“This was a completely normal election by Austrian standards”

Last Sunday, Austria held parliamentary elections. The right-wing Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) won and achieved its best historical result. To make sense of the election, we spoke with expert Laurenz Ennser-Jedenastik, Professor of Austrian Politics in the European Context at the Department of Political Science at the University of Vienna.

1. Who voted for the FPÖ and why?

The FPÖ enjoys strong support among people who harbour very negative views on immigration and European integration, who consider the COVID-19 measures of recent years to have been extremely exaggerated and unjust, and who reject climate protection measures. Additionally, FPÖ voters are more inclined than others to believe in certain conspiracy theories and consider the sanctions policy towards Russia to be harmful. In many of these issues (Russia, COVID, anti-climate protection), the FPÖ has in recent years secured a near-monopoly within the party system. No other party represents these positions with the same consistency, if at all. As a result, there is a significant group of voters whose interests are better represented by the FPÖ than by any other party. The COVID pandemic and the increasing importance of climate policy have further solidified these trends.

2. What is remarkable about the election?

Basically, this was a completely normal election by Austrian standards. If you look at public attitudes on important political issues, this election result aligns quite well with them.

What might be interesting is that we can observe a massive urban-rural divide in voting behaviour. This is not entirely new but has changed in character: the FPÖ is now significantly stronger in rural areas than in urban ones – something that was not as pronounced just a few years ago.

When looking at vote shifts, the 2024 election was essentially an election of two worlds. In rural areas, the losses of the ÖVP and gains of the FPÖ are much more dramatic than in urban areas. In urban regions, in contrast, the losses of the Greens are much more severe than elsewhere. Meanwhile, the SPÖ even gained in urban areas, while it stagnated or slightly declined in rural regions.

3. Is the National Council election a blueprint for the German federal election?

Radical right-wing parties are gaining strength across Europe and beyond. This was demonstrated in Austria last Sunday, and I would be very surprised if the upcoming German federal election were an exception. In a more pointed way, one could say that the rise of the AfD reflects a gradual “Austrianization” of the German party system – but this is more of a continuation of a pan-European trend. The most important difference between the AfD and FPÖ remains how the centre-right parties in the two countries – ÖVP in Austria and CDU/CSU in Germany – behave towards them.

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4. Another difference is that the FPÖ is much older than its European authoritarian-populist counterparts. What strategy has historically worked in Austria: isolating the FPÖ or governing with them?

Neither strategy has permanently led to a loss of support for the FPÖ. In the 1990s, there was a strict “no” from all other parties to any FPÖ involvement in the federal government. Yet during this time, the FPÖ was very successful in elections. After participating in governments, the FPÖ has repeatedly lost significant voter support (in 2002, 2019), but this was mainly due to scandals (like the Ibiza affair) or internal conflicts that led to the collapse of coalitions. There is simply a strong demand among the electorate for the FPÖ’s policy positions, and that won’t change significantly due to the behaviour of the other parties.

5. On 24 October, the National Council’s inaugural session will take place. In Germany, just last week, the AfD used the inaugural session of the Thuringian State parliament to stage an anti-democratic performance. How do you think things will proceed in Austria?

The next step for the parties is to enter exploratory talks. According to political tradition, the Federal President then entrusts the leader of the party with the most seats with the task of forming a government – but this is a social convention, not a constitutional requirement. That person will then try to form a majority for a coalition government. If successful, the Chancellor is appointed by the President, and the ministers are appointed thereafter.

Since the Federal President is not a great supporter of the current FPÖ leader Herbert Kickl, it’s unclear how this process will unfold. Kickl may be given the task of forming a government, or negotiations might take place without such a formal mandate. Theoretically, after the initial exploratory talks, someone else could be tasked with forming the government.

Complicating matters is the fact that the ÖVP – the only party that does not categorically rule out a coalition with the FPÖ – has committed to forming such a coalition only without Kickl. The FPÖ, however, has rejected this. If everyone sticks to their word, the only viable option would be a coalition without the FPÖ, which would most likely be a collaboration between the ÖVP, SPÖ, and a third party (either the NEOS or the Greens).

