Countering the Tech Oligarchy

Seeing Elon Musk with Donald Trump at the latter’s inauguration, it would be tempting to single him out as a unique and overbearing threat to a range of EU interests, such as its online environment, election integrity and regulatory capacity. But that would be to miss the point of a larger trend; what Joe Biden has termed the “tech-industrial complex” is not limited to the US. It, and an associated worldwide oligarchy, is converging with ascendant ultra-nationalist political agendas to pose wide-ranging challenges.

Some of these are familiar and have become more apparent recently, as when the EU launched its investigation of TikTok’s role in last November’s Romanian elections. There have also long been concerns over the use of troll farms, Russian and others, as a threat to Europe’s election integrity and online security. And the EU has started several cases against US tech giants both under its Digital Services Act (DSA), and its Digital Markets Act (DMA) (see e.g. here and here). This was never without wider political and economic implications, either. Ultimately, Musk’s involvement  in the new US administration, while posing a novel risk with a purported ally, is not a million miles away from the murky relationship between some Chinese tech companies and the authorities in Beijing.

Musk’s Role Within the Larger Tech-Industrial Complex

It is useful to place the role of Musk in this wider context as it emphasises the need for the EU and others who worry about issues such as undue interference, market dominance and deregulatory pressures to coordinate a broader strategic response. It can also help strengthen the EU’s resolve not to give in to the US on specific tech-related issues, as they are only one aspect of several much larger geopolitical and geo-economic struggles that are now heating up. While the US both in economic terms and as Europe’s security guarantor takes up a different position to Russia, China or other outside powers that mean to have a malign influence in the bloc, the issues at stake are very similar. Giving in to American special interests could also undermine the EU’s efforts against those other actors by weakening the whole regulatory structure.

During Donald Trump’s first term as president, the EU on the whole managed to prioritise adherence to its own laws and regulations over the pressures of sometimes strident US trade demands. This held for areas as varied as agricultural exports, the tech industry and steel tariffs. In some of those cases, the US complained about EU regulations acting as trade barriers in the way that the tech companies are now doing in the case of both the DSA and DMA. While cases such as Musk’s election interference, in terms of the algorithms that promote his content on his own platform, and TikTok’s role in Romania might appear to lay somewhat outside the scope of commercial disputes, the EU has thus far at least partially framed the response in terms of the DSA.

The Growing Interplay Between Tech Titans and Political Power

One of the several differences with Trump’s first term is that there’s now a much closer proximity between the tech-industry and the political powers that be, so close in fact that Musk acts as an influential advisor to the President and the new administration. While the power of the various American industry lobbies in previous administrations should not be understated, and captains of industry have in the past also headed departments, think of Commerce and Treasury secretaries, Musk’s profile and the scope of his interests set him apart. So do his willingness to undermine supposed allies and his heedlessness in promoting his interests and views.

This is both enabled and encouraged by Trump and his circle. They share with Musk a range of proclivities, such as opposition to regulation, a small government obsession, and a bias in favour of the ultra-rich and American mega-corporations, all of which make them naturally and caustically opposed to the EU. Both because of what it stands for and as a powerful rival that they regard as being vulnerable to being hollowed out from within and divided up into more easily intimidated morsels.

Another difference with Trump’s first term is that this animosity is now a lot more crystalised and advanced. By all accounts, Trump and his advisors are now either better prepared to navigate the obstacles on their confrontational course, be they legal, political or otherwise. And if they’re still thwarted, they’re more likely to resort to risky unorthodox practices to get their way. 

All this means that whereas in Trump’s first term, the EU was often able to stick to its guns, drag out procedures, retaliate, negotiate or appease, the latter, for example, by buying more US soybeans, such options might yield less favourable results this time around. 

A Changing EU Landscape: Internal Divisions and External Pressures

Added to that is a starkly different internal EU picture in terms of far- or hard-right fellow travellers of Trump’s being in charge in some major EU countries, including Italy, the Netherlands, and soon probably in Austria, in addition to Hungary, where Viktor Orban was already in power, and Slovakia. And both in Germany and France, the far-right is on the rise. Also, the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine is putting more security and economic pressure on the EU than was the case from 2016 to 2020.

The bloc’s internal cohesion could well come into question at some point, which could lead to a worst-case scenario of ad hoc coalitions of several powerful member countries. But before it comes to that, if ever, Brussels might turn up the dial on some other mechanisms to deal with the pressure from Musk and Trump. It could for one, treat some of the challenges as a matter of cybersecurity and defence. The European Commission has already partly done so in the case of TikTok and the Romanian elections. While this would have been unthinkable vis-à-vis the US until recently, the new situation might well call for parallel tracks of NATO-cooperation and an EU-led security policy that treats the erstwhile American ally increasingly as a security risk almost on a par with Russia and China, especially on issues such as cyberspace and AI.

Towards a United Front: Cybersecurity and Global Alliances

Another track would be strengthening international cooperation on cyber security and against disinformation. The EU is already cooperating with like-minded partners, such as Japan, South Korea, Australia and Canada but could do even more, especially as the US withdraws from the disinformation field and becomes either less reliable or more antagonistic. The recent closing of the US State Department’s Global Engagement Center that was tasked with fighting global disinformation efforts, provides an insight into the new administration’s stance on such issues and offers the EU a chance to fill the vacuum.

The Real Battleground: Education, Media, and the Narrative War

The new American and global constellation will require the EU to calibrate carefully on which tracks to engage with the challenges posed by Musk and Trump. But in terms of fighting broad problems such as disinformation, online insecurity and election interference, that struggle might have to take place elsewhere. Polarising societal narratives are being boosted online, from vaccine hesitancy to migration to ‘anti-wokery’. Even with more regulation, which might help a little bit, the real battleground is in education, the media and politics. The EU will need to look after its security, online and elsewhere, in terms of realpolitik but it and others who oppose the splintering of society driven by a desire for profits and hegemony, will need to be better and develop a compelling narrative to tell their story.