Voting for the Government-in-Exile

So far, democracy in Belarus has struggled to establish itself within the country. After the protest movement in 2020, sparked by the rigged presidential elections, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the leader of the Belarusian opposition, went into exile where for the past four years she and her supporters have been trying to penetrate the firm autocratic regime of Alexander Lukashenka. Yet, with not much success. On June 8, the results of the elections for the Coordination Council – an exiled substitute assembly for the in situ Belarusian Parliament were announced. Less than 7,000 people participated in the vote. Despite the considerable efforts to mobilise the voters for the Coordination Council, the exiled opposition has failed to secure any meaningful turnout and thus its much-needed further democratic legitimacy.

The election for the Coordination Council

From May 25 to 27, the Belarusian opposition in exile conducted elections for the Coordination Council. Created in August 2020 to “organize the process of overcoming the political crisis and ensuring social harmony” and “protect the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Belarus,” the Coordination Council was welcomed by the EU states as a temporary political representation of Belarus. In 2022, the council changed its main mission to work on the “program and strategic documents, the organization of discussion of socially significant issues, international cooperation, as well as the preparation and discussion of concepts for the development of Belarus.” The de facto Belarusian government labeled the Coordination Council as an extremist organization.

As most of the candidates for the Council do not reside in Belarus, the campaigns for the elections mostly took place abroad: in Warsaw, Poland, and Vilnius. The members of the Coordination Council include Nobel laureate in literature Sviatlana Alexievich who is the only member residing in Belarus, former Minister of Culture Pavel Latushka, Maria Kalesnikava, who was abducted when the mass protests were still ongoing in 2020 in the middle of the day from a street in Minsk, and of course, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya.

No poll stations in embassies were open for these elections; instead, the voting took place via a data-encrypting application “Belarus ID”, via which anyone with a Belarusian passport could participate (using a VPN when participating from within Belarus) and going through the identification process. The results identified Pavel Latushka as a winner of this election together with the movement “For Freedom”, getting around 35% of votes.

The number of votes is, unfortunately, not impressive. The participation of only 6,723 votes (around 3% of the eligible voters that live outside Belarus) was recorded, a surprising figure given that since 2020, a significant exodus has seen no fewer than 350,000 Belarusians compelled to leave the country. Such a low voter turnout even among those who are not directly threatened by repressions for participating in the elections shows that the Coordination Council needs to do more to increase its legitimacy.

Voting for governments-in-exile

The Belarusian Coordination Council election, although with a low turnout, triggered interesting questions about the legitimacy of the elections for a governments in exile. Is it possible? Is it constitutional? Is it in accordance with international law?

Not all governments in exile are alike: some exiled leaders were forced to leave their countries as they were involved in mass atrocities (e.g. Gambia’s Yahya Jammeh who went to seek haven in neighboring Senegal), others were pushed from their countries by the oppressive authoritarian regimes (for instance, although not necessarily democratically elected, Juan Guaidó of Venezuela exiling in the US). We are interested in the second scenario as the situation with exiled deposed leaders, often facing prosecutions in their countries for mass human rights violations and corruption charges, would be different.

An example of the latter scenario is, of course, the long-standing Tibetan government-in-exile. Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, the 14^th holy leader of Tibet, was forced to flee his country and for already 65 years he and the exiled members of the government have been trying to sustain the exiled democracy in Dharamsala, India. Although not a classical secular state, the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) operates on democratic principles, with elected leadership and institutions. Every five years, elections take place, allowing exiled Tibetans aged 18 and above to cast their votes for a 45-member parliament.

The CTA maintains diplomatic missions and offices in various countries and actively participates in international forums. Yet, states neither officially recognize the CTA as the legitimate government of Tibet nor Tibet as a state under Chinese occupation. While making decisions for the leadership of an unrecognized government could still be important for democracy in general, the Tibetan electoral practices do not trigger many legal issues because of their low impact on international relations with the CTA. The situation with Belarus is different.

As mentioned, the EU recognized the Coordination Council as the “interim representation of the people demanding democratic change in Belarus” and stated that it would not recognize Lukashenka as president. This development presents a complex dilemma: if an exiled government is considered legitimate, what is the status of the in situ government? The clarity on this question is important in many respects such as for determining who bears an obligation to protect Belarusian nationals, the entitlement to represent Belarus in judicial proceedings before international courts, and the authority to make decisions concerning Belarus’s security and foreign policy.

The criteria for recognizing in situ governments do not precisely apply to governments in exile (for the recognition analysis see here). A crucial aspect for exiled governments is their reflection of “the national will.” The notion of the national will, or the representative character, however, holds varied interpretations depending on the context. It is crucial to discern between its role as an initial qualification for government status and as a criterion for its continuity. For instance, while new exiled governments must prove substantial representative character to gain recognition, existing governments forced into exile arguably are freed from this task (read more about this distinction here).

In the context of Belarus, proving the government-in-exile’s representative nature without access to the people they claim to represent is, of course, a challenge. Each exile group must independently establish its representative character, often through demonstrable popular support (see e.g. Crawford at 220) either within their home country or among the exile community. Therefore, establishing a credible claim to represent the national will requires continuous and verifiable efforts to engage with and secure the endorsement of the people – something that the Belarusian opposition has been doing with varying success.

The low number of votes for the Coordination Council can barely reflect the popular support of the Belarusians. Althought the barriers to participation in vote should be taken into account, it seems that the threshold cannot be met this time. Given that the Coordination Council was recognized as an interim parliamentary substitute by a handful of states (mostly EU) and as a legitimate government of Belarus only by Lithuania, it also shows that deeming the Belarusian government-in-exile as a legitimate government under international law would be an unlikely and tenuous proposition.

What’s next?

Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s efforts to keep the Belarusian issue on the radar of European leaders are impressive, although one should notice that the issue receives considerably less attention. In the last four years, since the mass protests, the opposition has achieved little to gain support both at home and abroad. Perhaps, if the elections for the Coordination Council had taken place in February, coinciding with the elections for the current de facto parliament in Belarus, the situation would have been different. By declaring the elections to the Coordination Council as an alternative to Lukashenka’s regime’s elections and by leveraging the momentum of the politicized society, the opposition could have attracted greater support for the alternative regime.

Most importantly, in order to qualify as a legitimate government also under international law, the Bealrusian opposition has to do more to reach its electorate and political arena at home. It needs to clearly define its plans, advertise itself as a strong and capable alternative to the current repressive regime, and invest in communication with its constituencies. European support could also be crucial in this regard: besides maintaining and escalating diplomatic pressure on the current regime, it could assist the opposition in disseminating independent information within Belarus, advocate for the Belarusian opposition on international platforms, increase global awareness and support for their cause as well as provide tools and training to protect opposition members from cyber attacks and surveillance to ensure their safety and the security of their communications and activities.