29 April 2026

Ein Mandat zur Selbstbegrenzung

Der Wahlsieg der TISZA in Ungarn ist historisch. Gerade deshalb verlangt er politische Zurückhaltung. Denn auch die von TISZA errungene Zweidrittelmehrheit ist nicht einfach Ausdruck eines schrankenlosen gesellschaftlichen Konsenses, sondern Ergebnis eines Wahlrechts, das bereits in vergangenen Wahlzyklen die jeweils stärkste politische Kraft unverhältnismäßig stark belohnte. Wie es zu diesem Umstand kam, verrät ein Blick in die Geschichte der ungarischen Wahlgesetze seit dem Systemwechsel von 1989/90. Continue reading >>
21 April 2026

Verordnete Werte

Der Europäische Gerichtshof hat am 21. April 2026 ein ungarisches Gesetz für unionsrechtswidrig erklärt, das in die Rechte nicht-heterosexueller Menschen eingreift. Erstmals bejaht das Gericht einen eigenständigen Verstoß gegen Art. 2 EUV, eine Norm, die die Werte aufzählt, auf denen die Union ruht. Damit baut das Gericht die Reichweite seiner Wertejudikatur erheblich aus und verschiebt die Statik des europäischen Verfassungsverbunds zulasten der Mitgliedstaaten. Das kann weder dogmatisch noch legitimatorisch überzeugen. Continue reading >>
17 April 2026

Cheers, Dear Friends!

Viktor Orbán, as it turns out, can indeed be voted out. And to that I raise my glass of champagne. Cheers, dear friends! The haunting is over – this particular haunting, at any rate. And yet: how much we learned from it and through it and about it. How many concepts were coined in its study. What is populism? That, right there, what they were doing in Hungary. Continue reading >>
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17 April 2026

Prost, ihr Lieben!

Viktor Orbán kann man, wie sich herausstellt, sehr wohl abwählen. Und darauf erhebe ich mein Glas. Prost, ihr Lieben! Der Spuk hat ein Ende, dieser spezielle Spuk jedenfalls. Was haben wir nicht alles gelernt von und durch und über ihn. Was haben wir nicht alles begriffen. Was ist Populismus? Das da, was die in Ungarn machen. Continue reading >>
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09 April 2026

Beating (Authoritarian) Populism with (Democratic) Populism

Viktor Orbán, Hungary’s prime minister since 2010, is set to lose the parliamentary elections on 12 April 2026. According to recent polls, Fidesz’ main rival, centre-right Tisza, seems to be within reach of attaining a two-thirds constitutional majority. While this may provide conditions for re-establishing democratic institutions, it also implies that Tisza would not be constrained by any meaningful democratic controls. Avoiding the double trap of meeting populist expectations and stabilizing institutionally unconstrained powers are two major tasks the new government needs to perform. Continue reading >>
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25 March 2026

A Deal Is a Deal

Veto threats are ordinary currency in Brussels. A veto against an agreed compromise, used to force concessions on an unrelated dispute and to stage a domestic election campaign, is not. The events of 19 March 2026 were serious not only because Viktor Orbán blocked money for Ukraine, but because he did so after having promised in December 2025 not to stand in the way. This time Orbán went too far – if the other leaders fail to respond effectively, they will be teaching everyone that the most profitable strategy is blackmail. Continue reading >>
16 January 2026

Two Non-Constitutional Non-Democracies

Later this year, parliamentary elections will be held in Hungary and Israel, two autocratizing countries, whose incumbents are close allies of Donald Trump. The prospects for democratic and constitutional recovery in both Hungary and Israel depend not only on domestic political conditions but also on an increasingly permissive global environment in which systems of governance that fail to meet the requirements of either constitutionalism or democracy reinforce and normalize autocratization. Continue reading >>
31 August 2025
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Overcoming Objections to Overcome the Hungarian Veto

This June, we proposed ways to overcome a Hungarian veto on EU sanctions against Russia. Our proposal prompted Mark Dawson and Martijn van den Brink to write a sharp response, arguing that we had ventured beyond the confines of serious legal scholarship into the realm of the fantastical. Our critics and we seem to live in different realities. When reading Dawson’s and van den Brink’s piece, it feels like the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine does not exist. Yet, there lies an uncomfortable truth at the heart of our proposal, one that our critics fail to recognize: the Russian war might grow into an existential threat to the European Union. Continue reading >>
21 May 2025

A Threat to the Core

On May 13, 2025, just before midnight, a FIDESZ deputy tabled a new bill before the Hungarian Parliament. The bill seeks to enhance “sovereignty protection measures” by introducing sweeping transparency instruments targeting foreign-funded interference in Hungarian public life. These restrictions purposefully shrink civic space further, roll back protections of fundamental rights and impair the functioning of constitutional democracy in a retrogressive fashion. When adopted, Hungary’s constitutional order will fundamentally regress from the state that existed at the time of its accession to the European Union. Continue reading >>
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10 April 2025

Tackling the Union’s “Orbán Problem” Now

The EU is facing an “Orbán problem”. That much is clear. The Hungarian government not only pursues an illiberal domestic agenda that violates the Union’s values in Article 2 TEU, but also cultivates close ties with autocratic regimes abroad, particularly with Russia. The Hungarian government consistently uses its veto powers to block Ukrainian military aid and dilute sanctions against Russia. The Commission should submit a new proposal under Article 7(2) TEU focusing on breaches of solidarity and threats to the Union’s security. Continue reading >>
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