26 June 2026
The Dangerous Idea of a European Society Based on Common Values
The CJEU began to treat the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU as justiciable legal norms in its ASJP judgment from 2018. In its 2026 judgment in Commission v Hungary, it took the further step of treating those values as justiciable stand-alone norms and justified that step by invoking the existence of a European society. This contribution approaches the matter from a social-science point of view. I argue that the Article-2-TEU claim of a European society is theoretically unconvincing, empirically untenable, and politically dangerous. Continue reading >>
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26 June 2026
European Society Between Facts and Norms
Article 2 TEU values, such as pluralism, oscillate between descriptive claims, legal normativity, and appeals to European society as a source of authority. From a Habermasian perspective, the democratic legitimacy of EU values enforcement remains difficult to justify in the absence of a robust pan-European deliberative process through which those values can be articulated and contested. At the same time, Commission v Hungary constitutes a legitimate restorative intervention in a dysfunctional democratic process distorted by the stigmatisation of LGBTQ+ persons. Continue reading >>
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25 June 2026
In Search of Reflective Equilibrium
In her academic writings, Advocate General Tamara Ćapeta has observed that many EU rights have been developing on a case-by-case basis, but so far without “a general and comprehensive explanation that they form part of a liberal and tolerant democratic society”. Drawing on this observation, and against the backdrop of the Court’s ruling in the Hungarian case, I will argue in this contribution that “pluralistic European society” is not only a sociological concept but also plays an important normative role as an organising regulative concept in EU constitutional-legal interpretation. Continue reading >>
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25 June 2026
Taking Pluralism Seriously
If there is anything we can say about European society, it is that it is pluralistic. My suggestion is to understand pluralism in light of Isaiah Berlin's philosophy of value pluralism. A pluralistic society may be understood as a particular liberal model of the good society, or as an irreducible plurality of incommensurable visions that must coexist. The former risks turning Article 2 TEU into a mandate for convergence towards one substantive vision of a good society. Continue reading >>
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24 June 2026
The Politics of European Society
Commission v Hungary marks the remarkable ascent of the European society discourse. A closer look, however, reveals that there is little transformative in the Court’s Article 2 TEU case law or its invocation of European society. Beneath the rhetoric of transformation, the institutional adaptation of the society discourse is above all conservative in nature, seeking to protect the authority of the EU. The hope that the Court will pursue a transformative agenda is unfounded. Rather, the notion of European society is instrumental in legitimising the status quo. Continue reading >>
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24 June 2026
European Society at the Italian Constitutional Court
In its recent judgment No. 63/2026, the Italian Constitutional Court acknowledged the existence of a European society grounded on the values in Article 2 TEU. The judgment appears to be the first explicit reference by a constitutional court of an EU Member State to the emergence of a European society. Judgment concerned the constitutionality of recent legislation restricting access to Italian citizenship for descendants of Italians abroad. The passage on European society is an obiter dictum. I argue that its real significance lies in the question: Who belongs to European society? Continue reading >>
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23 June 2026
No Kings, No Queens in European Society
Armin von Bogdandy discovered the concept of society in Article 2 of the EU Treaty, theorised it as European society and brought it to the forefront of European legal scholarship and practice. The proposition of a European society stands or falls with the assumption that the Treaty of Lisbon has established a new framework. However, there are good reasons, particularly based on the history of Article 2 TEU and its structure, to take the exact opposite view. Continue reading >>23 June 2026
EU Law as the Law of European Society
In its decision Commission v Hungary, the CJEU’s plenary qualified EU law as the “common legal order of a society in which pluralism prevails”. Leaving pluralism aside, this blogpost explores possible meanings of the “of” in the first part of that formula. My exploration sketches four ever more foundational understandings: European society as the social field of EU law; EU law as expressing deep structures of that society; European society as generating EU law; and European society as the source of EU law’s authority. Continue reading >>22 June 2026
European Society After Commission v Hungary
Since the CJEU published its monumental decision Commission v Hungary on April 21, scholars have already produced an impressive number of analyses. This symposium on ‘European Society after Commission v Hungary’ aims to add to this debate by focusing on the deeper, structural, and so far overlooked implications of this decision for the concept of European society. In this introductory post, we adopt a genealogical approach to the emergence of the research interest in European society and elaborate on its implications and challenges. Continue reading >>
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19 June 2026
The Hungarian Transition’s Meaning for European Constitutionalism
The Hungarian transition is not only a Hungarian event. It is a European constitutional moment. The contributions to this symposium have shown how demanding the repair of constitutional democracy after a hybrid regime will be: a new government must restore constitutional supremacy, reconsider cardinal laws, guarantee judicial and prosecutorial independence, reopen markets, reestablish media pluralism, and counter corruption. But there is more. The Hungarian transition can play a crucial role in the development of European constitutionalism itself. Continue reading >>
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