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Editor’s Pick

by MAXIM BÖNNEMANN

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The Week on Verfassungsblog

… summarised by EVA MARIA BREDLER

This week, three very different European contexts raised the question what money can(’t) buy:

When it comes to nationality, the matter is clear, at least for the European Commission: In March, it sued Malta for granting citizenship to people who invest in the country. Malta argues that the CJEU lacks jurisdiction. PATRICK WEIL (EN) doesn’t buy it: He argues that the CJEU is indeed competent because Malta’s “Individual Investor Program” violates human dignity under Article 1 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Citizenship is not a commodity, but rather confers legal subjecthood, which is essential to guaranteeing the human dignity of EU citizens.

The matter is less clear in the context of sex work. In its decision M.A. and Others v. France, the ECtHR upheld the French ban on purchasing sex (the “Nordic Model”) as compliant with the ECHR. For SILVIA STEININGER (EN), the Court demonstrates not only intersectional blindness but also contradicts recent proposals for a “human rights-based approach to sex work”, which the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights supports.

Finally, there is the idea of money for the rule of law, which the EU is testing with its Conditionality Regulation. The General Court’s Medel decision specifically addresses funding for Poland from the EU’s largest special fund. The decision largely flew under the radar although it offers much of interest: not only the eternal question of individual legal protection before EU courts, but – perhaps more interestingly – the question of how to effectively defend EU values. MATTIS LESON (GER) has examined what the decision means for solidarity, the rule of law, and the EU budget.

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Given the many decisions of the German Federal Constitutional Court on what security authorities can and cannot do, it is easy to lose track. Apparently, even the authorities themselves are struggling. Back in 2016, the FCC gave the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) detailed guidelines on data storage and processing, but as LENNART LAGMÖLLER (GER) criticizes, not much has changed since then.

So the FCC had to step in again: In its ruling of 1 October 2024, it once again declared parts of the BKA Act unconstitutional, including a provision allowing the storage of data in the police information network INPOL. SEBASTIAN J. GOLLA (GER) summarizes the key points which Parliament must amend by July 2025. Only the BKA knows if it will finally “clean up its data house”.

After the AfD presented itself in a rather undemocratic manner during the inaugural session of the Thuringian State parliament, the debate on a party ban is gaining momentum again. Now, members of the Bundestag plan to file a request with the FCC. However, this request faces a particular procedural challenge: the so-called “requirement of strict state neutrality”. TILL PATRIK HOLTERHUS (GER) explains what this challenge means and how it could be overcome with a bit of legal creativity and bravery.

Not only Thuringia, but also Brandenburg suffers from a post-election hangover. In Brandenburg, this is also due to many parties failing to meet the five-percent threshold, as THORSTEN KINGREEN (GER) analyzes. He sees this as part of a larger trend and suggests it is time to rethink the five-percent electoral threshold.

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Rigid barriers also preoccupied the FCC in a constitutional complaint filed by several women who suffered miscarriages after the 12th but before the 24th week of pregnancy and, as a result, did not receive maternity protection. The court deemed the complaint inadmissible, leaving open the central question of whether the Maternity Protection Act (MuSchG) must protect women after a miscarriage as a matter of constitutional law. NICOLE FRIEDLEIN (GER) explores this question and concludes that the current protection period under the MuSchG violates the principle of equality. To effectively protect those affected, Parliament should reform the MuSchG.

Lastly, a glance at Latin America: The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has recognized election observers as human rights defenders. This is noteworthy because it establishes clear state obligations, as ALEJANDRO TULLIO (EN) explains: States must guarantee the work of election observers, including by non-interference, accreditation, and protection against risks, both in physical and digital realms.

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That’s it for this week! Take care and all the best.

Yours,
the Verfassungsblog Team

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