In 2022, Moldova launched an ambitious judicial vetting process to fight corruption in the justice system. To that end, it created special commissions tasked with reviewing the integrity of members of judicial self-governing bodies, as well as senior judges and prosecutors. Because such bodies exercise far-reaching powers over judicial careers and discipline, their own independence is crucial.

In Moldova, this independence is now at stake: the ruling majority of Parliament lowered the threshold for appointing members to a simple majority. What may appear to be a technical adjustment points to something more fundamental. Read in light of the ECtHR’s case law on Poland’s contested justice reforms, the new Moldovan threshold risks undermining the Commission’s independence under Article 6 ECHR and, unfortunately with it, the legitimacy of the vetting process itself.

A gatekeeper against partisan capture

Half of the vetting commissions’ members are international experts nominated, inter alia, by the European Union. Since 2016, the ECtHR and the Venice Commission had already endorsed similar mechanisms in Albania and Ukraine. While they are an essential integrity tool, there is a risk that these commissions are “misused to eliminate politically ‘undesirable’” officeholders (CDL-AD(2023)005 § 26). Therefore, the laws establishing the three commissions foresaw that Parliament could appoint members only with the votes of “3/5 of the elected deputies” (Art. 6 Law 252/2023). The provision ensured that a single political majority could not control such a “radical” – and thus delicate – reform.

On 26 February 2026, instead of the necessary 61, 53 deputies voted to appoint the new international vetting member proposed by the ruling majority for the Prosecutorial Vetting Commission. Never before (or after) did a proposal fail in the plenary – the result of all opposition parties forming an unparalleled alliance.

If the threshold does not fit, make it fit

Instead of picking another international expert from the list of six candidates, the ruling majority quickly amended the law and lowered the threshold for appointing international members of vetting commissions to a simple majority (new para. 5-1 of Art. 6 Law 252/2023). Eight days later, on 6 March 2026, the plenary appointed the initially proposed member by a simple majority of 53 votes. On 9 March 2026, the Constitutional Court refused to suspend the legal amendment, referring to a lack of “irreparable consequences” (42a/2026).

EU representatives reacted critically to the amendment, as did an unusual alliance of Moldovan civil society organisations. Pushed by the European Union, the Moldovan Parliament asked the Venice Commission for an opinion on the lowered threshold.

The role of the Prosecutorial Vetting Commission

The Prosecutorial Vetting Commission (hereinafter: the Commission) has two functions: first, vetting candidates for office (new prosecutors, promotions, new members of the prosecutorial self-governance body); second, vetting sitting prosecutors. If this Commission “decides on the determination of someone’s” rights (tribunal) as per Art. 6 ECHR, the appointment of its members needs to be in line with the ECtHR’s case law.

The role of the Commission is stronger when vetting candidates for office: The Commission’s “decision on failing the integrity evaluation constitutes a legal basis not to allow the candidate to the elections or competition” (Art. 13 Law 26/2022; Art. 21 Law 252/2023). It has no immediate disciplinary effect and is thus more comparable to that of a prosecutorial self-governance body selecting prosecutors to official positions than a disciplinary body administering sanctions such as dismissals. Art. 6 ECHR also covers the “right to a lawful and fair promotion procedure” (Bara, § 58); therefore, the Commission must be independent.

For vetting of sitting prosecutors, the Commission’s role is weaker: It only adopts a “report”. Based on this report, the prosecutorial self-governance body – now with new members after the first round of vetting – takes the final decision on whether the judge or prosecutor should be dismissed (Art. 18 para. 5 Law 252/2023). Still, the term “report” is somewhat euphemistic. The Commission’s role is not only to “ascertain and record facts which might subsequently be used as the basis for action by other competent authorities” (Fayed § 61). The Commission rather “concludes” and publicly “proposes” passing or dismissal of prosecutors through a report that it “issues”, and which, if disagreeing, the prosecutorial self-governing body must formally “reject” (Art. 18 III b Law 252/2023); if rejected, the (independent) Commission “resumes” its work.

