Authoritarians Who Hate Judicial Accountability
In Slovakia, a unique situation is unfolding. The country is ruled by an authoritarian government that restricts fundamental rights of its citizens, puts independent institutions under political control, exploits fast-track legislative procedures, and threatens the judges of the constitutional court. Yet, this same government is in favour of more judicial autonomy, less accountability, and higher salaries for judges. The government thus seems to have hit upon a convenient strategy: granting judges greater benefits in exchange for their loyalty. A proposal from the Ministry of Justice to amend the laws on judges, courts, and disciplinary proceedings illustrates this approach, as it caters directly to the long-standing demands of judicial representatives.
A prequel to Slovakia’s judicial reform
The Slovak judiciary generally enjoys high levels of self-governance and is protected by institutional safeguards of independence. One of the most important institutional bodies, which also becomes highly relevant for the later analysis of judicial reforms, is the Judicial Council, adopted in 2001 and entrusted with broad responsibilities over judicial careers. These responsibilities include the selection, appointment, transfer, promotion, training, performance evaluation, and disciplinary oversight of judges, either carried out directly by the Judicial Council or through bodies it establishes.
However, Slovakia suffers from the same issue as other post-socialist countries. The Slovak system of judicial governance struggles to safeguard both internal and external independence. As a result, it is vulnerable to being captured either by governing politicians or by an unaccountable circle of judicial elites. In Slovakia, unlike in Poland and Hungary, the latter scenario is unfolding.
In 2020, the Slovak judiciary underwent extensive reforms. The incentives for these reforms were twofold. First, the Slovak public was largely dissatisfied with the long-term influence of private and state actors on the judiciary, which peaked in the “Threema” corruption scandal revealed in 2018. Second, the plans for the judicial reform acquired a strong electoral mandate in the 2020 parliamentary election. The reforms significantly altered the Judicial Council: whereas it had previously lacked a clear legal definition and was generally perceived as an administrative body responsible for the judiciary as a whole, it is now constitutionally defined as the highest body of judicial legitimacy and a forum where the three branches of power deliberate and decide on judicial politics. Moreover, the Parliament stripped the Constitutional Court of the power to review constitutional acts. Furthermore, it aimed to strengthen accountability by creating a new offense called “abuse of law” for judges who deliberately misinterpret statutes. It established the new Supreme Administrative Court of the Slovak Republic (SACSR) as the apex of the administrative judiciary and a disciplinary body for judges and prosecutors. Lastly, it reformed the judicial map, reducing the number of first instance and appellate courts, despite resistance from judges.
Despite the international criticism regarding the adoption of the “abuse of law” offense and the option to dismiss members of the Judicial Council before the end of the term, the reforms were generally seen as a positive response to prior corruption issues and the lack of public trust in the judiciary. The new court map and the establishment of the SACSR, for example, were praised by the EU and led to Slovakia securing EU funds from the Resilience and Recovery plan. While the EU generally praised the reform, the Slovak judges united in opposition to former Justice Minister Mária Kolíková and opposed the reforms, which ultimately led to the new proposals for amendments in 2025. They felt that they were not sufficiently consulted in the drafting of the reforms and that the government portrayed them as if judges were collectively corrupt.
The new proposals for amendments
In late February 2025, the Slovak Ministry of Justice proposed changes to the Slovak judicial system once more. The proposal aims to increase the Judicial Council’s influence over disciplinary panels, creating a situation where the Judicial Council establishes the majority of disciplinary panels and initiates the disciplinary proceedings. It also introduces bonus systems and flat-rate allowances for judges, which have raised concerns due to the significant financial burden they entail. Moreover, the proposal introduces a shift to a two-tier disciplinary system, yet it provides no supporting data from the Ministry of Justice to justify this change. Finally, the proposal received attention from the Rule of Law report 2025 for trying to restrict the existing level of accountability by reducing the periodical assessment and psychological evaluations of the judges, and also because of the changes in the disciplinary system and financial bonuses. Let us examine the proposed amendments in more detail to show how they increase judicial autonomy while reducing the accountability of the judiciary.
First, while periodic evaluations of judges have been conducted every five years, the proposal suggests keeping only the first assessment five years after appointment, with no regular evaluations, except for the one for promotion to the higher court. While the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE) and the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) support regular assessments to gain a comprehensive understanding of judges’ performance as a means of ensuring accountability, and acknowledge that such evaluations are valuable for judges’ professional development, the Slovak Ministry of Justice criticized the ineffectiveness of these evaluations. It claimed that these evaluations were perfunctory in nature and failed to produce any constructive results. These assertions, however, were not underpinned by any systematic research or empirical evidence provided by the Ministry of Justice.
