05 April 2024
Still Alive?
Party banning was developed in Spain in 2002, with the aim of combating the terrorism of ETA (1958-2018), an extreme left-wing and separatist Basque organisation that murdered more than 800 people. This instrument proved useful in defeating the terrorist group and its network of support organisations, including several parties. Today, there are strong separatist or pro-independence movements in Catalonia, the Basque Country and, to a lesser extent, Galicia, and other regions. Faced with this, there are parties that have proposed using the mechanism of banning parties. But is this viable, and would it be useful? Continue reading >>
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31 October 2019
The Criminal Conviction of Catalan Secessionist Leaders and European Human Rights Law
In the controversial judgement of the Spanish Supreme Court against the Catalan secessionist leaders, seven defendants were found guilty of the crime of sedition (amongst others) and sentenced to prison terms ranging from 9 to 13 years. An appeal to the European Court of Human Rights is likely but it is doubtful whether it will be successful. Continue reading >>15 August 2018
Secessionism, Federalism and Constitutionalism in Ethiopia
On the morning of 4 August 2018, troops were seen taking over key positions in Jijiga, a capital city of the State of Somali, one of the constituent units of the Ethiopian federation. Heavily armed military vehicles were stationed outside the state parliament, the offices of state government and the state TV station. It was not an invasion by a foreign force. It was a federal intervention. Continue reading >>
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23 July 2018
Sandu and Others v Russia and Moldova: The High Costs of Occupation
On 17 July 2018, the European Court on Human Rights reminded again that occupation of foreign lands and support of separatist regimes is a costly affair. This cost is not only calculated in terms of monetary repercussions but also in terms of reputational losses. On that day the chamber of the Court delivered a judgment in the case of Sandu and Others v Russia and Moldova. This judgment is a new one in the line of cases dealing with a breakaway region of Moldova – the self-proclaimed Republic of Transnistria. Continue reading >>
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27 March 2017
Damaging the Legitimacy of the Spanish Constitutional Court
The Spanish legislative burdens the Constitutional Court with the task to prevent Catalonia from pursuing independence. To use the Constitutional Court as the main barricade against any attempt at starting the independence process does tremendous damage to the Court itself as it undermines its perception as neutral arbiter and, thereby, its legitimation. Continue reading >>01 December 2015
The Unconstitutional Holiday: Bosnian Constitutional Court annuls Serb Republic Day
Can a national holiday celebrated by a federal sub-entity be in violation of constitutional principles? In a system as fragmented as Bosnia-Herzegovina, apparently it can – according to a recent judgment by the Bosnian Constitutional Court which puts its own acceptance among Bosnian Serbs at risk. The decision, as heart-wrenchingly Bosnian as it may be, raises issues that concern all multicultural societies. Continue reading >>
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30 September 2015
“The key to the solution lies in Spain, not in Catalonia”
Why did the territorial conflict between separatist Catalonia and the Spanish central government escalate so badly? What is at stake in a country historically ridden by civil war and separatist terrorism? What needs to be done to resolve the conflict, and by whom? In an interview with Verfassungsblog, Benito Aláez Corral, constitutional law professor from Oviedo, explains how the Spanish constitution needs to be amended to satisfy the demand for national self-determination in Catalonia and maintain the constitutional integrity of Spain. Continue reading >>
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19 September 2015
Die Logik des Krieges: eine Anmerkung zur ukrainischen Verfassungsreform
Die Verfassungsreform in der Ukraine droht zu scheitern. In dem Vorgang zeigt sich das große ukrainische Dilemma im Kleinen: der Westen setzt Moskaus Zugriff auf die Ukraine wenig entgegen. Der Druck durch Merkel und Hollande auf Porošenko, die Verfassungsreform nach Minsk II umzusetzen, diente dem Ziel, Minsk II nicht scheitern zu lassen, nicht aber den Interessen der ukrainischen Staatsreform mit einer neuen Verfassung als freiwilligem Vertrag der Bürger über die Form ihres Zusammenlebens. Continue reading >>
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