POSTS BY Alexander Peukert
28 February 2024

Risky Recommendations

2024 will see numerous elections, including the European Parliament Elections in June. The Digital Services Act (DSA) obliges Big Tech to assess and mitigate systemic risks for “electoral processes”. The Commission published Draft Guidelines on the mitigation of systemic risks for electoral processes and sought feedback from all relevant stakeholders. While the protection of election integrity is a laudable aim, the Guidelines as proposed would not rebuild but further erode citizen trust in the digital environment and democratic processes. The recommendations are too vague, too broad and too lenient as regards the suggested cooperation between Big Tech, civil society and public authorities. Continue reading >>
10 November 2023
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Europe and the Global Race to Regulate AI

The EU wants to set the global rule book for AI. This blog explains the complex “risk hierarchy” that pervades the proposed AI Act, currently in the final stages of trilogue negotiation. This contrasts with the US focus on “national security risks”. We point out shortcomings of the EU approach requiring comprehensive risk assessments (ex ante), at the level of technology development. Using economic analysis, we distinguish exogenous and endogenous sources of potential AI harm arising from input data. We are sceptical that legislators can anticipate the future of a general purpose technology, such as AI. We propose that from the perspective of encouraging ongoing innovation, (ex post) liability rules can provide the right incentives to improve data quality and AI safety. Continue reading >>
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24 October 2023

Who Decides What Counts as Disinformation in the EU?

Who decides what counts as “disinformation” in the EU? Not public authorities, because disinformation is not directly sanctioned in the Digital Service Act (DSA) or other secondary legislation. Nor Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs) and Very Large Online Search Engines (VLOSes), which avoid editorial decisions to maintain their legal status as intermediaries with limited liability. Instead, the delicate task of identifying disinformation is being undertaken by other private organisations whose place of administration and activity, purpose, funding and organizational structure appear problematic in terms of the legitimacy and even legality of the fight against disinformation. This blog post maps out the relevant (private) actors, namely the ad industry, fact checking organizations and so-called source-raters. Continue reading >>
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31 August 2021

Five Reasons to be Skeptical About the DSA

In an effort to establish a “safe, predictable and trusted online environment” for the EU, the Digital Services Act proposal sets out an extensive catalogue of due diligence obligations for online intermediaries, coupled with tight enforcement rules. A freedom of expression perspective on the proposal reveals that it partly reinforces Big Tech’s control over communication, and moreover fights fire with fire by establishing a powerful public/private bureaucracy able to monitor and potentially manipulate online communication trends. Continue reading >>
14 June 2018

Put it back: Ein Vorschlag für ein NetzDG, das die Meinungsfreiheit wahrt

Das „Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Rechtsdurchsetzung in sozialen Netzwerken“ (NetzDG) wird von vielen für unionsrechts- und grundgesetzwidrig gehalten, vor allem in Hinblick auf die Meinungs- und Informationsfreiheit. Um die einseitige Ausrichtung des NetzDG auf das Löschen von Inhalten auszugleichen, wird insbesondere angemahnt, sog. Put-back-Verfahren zu installieren, also Verfahren, in denen der Nutzer eines sozialen Netzwerks die Wiederherstellung gelöschter, aber von der Meinungsfreiheit gedeckter Beiträge erreichen kann. Hierzu ein konkreter Gesetzgebungsvorschlag. Continue reading >>
02 March 2016
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Nochmals: Die Politik offener Grenzen ist nicht rechtskonform

Die Diskussion über die Frage, ob die Politik offener Grenzen mit dem geltenden Recht in Einklang steht, gewinnt an Dynamik und Tiefenschärfe. Mit Roman Lehner hat erstmals ein Fachkollege auf unsere andernorts vertretene Auslegung der Dublin III-VO und des Schengener Grenzkodex erwidert. Seine Gegenthese lautet im Kern: Schutzanträge an der deutsch-österreichischen oder einer anderen Binnengrenze unterfallen Art. 3 Abs. 1 und nicht Art. 20 Abs. 4 Dublin-III-VO, weshalb die Zuständigkeits- und letztlich die Antragsprüfung in Deutschland und nicht in Österreich stattzufinden haben. Dieser Einwand beruht freilich auf einem grundlegenden Missverständnis der Konzeption des Gemeinsamen Europäischen Asylsystems (GEAS) und speziell des Art. 3 Abs. 1 S. 1 Dublin III. Continue reading >>
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