Martin Höpner
The CJEU began to treat the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU as justiciable legal norms in its ASJP judgment from 2018. In its 2026 judgment in Commission v Hungary, it took the further step of treating those values as justiciable stand-alone norms and justified that step by invoking the existence of a European society. This contribution approaches the matter from a social-science point of view. I argue that the Article-2-TEU claim of a European society is theoretically unconvincing, empirically untenable, and politically dangerous.
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Franca Maria Feisel
Article 2 TEU values, such as pluralism, oscillate between descriptive claims, legal normativity, and appeals to European society as a source of authority. From a Habermasian perspective, the democratic legitimacy of EU values enforcement remains difficult to justify in the absence of a robust pan-European deliberative process through which those values can be articulated and contested. At the same time, Commission v Hungary constitutes a legitimate restorative intervention in a dysfunctional democratic process distorted by the stigmatisation of LGBTQ+ persons.
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Oliver Gerstenberg
In her academic writings, Advocate General Tamara Ćapeta has observed that many EU rights have been developing on a case-by-case basis, but so far without “a general and comprehensive explanation that they form part of a liberal and tolerant democratic society”. Drawing on this observation, and against the backdrop of the Court’s ruling in the Hungarian case, I will argue in this contribution that “pluralistic European society” is not only a sociological concept but also plays an important normative role as an organising regulative concept in EU constitutional-legal interpretation.
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Piotr Załęski
If there is anything we can say about European society, it is that it is pluralistic. My suggestion is to understand pluralism in light of Isaiah Berlin's philosophy of value pluralism. A pluralistic society may be understood as a particular liberal model of the good society, or as an irreducible plurality of incommensurable visions that must coexist. The former risks turning Article 2 TEU into a mandate for convergence towards one substantive vision of a good society.
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Liliana Ávila
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has just handed climate litigators in Latin America the most powerful tool they have ever had. Advisory Opinion OC-32/25 restructures the procedural architecture of climate litigation: inverting burdens of proof, authorising the presumption of causal links between state emissions and climate harm, and recognising satellite imagery as evidence that states must make accessible to victims. For organisations that have spent years fighting for communities on the front lines of the climate emergency, this is a transformative moment.
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Anna Lumerding, Melanie Maurer
This blog post takes the landmark ruling KlimaSeniorinnen as a starting point to examine the role of procedural rights in climate litigation before the European Court of Human Rights. Procedural rights, as we argue, can be understood in a twofold manner: on the one hand, as admissibility criteria structuring access to the Court, and on the other, as substantive guarantees flowing from the Convention itself. Read in this light, KlimaSeniorinnen – alongside Greenpeace Nordic – reveals key developments in the Court’s emerging climate jurisprudence across both dimensions.
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Jacob van de Beeten
Commission v Hungary marks the remarkable ascent of the European society discourse. A closer look, however, reveals that there is little transformative in the Court’s Article 2 TEU case law or its invocation of European society. Beneath the rhetoric of transformation, the institutional adaptation of the society discourse is above all conservative in nature, seeking to protect the authority of the EU. The hope that the Court will pursue a transformative agenda is unfounded. Rather, the notion of European society is instrumental in legitimising the status quo.
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Chiara Gentile
In its recent judgment No. 63/2026, the Italian Constitutional Court acknowledged the existence of a European society grounded on the values in Article 2 TEU. The judgment appears to be the first explicit reference by a constitutional court of an EU Member State to the emergence of a European society. Judgment concerned the constitutionality of recent legislation restricting access to Italian citizenship for descendants of Italians abroad. The passage on European society is an obiter dictum. I argue that its real significance lies in the question: Who belongs to European society?
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Maria Antonia Tigre
In July 2025, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights issued Advisory Opinion 32/25 on the Climate Emergency and Human Rights: it recognized the right to a healthy climate as a standalone human right, declared a jus cogens norm prohibiting irreversible environmental harm, and affirmed the legal personhood of nature. These are not incremental developments. They are structural shifts in international environmental law, and they are the culmination of more than two decades of jurisprudential construction. This post traces that arc.
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Frank Schorkopf
Armin von Bogdandy discovered the concept of society in Article 2 of the EU Treaty, theorised it as European society and brought it to the forefront of European legal scholarship and practice. The proposition of a European society stands or falls with the assumption that the Treaty of Lisbon has established a new framework. However, there are good reasons, particularly based on the history of Article 2 TEU and its structure, to take the exact opposite view.
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Armin von Bogdandy
In its decision Commission v Hungary, the CJEU’s plenary qualified EU law as the “common legal order of a society in which pluralism prevails”. Leaving pluralism aside, this blogpost explores possible meanings of the “of” in the first part of that formula. My exploration sketches four ever more foundational understandings: European society as the social field of EU law; EU law as expressing deep structures of that society; European society as generating EU law; and European society as the source of EU law’s authority.
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Silvia Steininger, Jasper Siegert
Since the CJEU published its monumental decision Commission v Hungary on April 21, scholars have already produced an impressive number of analyses. This symposium on ‘European Society after Commission v Hungary’ aims to add to this debate by focusing on the deeper, structural, and so far overlooked implications of this decision for the concept of European society. In this introductory post, we adopt a genealogical approach to the emergence of the research interest in European society and elaborate on its implications and challenges.
