21 Juni 2014

Slovenia: a de facto failed constitutional democracy

The political and legal crisis in Slovenia has escalated further. The opposition leader, the former Prime Minister Janez Janša, was taken to prison on June 20 amid public protests and harsh critique waged by the most prominent Slovenian constitutional lawyers. The crisis is due to have huge impact on the fairness of the election, scheduled for July 13. However, this seems to be of no concern to the highest Slovenian courts.

On Monday June 16 the Constitutional Court rejected the petitioner’s constitutional complaint as premature, for failing to fulfill extraordinary legal remedies at the Supreme Court. The Court refused to apply Art 51 of the Constitutional Court Act, which exceptionally allows for a constitutional complaint prior to the exhaustion of all legal remedies if the alleged violation of human rights is manifest and if the petitioner is to suffer unrepairable consequences.

The Court ruled 6:3 that while the alleged violations of the petitioner’s rights were serious, they were not manifest, within the meaning of the Court’s judicial test, so to allow a direct review. This was opposed by three judges, writing for the minority, who have produced extremely critical dissenting opinions, unprecedented in the history of the Court, stressing that the violations of human rights were not only manifest, but were patent and flagrant and were violated in a trial that was manifestly unfair.

The reluctance of the Court to rule on the merits of the constitutional complaint was also heavily criticized by four former Constitutional Court justices. One of them, self-proclaimed political opponent of Mr. Janša, stressed that the final ruling was based on such a violation of procedural, indeed fundamental principles of law (most notably: nemo iudex since actore) that he entertained no doubt that the ruling would be and shall be voided by the Supreme Court – immediately.

He was, however, wrong. And so was the Constitutional Court. The latter justified its reluctance to rule on the constitutional complaint prior to the exhaustion of all legal remedies by stressing the importance of the institutional loyalty and its trust in the Supreme Court that it will effectively protect the petitioner’s rights, including by suspending the prison sentence until ruling on the merits of the case. However, the Supreme Court obviously defied its trust. What has been going on there, according to media reports, amounts to a farce.

The case was assigned to a judge rapporteur who wanted to recuse herself and as her request was denied by the President of the Supreme Court, she left for a vacation that she had planned before. The President of the Court simultaneously refused to assign the case to another judge, stressing that while the case is of a multidimensional and absolute importance, it justified no special treatment. Moreover, the Supreme Court was – in its public statement – of the opinion that the petitioner himself could have asked for the suspension of the sentence by turning to the District court. As this has not been done, the case is estimated to be decided by the Supreme Court in the usual period of time, that is in four months!

It follows from this that Slovenian judiciary is passing the hot potato from one instance to another, blaming it on the petitioner for failing to use his legal remedies correctly, even when, with all respect to the rule of law, the courts should have acted ex-offo. However, while all this can appear to formally comply with the procedural rules, this is pure formalism. In reality, de facto, the petitioner has no effective legal remedy at hand to defend his liberty (he is in prison, where he can remain for a number of weeks, even months, as the Supreme Court deliberates, patiently waiting for judges to finish their vacation) and to defend his right to stand for election (he is anticipated to stay in the closed or semi-closed prison ward with no or very limited access to public).

Slovenia has thus become a primer example of a de facto failed constitutional democracy, whereby the orchestrated media which filter, as much as possible, the few academic voices that have spoken out – not in favor of the petitioner ad personam, let alone his political party, but in favor of what law and justice require, refuse to present to the wider public the Patria case for what it really stands for – an apparent abuse and instrumentalization of law, through the actions and omissions of the judiciary, to eliminate particular political opponents and to consolidate political, economic, legal-institutional and finally overall social power in the hands in which it has rested so far, that is the old-new post-communist elite. Indeed, this is happening in a country, which used to be known as the best disciple among the new Member States of the European Union.


SUGGESTED CITATION  Avbelj, Matej: Slovenia: a de facto failed constitutional democracy, VerfBlog, 2014/6/21, https://verfassungsblog.de/slovenia-de-facto-failed-constitutional-democracy/.