Second, the proposal suggests abolishing psychological assessment in the selection process for higher court judicial positions, without providing a clear explanation for this change. Psychological assessments are currently used to evaluate candidates’ emotional stability, stress-handling abilities, and personality traits that could affect fair decision-making during the selection of candidates for judicial positions. These evaluations also help identify communication skills and empathetic approaches that foster public trust in the judiciary. The assessments serve as a preventive measure against potential nervous breakdowns and aid in selecting the most suitable candidates for high-stress positions with significant responsibilities. Omitting this requirement may lower the personal standards for judges and potentially impact the overall quality of the judiciary.
Third, the current disciplinary system for judges in Slovakia involves single-instance proceedings, with second-instance proceedings only for the most severe disciplinary measures. All decisions can be appealed to the Constitutional Court. Five-member panels at the SACSR, consisting of three judges and two lay judges, decide on disciplinary offenses. This system, implemented in 2021, has reportedly improved efficiency and speed of the disciplinary proceedings, with the SACSR establishing consistent jurisprudence in disciplinary matters. The proposed change to two-instance proceedings for all cases lacks justification through any analysis, explaining the necessity and effectiveness of the proposed change. Such a reform would also risk unnecessarily delaying disciplinary proceedings.
The proposed changes to the disciplinary system for judges in Slovakia would also alter the composition of disciplinary panels at the SACSR. Under the proposal, the Judicial Council would elect two of the three members of first-instance panels and three of the five members of appeals panels, thereby securing a majority in both. This arrangement could conflict with Article 142(2) of the Constitution, which entrusts the SACSR with deciding on the disciplinary liability of judges and prosecutors. At the same time, the proposal reduces the proportion of SACSR judges in favour of general court judges and lay judges. As a result, disciplinary cases would no longer truly be decided by the SACSR, but only at the SACSR, since its own judges would be in the minority on the panels. The proposal also extends the Judicial Council’s role in creating panels for disciplinary proceedings for prosecutors, bailiffs, and notaries without clear justification. Additionally, a new requirement of at least 10 years of judicial service for panel members would exclude some experienced SACSR judges who transitioned from other legal professions when SACSR was established in 2020.
Moreover, the Council would gain the authority to file disciplinary complaints. This dual role as both the appointing body for the majority of panel members and the potential complainant raises concerns about the separation of powers in disciplinary proceedings. All these changes pose a danger that the Judicial Council might serve as a tool of intimidation against judges criticizing judicial politics.
Fourth, the first version of the proposal introduced flat-rate allowances for Supreme Court and SACSR judges that would add an annual burden of €8,578,498 to the state budget. Furthermore, the proposal suggested reintroducing bonuses for judges’ salaries, presenting them as a facultative option dependent on the financial resources of the court. Bonuses would be awarded based on factors such as extra-judicial activities or reaching the age of 50. The proposal estimates an additional €5,490,163 spent on these bonuses. Notably, the proposal did not address any increased compensation for non-judicial court personnel. The fact that the bonus depends on the decision of the Justice Minister or the court president raises concerns about judicial corruption, with which Slovakia already has some experience. Moreover, the Venice Commission advises against discretionary bonuses in judicial remuneration.
Finally, after the negative statement on the budgetary requirements of the reform from the Slovak Ministry of Finance, criticism of the public in the interdepartmental commentary process, and the announced requests of the prosecutors, that they will ask for the same benefits, the Ministry of Justice replaced the financial bonuses for extra-judicial activities with bonuses for reaching the age of 50 and age of 60 years. These bonuses will depend on the arbitrary decision of the president of the court.
The flat-rate reimbursements have been omitted from the bill, since district judges requested the same benefit. If such benefits were granted, it would raise the initial impact on the annual state budget by three times. At the moment, the bill has already passed the first reading in the Parliament.
Conclusion
The current situation in the Slovak judiciary is a result of the failed 2020 reform. That reform aimed to change the structure of the judiciary to reduce breaches of internal and external independence, block avenues of corruption, and limit the power centers within the judiciary. Although the reform contained promising elements, it provoked the anger of judges, who felt that they were being collectively accused of corruption and insufficiently involved in the reform process. The response to the reform from judges was, therefore, hostile.
Ultimately, the reform, despite its good intentions, ended up uniting judges around their shared interest: keeping the judiciary in the hands of judges themselves, self-governed. The notion of independence in this mindset is in autonomy and the absence of accountability. The judges’ primary concern was not the preservation of the rule of law or the protection of democratic values in Slovakia. Instead, it has become clear that the bodies representing judges mainly defend the judges’ own professional interests, and these interests now seem to dominate how the judiciary functions as a whole.
While the government of 2020 refused to allow them this share, the Fico government, after 2023, has been willing to fulfil the requests from the representatives of judges. Being on good terms with judicial representatives is, for Fico, a useful strategy, as the allied judiciary does not criticize his steps in domestic democratic backsliding or foreign policy. Moreover, thanks to this stance of the judicial representatives, Fico does not need to launch a systemic attack on courts, as Kaczyński and Orbán did.