17 October 2024
Unleashing Horizontal State Liability
The Common European Asylum System (CEAS) is under attack. In a recent Judgment against Hungary, the European Court of Justice has unambiguously stated that non-compliance with the rules of the CEAS undermines solidarity between Member States and strikes at the very heart of EU law. Traditional means of enforcement, however, seem insufficient to foster compliance with these rules. Against this backdrop, this blogpost argues for the unexplored avenue for enforcing the CEAS via horizontal state liability. Continue reading >>
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05 September 2024
First Time as Tragedy, Second Time as Farce
In December 2023 the Hungarian Parliament speedily adopted the Act on the Protection of National Sovereignty and by February 2024 the government had already designated the Sovereignty Protection Office (SPO) for its enforcement. The history repeats itself, first time as tragedy, second time as farce. The current activities of the SPO exemplify the Hungarian government’s ongoing efforts to undermine free and independent society. It is crucial for the Union and European civil society to once again act swiftly to prevent the harassment of journalists and the potential disappearance of NGOs. Continue reading >>
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02 September 2024
The Hungarian Treeless Treetop Walkway
In the small village of Nyírmártonfalva in northeastern Hungary, there stands a wooden treetop walkway designed for walking among the tree canopies. Yet, there are no trees around. The European Public Prosecutor’s Office initiated proceedings to investigate this allegedly fraudulent appropriation of the EU common budget. In early August 2024, the Hungarian Office of the Prosecutor General rejected EPPO's jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the EPPO has jurisdiction according to the result theory, accepted also in Hungary, due to the place where the result of an offence occurs. Continue reading >>
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26 August 2024
Hungary’s Sovereignty Protection Sham
Hungary’s persistent rule of law and corruption shortcomings have led the EU to freeze EUR 27.8 billion in funding under various conditionality regimes. Prime Minister Orbán, who relies on these funds to maintain his political machinery and reward loyalists, has wielded Hungary’s veto in the Council to unlock this funding. Moreover, Hungary adopted the Act LXXXVIII of 2023 on the protection of national sovereignty (Sovereignty Law), which sets up the Sovereignty Protection Office (SPO), a state entity created to defend Hungarian sovereignty. This post examines the Sovereignty Law and calls the EU to effectively halt the SPO’s activities and prevent this model from spreading elsewhere. Continue reading >>
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08 August 2024
Could Hungary be suspended from Schengen?
In early July, the Orbán government announced that it would extend a program that grants third country nationals simplified access and stay to work in Hungary to Russian and Belarussian nationals. This blog maps the ways in which Hungary’s policy might undermine the security of the Schengen area and surveys the tools Member States and EU institutions have at their disposal to counter it. Should the Hungarian government fail to dispel the concerns raised by its extension of the national card system, these mechanisms should be activated to safeguard the security of the Schengen area. Continue reading >>24 July 2024
Aristotle in the Commission
Today, the European Commission issued its fifth Annual Rule of Law Report (ARoLR). While this monitoring exercise has come a long way and has been significantly improved, the rule of law backsliding remains one of the most pressing issues of the EU. In the following I present seven recommendations how to improve the Commission’s monitoring exercise. At the core lies a differentiation between a democracy and a hybrid regime. Once a Member State qualifies as the latter, it must be treated accordingly. Continue reading >>
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15 July 2024
Why and How the Hungarian Presidency Must Be Stopped
It took less than a week for Viktor Orbán to make the worst predictions about the Hungarian Presidency of the Council become true. Yet with a twist. If many had warned about the danger that such a Presidency would have paralysed the internal operation of the EU, nobody expected this could also cause confusion and damage to the Union’s foreign policy. How the EU Member States will react to it may define the overall credibility of the Union on the international stage, particularly at a time when it increasingly faces significant challenges both from within and the outside. Continue reading >>
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26 June 2024
In Favour of the Hungarian Council Presidency
On the 1 July 2024, Hungary will start its second EU Council Presidency. In light of Hungary’s continuous breaches of the rule of law, questions have been posed whether the Presidency could be postponed or cancelled (also here). However, given the mere informal powers of the Presidency, I argue that the real damage is rather limited, especially because the Hungarian Presidency takes place just after the European elections. Finally, the Hungarian Presidency may even improve the connection of its citizens with the EU and show the best version of itself to the other Member States. Continue reading >>
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21 June 2024
Rule of Law Chickens Coming Home to Roost
Ongoing assaults by Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz administration on the rule of law in Hungary have produced manifold reactions, generally of depressingly limited effectiveness. Last week, on 13 June 2024, in Case C-123/22 European Commission v Hungary, the Court ordered a record lump sum payment of €200,000,000 and a penalty payment of €1,000,000 per day of delay until an earlier 2020 Court ruling is complied with. Hungary thus received a stinging reminder that the Court of Justice is not toothless when it comes to the rule of law. Continue reading >>
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17 June 2024
Why an EU Country under the Surveillance Procedure (Article 7.1 TEU) Should not Chair the Council Presidency
In accordance with the Council Decision on the exercise of the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, from July 1 of this year the office is to be held by Hungary. This occasion will mark the first time that the Presidency will have been held by a Member State that has been subject to the “surveillance” procedure in Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, having been launched by the European Parliament in September 2018. It would now be both prudent and sensible for the Council to delay the Hungarian Presidency to such a time when the Article 7(1) TEU surveillance procedure will have been successfully concluded. Such a postponement should not be considered as a sanction against Hungary, but rather a simple precautionary measure to preserve the smooth functioning of the European Union. Continue reading >>
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