In addition to these legal aspects, de facto, the Commission “may weaken the role” of the prosecutorial self-governing body (CDL-AD(2023)005 § 28): First, only the Commission has the specialisation and the manpower to analyse a vast amount of financial data over a time span of more than 12 years for each prosecutor. Second, the Commission’s hearings and the overall results (integrity: yes/no) are available online and potentially prejudge the vetted prosecutor in the public’s eye. Third, the additional credibility of international experts on the Commission – who are detached from local politics – challenges the prosecutorial self-governance body to “dare” deviating from the Commission’s finding. As of 3 April 2026, the prosecutorial self-governance body had deviated in 4 out of 23 cases.

All in all, Art. 6 ECHR applies to both aspects of integrity vetting: denying candidates appointments and promotions, or recommending the dismissal of sitting prosecutors.

A delicate influence

A central feature of an independent judiciary is to be detached from the parliamentary majority. To this end, “the means by which its members have been appointed” should not be “capable of giving rise to legitimate doubts […] as to the imperviousness of that court to external factors, in particular as to the direct or indirect influence of the legislature” (CJEU C-585/18, § 171). The ECtHR echoed this finding almost verbatim (“undue influence of the legislative”, Reczkowicz, § 276), contrasting a simple parliamentary “majority” with a 3/5-threshold (§ 176).

The ECtHR has also underlined the “extraordinary nature of the vetting process” (Xhoxhaj, § 297): As an exception, vetting commissions can dismiss life-tenure judges based only on “serious doubts” about their integrity (CDL-AD(2023)005) with the burden of proof partially on the judge. This calls for even stronger independence of vetting bodies than for ordinary judicial councils.

While “tribunals” in the sense of Art. 6 ECHR usually consist of life-tenure judges, international members of vetting commissions are consultants, and their next assignment may be perceived as depending on “good behaviour” – towards internationals who nominate them and towards state bodies who select and appoint them. If judges had to live from one temporary contract to another, the ECtHR would hardly call this “independent” (CDL-JD(2008)002 p. 4). In its judgements on Albania, the ECtHR could not yet assess this issue, as the vetting commission had no international members. By contrast, several international members in Moldova and Ukraine applied for and worked for more than one vetting commission.

Commission secretariats ruled by the majority?

Another aspect has received little attention so far: the Secretariat, which is the “operational backbone” of each vetting body, providing “critical […] analytical support”. International members of vetting commissions are “blind” if they do not understand the local language: They see only what their local assistants or local commission members identify for them in thousands of data sets. Trust-based relations with individual staff whom they can instruct at their own discretion are essential.

In general, there are more staff than members in vetting bodies. The Moldovan Prosecutorial Commission calculates “two analysts and one legal advisor” to be necessary per member. The Moldovan Law 252/2023 delegates human resources beyond the Commission’s reach (Art. 9 Law 252/2023) without any word on the Commission’s role in hiring or firing staff, and without the right of members to determine their own assistance. The absence of such a right significantly reduces the independence of international members. In two out of the ten vetting commissions I have assisted, the commission majority or the financing international project hired or dismissed staff against the will of individual or several members. The ECtHR has not yet had to review the aspect of staff support, as all decisions so far are about the Albanian vetting commission with only national members.

Conclusion

Several question marks remain as to whether the Moldovan Prosecutorial Vetting Commission is still an independent tribunal. This is a pity: judicial vetting is a very promising tool. If vetting is to remain a credible rule-of-law instrument in Moldova and beyond, the legitimacy of commission members must rest on more than a bare parliamentary majority. The Moldovan legislator should honour the support in millions of EU taxpayers’ money by adhering to European standards. In the context of Albanian vetting, the ECtHR already found a violation of Article 6 ECHR because a sitting member of the vetting commission had been appointed in violation of domestic law (Cani, § 116). The ECtHR might have to look at the issue of vetting “tribunals” again, this time from the perspective of independence – and based on a case from Moldova.

The author would like to thank Vera Devine and David Wellstein for their comments on a draft of this article. Disclosure: The author was a member of one vetting commission in Ukraine and was nominated as a member to four more commissions in Moldova and Ukraine, but not to the Prosecutorial Commission subject of this article.