11 June 2026
Constitutional Reset As the Only Choice
One of the most pressing challenges for the new Hungarian authorities will be the future of the Constitutional Court, perceived as a captured institution. The new authorities may be tempted to adopt amendments aimed at a complete overhaul of the Constitutional Court, although such radical actions risk being seen as a violation of judicial independence. However, sometimes radical steps in response to captured apex courts can be both justified and necessary, provided that they form part of a broader reform genuinely aimed at strengthening the institution’s independence. Continue reading >>
0 
09 June 2026
The Removal of Key Office Holders
After the deadline that Prime Minister Péter Magyar set for the key constitutional actors to resign passed, he reiterated the government’s intention to remove them by a single constitutional amendment. They are all Orbán appointees. However, one must first reconcile and overcome the anticipatory obstruction paradox and the procedural self-entrenchment paradox. This goes only while acknowledging that these are in themselves constitutional wrongdoings that must be confronted rather than concealed, and thus subjecting them to the highest possible standards of public justification and deliberation. Continue reading >>02 June 2026
The Rise and Fall of the Mafia-State in Hungary
Ever since the elections, there has been a sense of euphoria sweeping the country that surpasses even the democratic transition of 1989. Yet, one of the key lessons drawn from both the revolutionary 1989 and the counter-revolutionary 2011 constitution-making processes is that both were elite-driven, lacking any participatory dimension – which may have contributed to the fall of liberal democracy. Today, the overwhelming euphoria could yet channel itself into genuine “constitutional enthusiasm”. Perhaps Hungary has yet another chance to seize that constitutional moment. Continue reading >>29 April 2026
Ein Mandat zur Selbstbegrenzung
Der Wahlsieg der TISZA in Ungarn ist historisch. Gerade deshalb verlangt er politische Zurückhaltung. Denn auch die von TISZA errungene Zweidrittelmehrheit ist nicht einfach Ausdruck eines schrankenlosen gesellschaftlichen Konsenses, sondern Ergebnis eines Wahlrechts, das bereits in vergangenen Wahlzyklen die jeweils stärkste politische Kraft unverhältnismäßig stark belohnte. Wie es zu diesem Umstand kam, verrät ein Blick in die Geschichte der ungarischen Wahlgesetze seit dem Systemwechsel von 1989/90. Continue reading >>21 April 2026
Verordnete Werte
Der Europäische Gerichtshof hat am 21. April 2026 ein ungarisches Gesetz für unionsrechtswidrig erklärt, das in die Rechte nicht-heterosexueller Menschen eingreift. Erstmals bejaht das Gericht einen eigenständigen Verstoß gegen Art. 2 EUV, eine Norm, die die Werte aufzählt, auf denen die Union ruht. Damit baut das Gericht die Reichweite seiner Wertejudikatur erheblich aus und verschiebt die Statik des europäischen Verfassungsverbunds zulasten der Mitgliedstaaten. Das kann weder dogmatisch noch legitimatorisch überzeugen. Continue reading >>17 April 2026
Cheers, Dear Friends!
Viktor Orbán, as it turns out, can indeed be voted out. And to that I raise my glass of champagne. Cheers, dear friends! The haunting is over – this particular haunting, at any rate. And yet: how much we learned from it and through it and about it. How many concepts were coined in its study. What is populism? That, right there, what they were doing in Hungary. Continue reading >>
0
17 April 2026
Prost, ihr Lieben!
Viktor Orbán kann man, wie sich herausstellt, sehr wohl abwählen. Und darauf erhebe ich mein Glas. Prost, ihr Lieben! Der Spuk hat ein Ende, dieser spezielle Spuk jedenfalls. Was haben wir nicht alles gelernt von und durch und über ihn. Was haben wir nicht alles begriffen. Was ist Populismus? Das da, was die in Ungarn machen. Continue reading >>
0
09 April 2026
Beating (Authoritarian) Populism with (Democratic) Populism
Viktor Orbán, Hungary’s prime minister since 2010, is set to lose the parliamentary elections on 12 April 2026. According to recent polls, Fidesz’ main rival, centre-right Tisza, seems to be within reach of attaining a two-thirds constitutional majority. While this may provide conditions for re-establishing democratic institutions, it also implies that Tisza would not be constrained by any meaningful democratic controls. Avoiding the double trap of meeting populist expectations and stabilizing institutionally unconstrained powers are two major tasks the new government needs to perform. Continue reading >>
0
25 March 2026
A Deal Is a Deal
Veto threats are ordinary currency in Brussels. A veto against an agreed compromise, used to force concessions on an unrelated dispute and to stage a domestic election campaign, is not. The events of 19 March 2026 were serious not only because Viktor Orbán blocked money for Ukraine, but because he did so after having promised in December 2025 not to stand in the way. This time Orbán went too far – if the other leaders fail to respond effectively, they will be teaching everyone that the most profitable strategy is blackmail. Continue reading >>16 January 2026