4 Comments

  1. trilogy Mi 25 Jun 2014 at 22:45 - Reply

    http://www.wobbing.eu/news/untold-yugoslavian-arms-trade-scandal

    Journalists Matej Šurc and Blaž Zgaga investigated the illegal trade of arms in Slovenia during the early 1990s and chronicled their findings in the trilogy In the Name of the State. The first volume of the trilogy, Sell, published in June 2011, focused on the sale of arms and ammunition. The second volume, Resell, appeared in October 2011 and dealt with the purchase of arms abroad and subsequent resale to Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina during the UN arms embargo. The third volume, Cover-up, describes how the arms smugglers managed to keep their activities largely concealed for the last twenty years and was published in April 2012.

  2. OPEN LETTER Do 26 Jun 2014 at 09:59 - Reply

    odprto pismo, ki ga je lani januarja Matej Šurc poslal takrat še predsedniku vlade Janezu Janši:

    „Spoštovani,
    komisija za preprečevanje korupcije je med drugim ugotovila, da se je vaše premoženje nepojasnjeno povečalo za najmanj 210.000 evrov. Vira teh sredstev komisiji še niste razkrili, dokazno breme pa je v tem primeru na vaši strani.
    Naj vas zato spomnim na prodajo od JLA prevzetega in zaseženega orožja ter preprodajo v tujini nabavljenega orožja, ki je večinoma potekala med letoma 1991 in 1993. Takrat ste bili minister za obrambo. Ko je v Sloveniji cvetelo vojno dobičkarstvo, nadzorni mehanizmi niso bili učinkoviti ali pa še niso bili vzpostavljeni. Rojstvo države in bližino vojne je bilo tako mogoče izkoristiti tudi za prodajo orožja, torej za plenjenje države in kopičenje zasebnega bogastva. Na tem mestu ne želim pogrevati sicer nikoli docela pojasnjenih orožarskih afer, niti razpravljati o etiki, še manj o kazenski odgovornosti, kajti postopki povezani z orožjem so (razen Patrie) zastarali. Nerešeno pa ostaja bistveno vprašanje: kje je denar od orožja? Odgovor si zaslužijo tudi branilci iz Hrvaške ter BiH, ki so v Sloveniji kupovali orožje – tudi po oderuških cenah.
    V zadnjih petih letih sva z novinarskim kolegom temeljito preučila dokumentacijo o trgovini z orožjem, ki sem jo pridobil s pomočjo Informacijske pooblaščenke. Napisala sva tri knjige s skupnim naslovom V imenu države (Odprodaja, Preprodaja, Prikrivanje). V trilogiji so objavljeni verodostojni dokumenti in izjave prič, ki kažejo na to, da ste vi nadzorovali gotovinsko prodajo orožja in skrbeli za izkupičke. Jeseni 1994 je Uprava za logistiko Ministrstva za obrambo preštela količino in vrste na Hrvaško in v BiH prodanega orožja ter ocenila, da je bilo vredno najmanj 140 milijonov takratnih nemških mark. Ko ste vodili ministrstvo, je bil za gotovinsko prodajo orožja operativno zadolžen Varnostni organ MO (Vomo). Njegov direktor je bil Andrej Lovšin, evidence pa je vodil Franci Cimerman, vendar so te pozneje izginile.
    V drugi polovici leta 1994 je na Vomu potekala notranja preiskava. Vodja protiobveščevalnega oddelka je priznal, da je Cimerman po Lovšinovem nalogu čez mejo v Avstrijo petkrat peljal poslovni kovček poln nemških mark. Vodja obveščevalnega oddelka pa je preiskovalcem povedal, da je Vomo do spomladi 1993 iztržil 60 milijonov mark. Denar, ki je ostal v Lovšinovi blagajni, je bil po njegovih besedah izročen vam. Cimerman je na zaslišanjih v Državnem zboru trdil, da je vse počel po Lovšinovem nalogu, Lovšin pa je ponavljal, da je o teh stvareh potrebno vprašati vas.
    Takih in podobnih obremenilnih zadev na vaš račun je v trilogiji še veliko, vendar avtorjev niste tožili.
    V tretji knjigi je objavljeno tudi vaše poročilo o orožju od maja 1990 do septembra 1993, kjer je zapisanih precej polresnic in zavajajočih podatkov. Prodaje orožja za gotovino pa sploh niste omenili. Nedavno mi je Informacijska pooblaščenka omogočila še vpogled v nekatera doslej zaupna poročila Komisije DZ za nadzor obveščevalnih in varnostnih služb o trgovini z orožjem in v posebno analizo dokumentov, ki sta jo spomladi 2008 za DZ pripravila strokovnjaka Mitja Klavora in Bojan Gričar. Pritrdila sta ugotovitvam, da je MO na Hrvaško prodajal orožje po nekajkrat višjih cenah, kot ste jih prikazali v svojem poročilu. Navedli ste tudi znatno manjše količine orožja od dejansko prodanih. Še vedno pa niste argumentirano pojasnili, kam je šel izkupiček, ki je bil, kljub pomanjkljivi (uničeni) dokumentaciji, ocenjen na več deset milijonov nemških mark.
    Iz dokumentacije je razvidno, da je imel uslužbenec MO na Bank für Kärnten und Steiermark v Celovcu odprt račun. Z njega je vplačal nakup avtomobilov za ministrstvo, nakup pištol iz Italije in gradbene storitve podjetja SCT za specialno brigado Moris. Kriminalisti so v devetdesetih letih pozivali tožilstvo, naj pristojni organi v drugih državah omogočijo vpogled v BKS in druge banke ter na bančne račune podružnic slovenskih podjetij v Nemčiji, Švici … zaradi suma pranja denarja od prodaje orožja. Vendar tožilstvo tega ni storilo. Ampak denar je nekam moral iti? V zasebne žepe, v davčne oaze, na druge kontinente …?
    Zakaj ste bili v prvih dneh leta 2007 v Avstraliji? Ali drži, da ste se takrat izmuznili varnostnikoma in obiskali banke v Sydneyu? Kakšne zadolžitve pri domnevno vaših računih v avstralskih bankah imata nekdanji častni generalni konzul Republike Slovenije na Novi Zelandiji Dušan Lajovic in častni konzul Avstralije v Sloveniji Viktor Baraga? •
    Matej Šurc, Radovljica „

