Paying Judges Properly
On 22 February, several thousand marched in Budapest for an independent judiciary, including fair pay for judges. Three days later, the CJEU issued a decision in Joined Cases C‑146/23 and C‑374/23, setting out the EU law criteria for judges’ remuneration. The decision sets general minimum criteria for the remuneration of judges to guarantee their independence and is highly relevant for Hungary, where the salary pathway for judges is not set by law, it is not judicially enforceable, and the entire system lacks foreseeability.
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Voraussetzungen des Vertrauens im Auslieferungsrecht
Die Auslieferung von Maja T. nach Ungarn im Juni 2024 hat erhebliche verfassungsrechtliche Bedenken aufgeworfen. Das Bundesverfassungsgericht hat in seinem Urteil vom 24. Januar 2025 das Kammergericht nun für seine Entscheidung und die unzureichende Prüfung der Haftbedingungen in Ungarn kritisiert. Das Urteil betont die Pflicht der Gerichte, Zusicherungen im Auslieferungsverfahren nicht ungeprüft zu akzeptieren und stärkt die Position von Personen in Auslieferungsverfahren.
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Four Reasons Why Illiberal Politics Appropriated the Memory of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution
In this contribution, I am analysing the reasons for the appropriation of the 1956 Hungarian revolution. I argue that these reasons are four-fold: First, the memory of 1956 has been divided from the start. Second, half of the population, namely women, were excluded from this memory. Third, the revolution was a bottom-up event. Fourth, the transition after 1990 was built on the concept of authenticity and truth made the narrative vulnerable to illiberal appropriation.
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The Authoritarian Market Playbook
For more than a decade, lawyers and political scientists have extensively studied the “authoritarian playbook” – the instruments, methods and processes used by autocrats such as Hungary’s Viktor Orbán to capture established democracies. However, so far, the impact of autocratic economic governance on the rule of law has been surprisingly underexplored in the legal field. The respective electoral wins of Donald Trump in 2016 and 2024 illustrate that economic policies are often at the heart of authoritarian actors’ electoral success and ideological goals. Even more so, this is certainly true for Hungary, as Orbán’s political regime is deeply rooted in crony state capitalism and institutionalized corruption.
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The Diversity of Legal Governance of Memory in Europe
Memory laws pose a set of distinct challenges for modern democracies, including in the realm of human rights law. In the four reports, conducted during the MEMOCRACY project, we took stock of the dynamics, trade-offs, and the effects of legal governance of historical memory in a region ridden with mnemonic conflicts. This contribution distils the most interesting comparative findings of the reports, namely the fact that the countries’ own and foreign experiences with totalitarianism are legally and politically approached very differently. On this basis, we sketch the consequences and challenges of these fundamental differences, both for the establishment of a “European memory” and the various states’ approaches to modern geopolitics.
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How the Destroyers of Academic Freedom Masquerade Themselves as Its Victims
Under the authoritarian leadership of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, the government has started a culture war to dismantle the independence of academic institutions, including universities and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, arguing that they represent a threat to their proudly proclaimed illiberal ideology. Ironically, after dismantling academic freedom in the country, Orbán’s administration started to claim that actually the liberals are the ones who, through "cancel culture", threaten academic freedom.
Continue reading >>First Time as Tragedy, Second Time as Farce
In December 2023 the Hungarian Parliament speedily adopted the Act on the Protection of National Sovereignty and by February 2024 the government had already designated the Sovereignty Protection Office (SPO) for its enforcement. The history repeats itself, first time as tragedy, second time as farce. The current activities of the SPO exemplify the Hungarian government’s ongoing efforts to undermine free and independent society. It is crucial for the Union and European civil society to once again act swiftly to prevent the harassment of journalists and the potential disappearance of NGOs.
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The Hungarian Treeless Treetop Walkway
In the small village of Nyírmártonfalva in northeastern Hungary, there stands a wooden treetop walkway designed for walking among the tree canopies. Yet, there are no trees around. The European Public Prosecutor’s Office initiated proceedings to investigate this allegedly fraudulent appropriation of the EU common budget. In early August 2024, the Hungarian Office of the Prosecutor General rejected EPPO's jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the EPPO has jurisdiction according to the result theory, accepted also in Hungary, due to the place where the result of an offence occurs.
