physical hostilities, limiting their involvement to providing weapons and military material to Ukrainian forces, in the digital sphere such abstention was not possible. Continue reading >>
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13 Dezember 2022
Schutz vor Verletzung von Persönlichkeitsrechten und „Desinformation“ in sozialen Medien unter Bedingungen der politischen Polarisierung
Für den Schutz vor Persönlichkeitsverletzungen in Medien wie Twitter und Facebook gilt im Wesentlichen und kaum verändert das auf den Schutz des Individuums eingestellte Äußerungsrecht, wie es seit vielen Jahrzehnten besteht. Das deutsche NetzDG und der europäische Digital Services Act (DSA) ergänzen dies um eine quantitative kollektive Dimension: Für den Schutz gegen die große Zahl der rechtswidrigen Äußerungen im Internet wird eine Art Rasenmäher-Prinzip entwickelt, das vor allem schnelle Löschungen durch Provider erzwingen soll. Dies ist nicht der richtige Ansatz. Continue reading >>
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20 Oktober 2022
Silenced, Chilled, and Jailed
As Turkey is in the process of getting ready for the general and presidential elections of June 2023, a recent legal reform has created much concern regarding freedom of expression and increased threat of online censorship in the country. Citizens have called the amendment a ‘censorship law’, while some prominent civil society organizations have voiced their concern about the law creating avenues for a dystopian crackdown when the elections are just around the corner. Continue reading >>
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05 August 2022
The EU’s regulatory push against disinformation
Tech billionaire Elon Musk’s surprise bid to buy Twitter questions the wisdom of the current EU efforts to combat the spread of disinformation, which has relied to a large extend on platforms’ voluntary cooperation. Whether successful or not, it raises serious questions on EU disinformation policy’s reliance on platforms’ discretion to moderate this category of speech. It is likely to put pressure on the carefully constructed web of self- and co-regulatory measures and legislation the European Commission has spun to counter the spread of disinformation. Continue reading >>
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12 Mai 2022
The War in Ukraine, Fake News, and the Digital Epistemic Divide
The ongoing war in Ukraine sheds light on crucial challenges of our digital media landscape. The social media-driven “(mis)information wars” surrounding the Russian invasion expose a growing epistemic divide running through liberal democracies. The regulatory focus on truth, with measures like fact-checking, serves little to cure the larger problems behind this. We should rather use the power of the law to devise new modes of intelligent speech regulation mimicking the functions formerly played by the centralized set-up of communication conditions. Continue reading >>
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