  3. wikileaks Sa 28 Jun 2014 at 17:14 - Reply

    14. (S/NF) According to a clandestine source with direct
    access to an empoloyee of Rotis, Prime Minister Jansa’s SDS
    received more than 2.8 million Euro from Patria “under the
    table” as part of the deal for armored vehicles. The source
    also noted that Sto Ravne had failed to offer a similar
    contributuion to Jansa’s party.

    https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07LJUBLJANA337_a.html

  4. Viljem Do 3 Jul 2014 at 10:22 - Reply

    Did ex-Slovenian president and ex-Communist Party leader sell arms to Bosnia and Herzegovina in early 90’s? The enclosed original documents regarding correspondence between Kučan and Izetbegović tells us more than many are prepared to believe. See: http://www.vinkogorenak.net/2014/07/01/milan-kucan-trgovec-z-orozjem/
    O vlogi tovariša Kučana pri prodaji orožja BiH si lahko preberete na tejle strani, kjer so priloženi zgovorni dokumenti.
    http://www.vinkogorenak.net/2014/07/01/milan-kucan-trgovec-z-orozjem/

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Other posts about this region:
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21 Juni 2014

Slovenia: a de facto failed constitutional democracy

The political and legal crisis in Slovenia has escalated further. The opposition leader, the former Prime Minister Janez Janša, was taken to prison on June 20 amid public protests and harsh critique waged by the most prominent Slovenian constitutional lawyers. The crisis is due to have huge impact on the fairness of the election, scheduled for July 13. However, this seems to be of no concern to the highest Slovenian courts.

On Monday June 16 the Constitutional Court rejected the petitioner’s constitutional complaint as premature, for failing to fulfill extraordinary legal remedies at the Supreme Court. The Court refused to apply Art 51 of the Constitutional Court Act, which exceptionally allows for a constitutional complaint prior to the exhaustion of all legal remedies if the alleged violation of human rights is manifest and if the petitioner is to suffer unrepairable consequences.