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Hungary’s Sovereignty Protection Sham
Hungary’s persistent rule of law and corruption shortcomings have led the EU to freeze EUR 27.8 billion in funding under various conditionality regimes. Prime Minister Orbán, who relies on these funds to maintain his political machinery and reward loyalists, has wielded Hungary’s veto in the Council to unlock this funding. Moreover, Hungary adopted the Act LXXXVIII of 2023 on the protection of national sovereignty (Sovereignty Law), which sets up the Sovereignty Protection Office (SPO), a state entity created to defend Hungarian sovereignty. This post examines the Sovereignty Law and calls the EU to effectively halt the SPO’s activities and prevent this model from spreading elsewhere.
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Aristotle in the Commission
Today, the European Commission issued its fifth Annual Rule of Law Report (ARoLR). While this monitoring exercise has come a long way and has been significantly improved, the rule of law backsliding remains one of the most pressing issues of the EU. In the following I present seven recommendations how to improve the Commission’s monitoring exercise. At the core lies a differentiation between a democracy and a hybrid regime. Once a Member State qualifies as the latter, it must be treated accordingly.
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Never Again. And Not Quite.
Those who build new public law act with the past hovering over their shoulders. Rejecting regimes of horror explains much of the content of new constitutions. Aversive constitutionalism – in which constitutionalists overtly steer away from a country’s appalling pasts – guides how they understand these new texts. On balance, even among those who disagree over precisely how the past is memorialized as “never again” in new constitutions, evidence shows that the horrors of the past influence public law in the present much more than do the dreams of some ideal future.
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In Favour of the Hungarian Council Presidency
On the 1 July 2024, Hungary will start its second EU Council Presidency. In light of Hungary’s continuous breaches of the rule of law, questions have been posed whether the Presidency could be postponed or cancelled (also here). However, given the mere informal powers of the Presidency, I argue that the real damage is rather limited, especially because the Hungarian Presidency takes place just after the European elections. Finally, the Hungarian Presidency may even improve the connection of its citizens with the EU and show the best version of itself to the other Member States.
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Rule of Law Chickens Coming Home to Roost
Ongoing assaults by Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz administration on the rule of law in Hungary have produced manifold reactions, generally of depressingly limited effectiveness. Last week, on 13 June 2024, in Case C-123/22 European Commission v Hungary, the Court ordered a record lump sum payment of €200,000,000 and a penalty payment of €1,000,000 per day of delay until an earlier 2020 Court ruling is complied with. Hungary thus received a stinging reminder that the Court of Justice is not toothless when it comes to the rule of law.
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Ten Commandments to Stifle Academic Freedom
Since 2010, the beginning of the populist takeover and the authoritarian transition, Hungary has gathered a lot of experience on how to dismantle academic freedom. This knowledge can be useful for other autocrats as well. But even if we don’t want to give them tips on how to repeat what happened and is happening in this country, it might still be worth reconstructing how it all took place. This can be especially useful for calculating what to expect from autocrats and preparing how to defend against them.
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The Sovereign Protection Office as the Tip of the Iceberg
In December 2023, the Hungarian Parliament passed a law establishing a Sovereign Protection Office—a state administration which now possesses unfettered access to personal data to find and sanction supposed foreign agents among the Hungarian populace. This office operates at will and without oversight, offers no avenue for legal redress, and wields prison time upwards of three years. In recent weeks, the European Commission launched an infringement proceeding over the law, and the European Parliament called on the European Council to consider Article 7(2) procedures.
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A Constitutional Dignitary Conceived in the Orbán-Regime
On 26 February, Tamás Sulyok, the former President of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, was elected Head of State by the Parliament. The election of Tamás Sulyok as a member of the Constitutional Court and then as its president was part of the process during which Fidesz took over the Constitutional Court. Sulyok’s presidency (2016-2024) was a testimony to the fact that the Constitutional Court has become subservient to the Fidesz-dominated political branches, and there is no sign that he has actively tried to do anything against it. Based on what we have seen so far, therefore, Tamás Sulyok is part of the Orbán-regime, and nothing suggests that he will exercise greater autonomy and independence in his role as Head of State.
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Taking Revenge for Dissent
Hungary’s latest judicial reform in May 2023 came in response to EU decisions to suspend the country’s access to funds due to serious rule of law concerns. The reform aimed, among other things, to strengthen the independence of the Kúria, the Supreme Court of Hungary. Experience to date shows that while on the level of formal legal rules, some improvements towards the rule of law have been made, in actual daily practice, the opposite is happening: While steps have been taken to restore the independence of the Kúria, the Chief Justice is working on further eroding the independence of individual judges.
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