10 March 2025
The End of NATO As We Know It
It is frighteningly easy to picture a situation in which President Trump steps off a plane and declares: “I have a paper signed by Mister Putin, there will be peace for our time.” When Neville Chamberlain declared “peace for our time” on 30 September 1938, the world was at war only one year later. Should Russia choose to test the true value of Article 5 NATO-Treaty, this would be the ultimate test for NATO. Europe needs to get serious about acquiring its own nuclear deterrent, entirely independent of the USA. Continue reading >>
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07 February 2025
Memory-driven Foreign Policy
The German debate on whether and to what extent Germany should support Ukraine in its war against Russia with arms supplies is closely linked to Germany’s collective memory. For a long time, Germany's guilt for the crimes of occupation during the Second World War was largely associated with Russia – and not with Ukraine and Belarus. It is only since the Russian invasion in 2022 that the highest levels of the German government have begun to recognize the special responsibility Germany has towards Ukraine, a responsibility that also stems from the memory of the Second World War. Along with this change, it can be observed that the imperative of ‘never again’, closely tied to the German memory of the Second World War and especially of the Holocaust, is gradually being formulated in more abstract terms in historical-political debates, despite some resistance. Continue reading >>
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05 February 2025
The Baltic Politics of Post-War Accountability for Russia
Will the Russian war against Ukraine prove to be a watershed moment for the implementation of international criminal law on the aggressor? This contribution focuses on the Baltic states’ accountability-seeking for Russia as the politics of deterrence by legal means and a struggle for historical justice. Continue reading >>
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06 November 2024
Warum Deutschlands neues maritimes taktisches Hauptquartier nicht gegen den Zwei-plus-Vier Vertrag verstößt
Am 22. Oktober 2024 wurde der deutsche Botschafter in das russische Außenministerium einbestellt. Die Bundesrepublik, so der Vorwurf, habe den Zwei-Plus-Vier-Vertrag verletzt, indem sie NATO-Truppen auf dem Gebiet der ehemaligen DDR stationiere. An diesem Tag weihte Bundesverteidigungsminister Pistorius in Rostock ein neues maritimes taktisches Hauptquartier ein. So scharf die Töne aus dem russischen Außenministerium ausfallen, so wenig hält die russische Ansicht einer rechtlichen Beurteilung stand. Völkerrechtlich ist die Umnutzung des Marine-Hauptquartiers aber unbedenklich und verstößt insbesondere nicht gegen die Stationierungsklausel des Zwei-plus-Vier-Vertrags. Continue reading >>
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03 November 2024
European Security and the Threat of ‘Cognitive Warfare’
Alleged threats from outside actors to the information ecosystems of the liberal-democratic societies in Western Europe have prompted policymakers to look for solutions that utilize artificial intelligence. However, such a techno-solutionist framing securitizes and externalizes an issue that is ultimately primarily societal and internal in nature. Continue reading >>
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04 July 2024
Soccer Meets Geopolitics
Two competitions are currently predominating Europe’s agenda – the UEFA Euro 2024 in Germany and the brute reality of geopolitics. While the former will decide over Europe’s next soccer champion, outcomes of the latter will arguably shape whether Europe will champion the new geopolitics of the 21st century. To win this competition, we argue that the European Union (EU) does not need a unified military force, but rather a new defense commissioner who would act as a dual security manager, bringing together the EU’s global entanglements with its economic clout to enhance the military power of its Member States. Continue reading >>16 May 2022
A Swedish NATO Membership and Its Constitutional Barriers
After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the debate about a possible NATO membership in Sweden has been intense. The ruling Social Democratic Party was against a membership for a long time, but on Sunday 15 May it changed its position. Now everything points to a Swedish NATO accession and it seems likely that the constitutional barriers for that are surprisingly low: parliamentary approval with a simple majority vote. Continue reading >>
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31 March 2022
Russia’s Eurasian Großraum and its Consequences
The available options for the German and Western policy towards Russia have to be based on the correct diagnosis of the causes of the conflict. The purpose of this analysis is to shed some light on the structural reasons for the Russian expansionism and make some projections on the possible long-tern consequences. The rivalry between the Russian-dominated space (Großraum – greater space) and the EU/NATO systems fuels an intense geopolitical antagonism in Europe, which can be transformed into actual conflict. I understand the Großraum in the sense of Carl Schmitt as a tightly managed sphere of interests, under the direct or indirect control of an authoritarian Great Power (infra II).
Continue reading >>22 March 2022
On Finland with Love
This contribution briefly unpacks the relevancy of the East/West intersectionality Finland represents for us today. The pragmatic manner in which the Finns have dealt with Russia – in all its previous versions, white, red or “federal” – is instructive in understanding the limits of moral, economic and physical power when facing a neighboring country that will most probably never be trusted, loved or changed, by outsiders. Continue reading >>16 March 2022
The EU as Quasi-NATO
Putin has reportedly threatened both Sweden and Finland against joining NATO, attempting to preempt a shift away from the commitment to neutrality that is deeply embedded in the Swedish political soul. It is therefore all the more interesting that Sweden and Finland have recently concluded a new strategy of enhanced security cooperation between the states. In addition, the Swedish government, together with Finland, has sent a letter to other EU Member States reminding them of their obligation to assist any EU country in case of belligerent attack. Should we interpret this as an expectation for the EU to function effectively as a quasi-NATO? Continue reading >>
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