The Court ruled 6:3 that while the alleged violations of the petitioner’s rights were serious, they were not manifest, within the meaning of the Court’s judicial test, so to allow a direct review. This was opposed by three judges, writing for the minority, who have produced extremely critical dissenting opinions, unprecedented in the history of the Court, stressing that the violations of human rights were not only manifest, but were patent and flagrant and were violated in a trial that was manifestly unfair.

The reluctance of the Court to rule on the merits of the constitutional complaint was also heavily criticized by four former Constitutional Court justices. One of them, self-proclaimed political opponent of Mr. Janša, stressed that the final ruling was based on such a violation of procedural, indeed fundamental principles of law (most notably: nemo iudex since actore) that he entertained no doubt that the ruling would be and shall be voided by the Supreme Court – immediately.

He was, however, wrong. And so was the Constitutional Court. The latter justified its reluctance to rule on the constitutional complaint prior to the exhaustion of all legal remedies by stressing the importance of the institutional loyalty and its trust in the Supreme Court that it will effectively protect the petitioner’s rights, including by suspending the prison sentence until ruling on the merits of the case. However, the Supreme Court obviously defied its trust. What has been going on there, according to media reports, amounts to a farce.

The case was assigned to a judge rapporteur who wanted to recuse herself and as her request was denied by the President of the Supreme Court, she left for a vacation that she had planned before. The President of the Court simultaneously refused to assign the case to another judge, stressing that while the case is of a multidimensional and absolute importance, it justified no special treatment. Moreover, the Supreme Court was – in its public statement – of the opinion that the petitioner himself could have asked for the suspension of the sentence by turning to the District court. As this has not been done, the case is estimated to be decided by the Supreme Court in the usual period of time, that is in four months!

It follows from this that Slovenian judiciary is passing the hot potato from one instance to another, blaming it on the petitioner for failing to use his legal remedies correctly, even when, with all respect to the rule of law, the courts should have acted ex-offo. However, while all this can appear to formally comply with the procedural rules, this is pure formalism. In reality, de facto, the petitioner has no effective legal remedy at hand to defend his liberty (he is in prison, where he can remain for a number of weeks, even months, as the Supreme Court deliberates, patiently waiting for judges to finish their vacation) and to defend his right to stand for election (he is anticipated to stay in the closed or semi-closed prison ward with no or very limited access to public).

Slovenia has thus become a primer example of a de facto failed constitutional democracy, whereby the orchestrated media which filter, as much as possible, the few academic voices that have spoken out – not in favor of the petitioner ad personam, let alone his political party, but in favor of what law and justice require, refuse to present to the wider public the Patria case for what it really stands for – an apparent abuse and instrumentalization of law, through the actions and omissions of the judiciary, to eliminate particular political opponents and to consolidate political, economic, legal-institutional and finally overall social power in the hands in which it has rested so far, that is the old-new post-communist elite. Indeed, this is happening in a country, which used to be known as the best disciple among the new Member States of the European Union.


SUGGESTED CITATION  Avbelj, Matej: Slovenia: a de facto failed constitutional democracy, VerfBlog, 2014/6/21, https://verfassungsblog.de/slovenia-de-facto-failed-constitutional-democracy/, DOI: 10.17176/20170303-160430.

