Once Again, a Laboratory for What Is to Come

The 1980 Constitution of Chile contained different “locks” that have entrenched some of the core social, political, legal and economic arrangements inherited from the dictatorship. While some parts of the original constitution (those most obviously connected to the authoritarian regime) have been changed in the years following its enactment, almost all the “locks” remain in place. The issue with the legitimacy of the Chilean constitution is twofold: its legitimacy is questionable both in terms of its pedigree and in terms of its capacity to keep open the space for political action.

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The “Savona Affaire”: Over­constitutionali­zation in Action?

As is well known, Italy is undergoing an institutional crisis sparked by President Mattarella’s veto on the composition of the prospective Italian government. Following Dieter Grimm, we claim that the events here analysed reveal the extent to which the EU legal framework is overconstitutionalised and the democratic costs and risks inherent in this legal and political order.

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