30 November 2022
The Pitfalls of Enhanced Cooperation
There has been a public debate among academics and politicians on whether Hungary should be required to join the European Public Prosecutor’s Office as a condition to receive EU funds according to the different milestones. Joining the EPPO would send a clear message that Hungary takes ending public corruption seriously and a more general sign that it wishes to be a part of the European family. However, this proposal will not be legally possible to implement, thus illustrating the key problem with enhanced cooperation as a form of European integration. Continue reading >>
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28 November 2022
In Hungary, the Law Changes Every Day but It Doesn’t Get Better
The EU Commission has agreed with us that the laws that we have analyzed in our series of four blogposts did not in fact constitute an effective anti-corruption plan. And the Commission has attached a €13.3 billion price tag to non-compliance. Now the Hungarian government is scrambling to unlock this cash by introducing two additional laws that attempt to address the Commission’s concerns. But these new laws repeat the errors of the prior laws. They create the appearance of an independent corruption-fighting system while digging in political allies at all of the chokepoints and tying up whistleblowers and anti-corruption fighters in red tape. The new laws do not make things better and they may even make things worse. Continue reading >>
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18 November 2022
Trusting Hungary with Billions of Euros
It’s crunch time for the Conditionality Regulation at the European Commission. In its College meeting on 22 November, the Commission is scheduled to discuss whether Hungary has actually made the 17 changes it proposed in order to avoid cuts to its Cohesion Funds. What the Commission chooses to do will depend on whether it believes that Hungary’s anti-corruption program will in fact allow Hungary to be entrusted with billions of Euros without having a sizeable fraction of those Euros pocketed by cronies. We believe that Hungary’s reforms are designed to be ineffective and will not even begin to halt the massive corruption that is the hallmark of Hungary’s kleptocracy. Continue reading >>
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14 November 2022
Are Hungary’s EU Funds Being Cut (or Not)?
The news about whether Hungary will receive EU funds (or not) these days is confusing. One day, we hear that the European Commission is proposing to lower the boom on Hungary by cutting a large chunk of its Cohesion Funds under the general EU budget. The next day, we hear that the Commission is nearing an agreement to approve Hungary’s Recovery Plan in order to greenlight the release of funds. Is the Commission using or surrendering its financial leverage to require that the Hungarian government honor the rule of law? Will the Hungarian government negotiate its way out of funding cuts by really loosening its autocratic grip on power, or would any reform be illusory? Continue reading >>07 November 2022
With or Without Hungary
By December 2022, the Council must vote on the Commission's proposal to withdraw EU budgetary funds from Hungary under the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation. Without a legal basis for its exclusion, Hungary will cast its vote on that proposal. Obviously, the participation of a Member State in a vote that decides on the consequences of its own rule of law violations seems paradoxical. There should be a general Treaty rule that prevents a Member State from voting in the Council when their own alleged misconduct is at stake. Continue reading >>
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31 October 2022
Hungary’s Shambolic Anticorruption Proposals
The Article Useless and Maybe Unconstitutional: Hungary’s Proposed Judicial Review of the Prosecutorial Decisions by Kim Lane Scheppele, Petra Bárd and Gábor Mészáros gives a detailed account of the proposed legislation on amending the Hungarian Criminal Procedure Code. The conclusions of the article are correct and most of the criticism is accurate. Yet the article misses some real weaknesses of the Hungarian government’s proposal. This article aims to point out these weaknesses from the viewpoint of a practicing Hungarian criminal lawyer. Continue reading >>
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26 October 2022
Useless and Maybe Unconstitutional
In part III of our analysis of the anti-corruption framework, we will look at another aspect of the Hungarian “reforms”: a new procedure that seems to allow the general public to challenge in court the decisions of Hungarian public prosecutors to drop corruption cases. The new procedure is nearly impossible to use and adds little value to existing controls on the public prosecutor. In addition, the Hungarian Constitutional Court may declare it unconstitutional in any event. Continue reading >>
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06 October 2022
How NOT to Be an Independent Agency
The Hungarian government is trying to convince EU institutions that it is taking adequate steps to ensure proper spending of EU funds going forward. At the center of this effort is a new ‘Integrity Authority’. The law establishing this authority, Bill T/1260, just passed the Hungarian Parliament on 3 October 2022. We have carefully read the laws enacted so far that establish a new anti-corruption framework and can confidently say that neither the Commission nor the Council should accept what the Hungarian government is offering because the proposed changes do not begin to alter business as usual in Hungary. In this blogpost, we will analyze the ‘Integrity Authority’ which forms the centerpiece of the government’s program, showing that it is not independent from the government nor are its powers real. Continue reading >>
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05 October 2022
Sham and Smokescreen
Since 27 April 2022, Hungary has been under the Rule of Law conditionality mechanism, introduced by the Conditionality Regulation. After various debates and considerations, and in the light of the blackmailing potential of the Hungarian prime minister, the Regulation, in a weaker form than initially proposed, works as a preventive tool for ensuring the protection of the EU budget and sound financial management of EU resources. The Hungarian government has a record of misleading (and betraying) the European Union, and apparently, it is not different now. Continue reading >>
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27 September 2022
Coping Strategies of the Hungarian Constitutional Court since 2010
The very first step of Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party after its 2010 electoral victory towards an ‘illiberal’ constitutional regime was to substantially limit the once very broad review powers of the Constitutional Court. The Fidesz government also started to pack the formerly activist Court with loyalist. By 2013 was appointed by Fidesz. Before 2013, the Court used some cautious strategies to keep a certain autonomy in the midst of threats to lose its independent status altogether by becoming part of the Supreme Court. Continue reading >>
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