8 Comments

  1. bogoslav So 22 Jun 2014 at 15:04 - Reply

    congratualtion for an excellent article

  2. open letter Mi 25 Jun 2014 at 22:28 - Reply

    Spoštovani, komisija za preprečevanje korupcije je med drugim ugotovila, da se je vaše premoženje nepojasnjeno povečalo za najmanj 210.000 evrov. Vira teh sredstev komisiji še niste razkrili, dokazno breme pa je v tem primeru na vaši strani.
    Naj vas zato spomnim na prodajo od JLA prevzetega in zaseženega orožja ter preprodajo v tujini nabavljenega orožja, ki je večinoma potekala med letoma 1991 in 1993. Takrat ste bili minister za obrambo. Ko je v Sloveniji cvetelo vojno dobičkarstvo, nadzorni mehanizmi niso bili učinkoviti ali pa še niso bili vzpostavljeni. Rojstvo države in bližino vojne je bilo tako mogoče izkoristiti tudi za prodajo orožja, torej za plenjenje države in kopičenje zasebnega bogastva. Na tem mestu ne želim pogrevati sicer nikoli docela pojasnjenih orožarskih afer, niti razpravljati o etiki, še manj o kazenski odgovornosti, kajti postopki povezani z orožjem so (razen Patrie) zastarali. Nerešeno pa ostaja bistveno vprašanje: kje je denar od orožja? Odgovor si zaslužijo tudi branilci iz Hrvaške ter BiH, ki so v Sloveniji kupovali orožje – tudi po oderuških cenah.
    V zadnjih petih letih sva z novinarskim kolegom temeljito preučila dokumentacijo o trgovini z orožjem, ki sem jo pridobil s pomočjo Informacijske pooblaščenke. Napisala sva tri knjige s skupnim naslovom V imenu države (Odprodaja, Preprodaja, Prikrivanje). V trilogiji so objavljeni verodostojni dokumenti in izjave prič, ki kažejo na to, da ste vi nadzorovali gotovinsko prodajo orožja in skrbeli za izkupičke. Jeseni 1994 je Uprava za logistiko Ministrstva za obrambo preštela količino in vrste na Hrvaško in v BiH prodanega orožja ter ocenila, da je bilo vredno najmanj 140 milijonov takratnih nemških mark. Ko ste vodili ministrstvo, je bil za gotovinsko prodajo orožja operativno zadolžen Varnostni organ MO (Vomo). Njegov direktor je bil Andrej Lovšin, evidence pa je vodil Franci Cimerman, vendar so te pozneje izginile.
    V drugi polovici leta 1994 je na Vomu potekala notranja preiskava. Vodja protiobveščevalnega oddelka je priznal, da je Cimerman po Lovšinovem nalogu čez mejo v Avstrijo petkrat peljal poslovni kovček poln nemških mark. Vodja obveščevalnega oddelka pa je preiskovalcem povedal, da je Vomo do spomladi 1993 iztržil 60 milijonov mark. Denar, ki je ostal v Lovšinovi blagajni, je bil po njegovih besedah izročen vam. Cimerman je na zaslišanjih v Državnem zboru trdil, da je vse počel po Lovšinovem nalogu, Lovšin pa je ponavljal, da je o teh stvareh potrebno vprašati vas.
    Takih in podobnih obremenilnih zadev na vaš račun je v trilogiji še veliko, vendar avtorjev niste tožili.
    V tretji knjigi je objavljeno tudi vaše poročilo o orožju od maja 1990 do septembra 1993, kjer je zapisanih precej polresnic in zavajajočih podatkov. Prodaje orožja za gotovino pa sploh niste omenili. Nedavno mi je Informacijska pooblaščenka omogočila še vpogled v nekatera doslej zaupna poročila Komisije DZ za nadzor obveščevalnih in varnostnih služb o trgovini z orožjem in v posebno analizo dokumentov, ki sta jo spomladi 2008 za DZ pripravila strokovnjaka Mitja Klavora in Bojan Gričar. Pritrdila sta ugotovitvam, da je MO na Hrvaško prodajal orožje po nekajkrat višjih cenah, kot ste jih prikazali v svojem poročilu. Navedli ste tudi znatno manjše količine orožja od dejansko prodanih. Še vedno pa niste argumentirano pojasnili, kam je šel izkupiček, ki je bil, kljub pomanjkljivi (uničeni) dokumentaciji, ocenjen na več deset milijonov nemških mark.
    Iz dokumentacije je razvidno, da je imel uslužbenec MO na Bank für Kärnten und Steiermark v Celovcu odprt račun. Z njega je vplačal nakup avtomobilov za ministrstvo, nakup pištol iz Italije in gradbene storitve podjetja SCT za specialno brigado Moris. Kriminalisti so v devetdesetih letih pozivali tožilstvo, naj pristojni organi v drugih državah omogočijo vpogled v BKS in druge banke ter na bančne račune podružnic slovenskih podjetij v Nemčiji, Švici … zaradi suma pranja denarja od prodaje orožja. Vendar tožilstvo tega ni storilo. Ampak denar je nekam moral iti? V zasebne žepe, v davčne oaze, na druge kontinente …?
    Zakaj ste bili v prvih dneh leta 2007 v Avstraliji? Ali drži, da ste se takrat izmuznili varnostnikoma in obiskali banke v Sydneyu? Kakšne zadolžitve pri domnevno vaših računih v avstralskih bankah imata nekdanji častni generalni konzul Republike Slovenije na Novi Zelandiji Dušan Lajovic in častni konzul Avstralije v Sloveniji Viktor Baraga? •
    Matej Šurc, Radovljica „

