The right lessons from Trump 1.0

As the 2024 US presidential election approaches, Europe faces renewed uncertainty about its relationship with the US. Donald Trump’s potential return to the White House triggers concerns about transatlantic ties and multilateralism. His “America First” policy and the termination of support for numerous international agreements and organisations is generally regarded as exceptional, erratic, and apocalyptical for the international order. By contrast, Kamala Harris is associated with hopes for normality in the transatlantic partnership and a commitment to a rules-based international order.

At first glance, the two candidates could not be more different. However, treating Trump as an anomaly risks missing deeper, longer-term trends in US foreign policy – trends that Europeans must now prepare for, regardless of the election outcome. To safeguard the rules-based international order that has immensely benefited them, Europeans must draw the right lessons from the past and stop considering Trump’s policies a mere aberration. This blog post draws on six years of research into the ambivalent relationship between the US and multilateralism – under Trump and beyond – to argue that the withdrawal of US support from multilateral institutions is not a novel but a more general phenomenon. Rather than being irrational and erratic, the US withdrawal of support tends to follow strategic calculations. Importantly, multilateral institutions abandoned by the US are not doomed to fail but often remarkably resilient.

Not just a Trumpian Phenomenon

It is commonly assumed that the US withdrawal from multilateral institutions in the Trump era was exceptional. In fact, the Trump Administration terminated the support for or membership in numerous international organisations and agreements. Examples include the Paris Agreement on climate change, the “Iran deal”, the UN Human Rights Council, the World Trade Organisation and even the World Health Organisation during the coronavirus pandemic.

While the US withdrawal from multilateral institutions during the Trump Administration was unprecedented in terms of the number and relevance of the abandoned institutions, it should not be overlooked that the US has a long history of ambivalence towards multilateralism. The US previously terminated its membership in multilateral institutions, for instance in the International Labour Organization (ILO) under Jimmy Carter, in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) under Ronald Reagan, and in the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) under Bill Clinton. Moreover, George W. Bush refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Three major trends suggest that US ambivalence towards multilateralism will persist: Firstly, there have never been so many and so intrusive international institutions, which limit the room for manoeuvre of even the US and thus become targets of contestation. Secondly, domestic political polarisation in the USA is also increasing over international politics, which makes foreign policy decisions in Congress more difficult. Finally, the USA are declining relative to rising powers, such as China, and are confronted with increasingly influential blocks of revisionist and illiberal states, such as Russia.

Joe Biden was also subject to these internal and external forces and only selectively followed through on his promise that “America is back”. Under Biden, the US has indeed resumed support for some multilateral institutions. Examples include the Paris Agreement, UNESCO, the UN Human Rights Council, and the World Health Organisation. However, Biden never returned to other institutions, such as the “Iran deal”, the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), or the Open Skies Treaty. And the gaps in climate financing were also not completely filled  under Biden. We have even seen new protectionist policies under Biden that violate WTO free-trade rules, such as the Inflation Reduction Act. Instead of engaging or even creating new multilateral institutions, the US under Biden has pursued its foreign policy through selective minilateral clubs with selected partners.

Europe must therefore overcome its tendency to view Trump as an outlier. The factors driving US withdrawal from multilateral institutions are manifold and range from geopolitical concerns about the rise of China to the intrusiveness of multilateral institutions to domestic politics and internal hurdles in the US political system. Under the next US President – be it Trump or Harris – we will likely see further instances of the US terminating their support for multilateral institutions.

The Strategy of Withdrawal

A second widespread mistake is to dismiss Trump’s behaviour towards multilateral institutions as irrational, impulsive, and erratic. His vociferous and fundamental criticism of multilateral institutions served populist motives of regaining control over foreign policy and taking the own national interest first. However, a look beyond his rhetoric reveals even under Trump the way the US challenged multilateral institutions followed strategic considerations.

Whether the Trump Administration engaged in criticism, sabotage, or exit, all was shaped by the control the US exercised over multilateral institutions. The more opportunities the US had to change – or at least block – dissatisfying policies within an institution, the more likely it was to limit its attacks. Where it could expect quick concessions due to its strong position of power, it limited itself to criticism. For example, Trump’s challenge to NATO was limited to criticism, which was quickly met with concessions by the allies. Where the US could block dissatisfying policies, the USA remained a member and sabotaged the institution. The WTO constitutes an example where the US blocked the WTO’s binding dispute settlement process under both Trump and Biden to prevent binding judgements against its protectionist trade policy. Only where membership offered little advantage in avoiding undesired decisions, the US opted to exit. For instance, the US withdrew from the Paris Agreement, where it lacked means to unilaterally prohibit or even shape global climate rules.

US withdrawal from multilateral institutions is by no means unpredictable and erratic but follows a regular pattern. The less control the US retains over multilateral institutions, the more the US escalated its contestation. The fact that this even applies to President Donald Trump, who is generally regarded as impulsive or ideologically driven, underlines that control over decision-making in multilateral institutions is key to understand – and predict – US contestation. To prevent the escalation of US criticism into exit – under Trump or Harris – European governments can thus rely on concessions within institutions. They can accommodate US concerns about individual policies or grant them more internal leverage through veto rights or key positions in the organizations. Even if such privileges weaken decision-making in multilateral institutions and run counter to procedural fairness norms, they promise to preserve the relevance of multilateral forums in the future.

Resilient Multilateralism without the US

A third common misconception is that the rules-based international order is doomed to fail without the US. Although the US was instrumental in the creation and maintenance of key multilateral institutions, many institutions have proven resilient. For example, the Paris Agreement, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the World Trade Organisation, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) withstood challenges by the US under the Trump Administration.

Multilateral institutions are therefore not necessarily dependent on the US in order to survive and fulfil their tasks. However, not all institutions survive US withdrawal. Take as examples the budget crisis of UNESCO and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) as well as the failure of the Kyoto Protocol, the “Iran Deal”, and the Open Skies Treaty.

Institutional resilience must be actively brought about by alternative leaders. After the Trump Administration terminated US support for multilateral institutions, European governments and the bureaucracies of international organisations provided leadership in many institutions. They organised coalitions of supporters to defend the abandoned institutions and to jointly fill the gap left by the US. After Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, for example, the EU and China took the lead in pursuing global climate goals without the USA. Moreover, the WHO Secretariat worked closely with European governments to counter Trump’s criticism and fight the COVID-19 pandemic without the US. Finally, the EU took a leadership role in the WTO and, together with other trading powers, set-up an interim appeal court to circumvent the US blockade.

A Stronger and Multilateral Europe

European governments that want to preserve the rules-based international order should therefore be prepared to take the lead and fill the gap after US withdrawal. Three imperatives follow from this for European policymakers:

European governments should, firstly, continue to champion multilateral institutions and abide by their rules in order to maintain their reputation as supporters of liberal principles. This will help their “soft power”, which they can use to win partners for their coalitions. European governments will have to rely more on non-Western partners who can support multilateralism.

Second, Europeans should pool and expand their own capabilities, from defence to finance. Only together do Europeans have enough so-called “hard power” to make a difference on the international stage when it comes to problems ranging from the environment to security policy. It is also important to realise our own dependencies and reduce them. For example, the European attempt to save the Iran deal failed due to the dominance of the US dollar in the international financial system.

Third, Europeans should strengthen IO secretariats. These bureaucratic actors are not only highly motivated to fight for their organizational survival but are typically committed to its values. European governments and the EU should therefore, for example, provide them with greater financial resources and increase their independence from individual member states.