  3. trilogy Mi 25 Jun 2014 at 22:33 - Reply

    http://www.wobbing.eu/news/untold-yugoslavian-arms-trade-scandal

    Journalists Matej Šurc and Blaž Zgaga investigated the illegal trade of arms in Slovenia during the early 1990s and chronicled their findings in the trilogy In the Name of the State. The first volume of the trilogy, Sell, published in June 2011, focused on the sale of arms and ammunition. The second volume, Resell, appeared in October 2011 and dealt with the purchase of arms abroad and subsequent resale to Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina during the UN arms embargo. The third volume, Cover-up, describes how the arms smugglers managed to keep their activities largely concealed for the last twenty years and was published in April 2012.

  4. wikileaks Sa 28 Jun 2014 at 17:13 - Reply

    14. (S/NF) According to a clandestine source with direct
    access to an empoloyee of Rotis, Prime Minister Jansa’s SDS
    received more than 2.8 million Euro from Patria „under the
    table“ as part of the deal for armored vehicles. The source
    also noted that Sto Ravne had failed to offer a similar
    contributuion to Jansa’s party.

    https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07LJUBLJANA337_a.html

  5. Jon Mo 30 Jun 2014 at 06:29 - Reply

    Spoštovani g. Šurc,

    poglejmo naravo te zgodbe, orožarske afere. V njej ni nič novega, vse je že znano od srede 90. let in od časa t. i. Mogetove komisije. Tudi Matjaž Frangež in vse te alarmantne pisarije so samo neke bedne reprodukcija t. i. ugotovitev Mogetove komisije, s katerimi pa že takratni predsednik vlade Janez Drnovšek ni bil zadovoljen in jih je dal zaradi tega na stranski tir ter rekel, da naj se to neha preiskovati.

    Če bi tukaj bilo kar koli, bi Drnovšek, videč, da se artikulira v začetku devetdesetih let njegov najpomembnejši nasprotnik – se pravi Janez Janša in SDS -, poskrbel za to, da bi se stvari procesuirale, da bi nekdo prišel na sodišče in da bi Janša, če bi bil kriv, za to tudi odgovarjal. Drnovšek je sam vedel, da Janša ni kriv, in je zato vso zadevo umaknil. Po petnajstih letih pa to pogrevate brez kakršnih koli argumentov.

  6. jansa je vedel Mi 2 Jul 2014 at 11:11 - Reply

    http://www.mladina.si/51619/jansa-je-vedel/

    Št. 3: Janša je vedel
    To torej pomeni, da je bila vloga Jožeta Zagožna na obrambnem ministrstvu znana. Zanj so vedeli tako v logističnem oddelku kot tudi v strokovni komisiji na MORS, ki je izbirala najboljšega ponudnika. Dokazov za to je še več. Konec koncev je tudi Peter Zupan sam, prek Jureta Cekute, Fincem 13. aprila 2006 sporočil »da je Ministrstvu za obrambo in ocenjevalni skupini Patria definitivno favorizirana«, in pa, da se je »Na MO nekako izvedelo (brig K?), da je Patria tudi politično favorizirana«. Za korupcijo sta torej vedela dva člana bivše Janševe vlade, vedeli so trije najožji Janševi kolegi, Zagožen, Krkovič in Črnkovič. Za korupcijo so vedeli na gospodarskem ministrstvu, konec koncev tudi na notranjem ministrstvu, kjer so »založili depešo«. Kaj pa Janša?
    Janez Janša je v odgovoru na zadnji članek Mladine ponovno zatrdil, da on sam o nakupih finskih oklepnikov »nikoli« ni odločal, kaj šele da bi »poskusil sprejeti darila«. Z nikomer od obtoženih naj ne bi nikoli ne osebno ne po telefonu govoril o oklepnikih Patria. In »če je kdorkoli v komunikacijah o nabavi oklepnikov Patria nepooblaščeno uporabljal moje ime ali ime SDS, je to enostavno dokazljiva zloraba«. Janša želi, da bi se v javnosti uveljavila njegova interpretacija, po kateri so si Wolf, Cekuta in Riedl, torej uradni Patrijini lobisti enostavno izmislili poznanstva z njim zaradi zaslužka, njegova vlada pa naj bi prvič v zgodovini transparentno izvedla mednarodni natečaj. Medtem ko prejšnja vlada pri sklepanju poslov s Sistemsko tehniko tega ni storila.
    A pri tem gre za Janševo sprenevedanje. Kot je kriminalistom pojasnil Patrijin predstavnik v Sloveniji Andrey Mladenov, že samo dejstvo, da »je Janševa vlada odprla mednarodni razpis, jasno kaže, da že v začetku niso želeli, da Sistemska tehnika zmaga na razpisu«. Že januarja 2005 je uslužbenec MORS Peter Zupan na sestanku v Ljubljani Riedlu, Niittynenu in Wolfu razložil, da bo pri izboru najboljšega ponudnika na natečaju »70 odstotkov teže« imela politična odločitev, Niittynen pa je kriminalistom povedal, da mu je 12. maja 2005 na nekem sprejemu Marjan Senica, tedaj vodja logistike na obrambnem ministrstvu, pojasnil, da želi vladajoča SDS ustaviti »Ravne«, torej Sistemsko tehniko, ki je bližje konkurenčni stranki LDS.
    Ravno zaradi tega so se v Patrii že uvodoma odločili, da je treba v Sloveniji iskati politično podporo. Vedeli so, da je posel političen. Po uvodnih sestankih z Zagožnom je nastal Niittynenov »Matrix of influence«, tako imenovani štabni dokument ali načrt lobiranja, o katerem je Janša pred pol leta razlagal, češ da gre zgolj za načrt, kako bi prišli do njega. A to ni bil zgolj teoretični načrt, temveč dejstvo, ker se je Janša odločil zgraditi obrambno industrijo, ki bo pod nadzorom SDS. Plan jim je dejansko uspel. Jorma Wiitakorpi, nekdanji direktor Patrie, je kriminalistom dejal, da je bil pritisk Zagožna, Krkoviča, torej Janševega ozadja, naj Patria izbere Rotis, tako močan, »da so se Hulkkonen in ostali iz izvršne skupine morali ukloniti«.
    Janša se je v odločilnem letu 2005 in 2006 z Zagožnom večkrat srečal na kosilu. Z njim se je sestal vsaj 19. julija 2005 ob 10h, pa 11. avgusta 2005, potem 19. januarja 2006 in pa 24. avgusta 2006, so ugotovili kriminalisti. Takoj po teh datumih pa so Finci dobivali tudi poročila o sestankih. Tri dni po 19. juliju je Niittynen prebral, da sta »PM« in »dr. Z« obljubila, da bosta podprla samo njih. Teden dni po sestanku 19. januarja 2006 pa spet, da je »Z. potrdil, da PM podpira Patrio«. Janez Janša je 23. avgusta letos zagrozil, da »kdor bo sejal lažne obtožbe, bo odgovarjal«. Če so si poleg Riedla, Cekute, Wolfa njegovo ime pri pogovorih s Patrio sposodili tudi njegovi najbližji kolegi ali sodelavci, zakaj jih Janša sedaj ne toži?

  7. jansa je vedel Mi 2 Jul 2014 at 11:32 - Reply

    http://www.jutarnji.hr/slovenski-mocnik-u-aferi-teskoj-28-mil-eura-jansa-je-preko-hrvatske-prao-novac-za-kampanju-/1193484/?fb_action_ids=669297236452558&fb_action_types=og.likes

    SLOVENSKI MOĆNIK U AFERI TEŠKOJ 28 MILIJUNA EURA Janša je preko Hrvatske prao novac za kampanju!
    Službenici banke u Mariboru u Hrvatskoj su kupovali zemlju i prodavali po nižim cijenama. O svemu je bio obaviješten tadašnji premijer Janša

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