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Nancy Hernández López
The relationship between climate change and human rights has occupied international legal scholarship for more than two decades. Yet for much of that period, the relationship remained largely aspirational — acknowledged in soft-law instruments and scholarly commentary, but only partially operationalized by binding international adjudication. Advisory Opinion OC-32/25, adopted by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR or the Court) on May 29, 2025, marks a decisive shift in that landscape.
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Armin von Bogdandy, Luke Dimitrios Spieker
The Hungarian transition is not only a Hungarian event. It is a European constitutional moment. The contributions to this symposium have shown how demanding the repair of constitutional democracy after a hybrid regime will be: a new government must restore constitutional supremacy, reconsider cardinal laws, guarantee judicial and prosecutorial independence, reopen markets, reestablish media pluralism, and counter corruption. But there is more. The Hungarian transition can play a crucial role in the development of European constitutionalism itself.
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Angelika Nußberger
Time is short and the demands are enormous. Following the landslide victory in Hungary’s parliamentary elections, the new government must demonstrate that its commitment to reform extends beyond mere rhetoric. Nevertheless, hard limits are set by EU law, and soft limits are set by best practice. When theoretically unlimited possibilities meet with vaguely worded standards, it is helpful to have an Archimedean point outside the system from which to assess which reforms will be helpful and sustainable, and which may exacerbate existing problems or unnecessarily weaken the system.
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Michal Bobek
The last decade has demonstrated what role the Union and in particular the Court of Justice can play in keeping a Member State “within the orbit” of the rule of law. Within that process, the case law of such bodies established numerous red lines as to what practices are not acceptable in a rule of law governed liberal democracy. But will the same red lines now be applicable also to the “good guys”? If yes/no, what will that mean for the legitimacy of those bodies, in particular the European Union?
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Stéphanie Caligara
Müllner v Austria is more than just a sequel to KlimaSeniorinnen. It has the potential to become a pivotal case for the Court’s developing climate jurisprudence, particularly as regards individual victim status, the scope of States’ positive obligations, and the position of EU climate law within the Convention framework.
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Darian Pavli
On 9 April 2024, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights delivered rulings in three climate-change cases, thus becoming the first international court to establish a right to be protected from the effects of climate change. The leading judgment was Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland. Now, two years after the KlimaSeniorinnen precedent, we can perhaps begin to take stock of its implications and its progeny.
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Anna Lumerding, Melanie Maurer, Lena Riemer
Climate change is not only an environmental or scientific issue – it is fundamentally a human rights challenge. Across jurisdictions and legal traditions, courts are increasingly being called upon to respond to their complex and far-reaching impacts on our human rights. This symposium brings together reflections from judges, practitioners, and scholars from the three regional human rights systems, based on presentations delivered at a conference held at Central European University in cooperation with the University of Vienna on 17 April 2026.
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Katarzyna Łakomiec, Barbara Grabowska-Moroz
Women’s rights turned out to be the litmus test for harms caused by the rule of law backsliding. That is why it is worth analysing the effectiveness of the post-2023 restoration of the rule of law in Poland, focusing specifically on what was visibly undermined by the populists: women’s rights. We argue that the pre-populist negligence in recognising the constitutional status of women’s rights made it easier for populists to attack them. Such negligence can also be identified in the Hungarian context.
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Renáta Uitz
Hungary’s experience with illiberal democracy exposed several uncomfortable truths about constitutional democracy, including vulnerabilities at the foundations. Higher education is a case in point. If the Magyar government chooses to engage in constitution making, it will face a robust architecture created by illiberal knowledge politics and nestled in transnational networks. It may decide to seize a historic opportunity to set a constitutional script that provides protection for academic freedom and safeguards university autonomy for a post-illiberal constitutional democracy.
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Edit Zgut-Przybylska
Hungary’s democratic renewal cannot succeed through constitutional restoration alone. The durability of the Orbán regime stemmed not only from formal institutional capture, but from deeply embedded informal power throughout society. Rebuilding democracy therefore needs more than legal repair: it requires institutionalized participation, decentralized power, and directly embedded civil society into governance. Thus, transitional justice cannot be reduced to constitutional restoration or elite replacement. It must also address the underlying social logic of authoritarian governance.
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Márta Pardavi
Hungary’s April 2026 elections that ended 16 years of Viktor Orbán’s autocratic rule have rightly generated urgent debate about constitutional repair. Beyond rebuilding the rule of law and democratic institutions, a successful transition will also need an engaged citizenry who value and trust these institutions and are eager to participate in public life. The transition therefore presents a critical opportunity to rebuild the legal, policy, and financial frameworks needed for an independent civil society to flourish. Achieving this requires a coherent package of legislative, institutional, and financial measures.
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Marcin Szwed
One of the most pressing challenges for the new Hungarian authorities will be the future of the Constitutional Court, perceived as a captured institution. The new authorities may be tempted to adopt amendments aimed at a complete overhaul of the Constitutional Court, although such radical actions risk being seen as a violation of judicial independence. However, sometimes radical steps in response to captured apex courts can be both justified and necessary, provided that they form part of a broader reform genuinely aimed at strengthening the institution’s independence.
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Anna Wójcik
If Hungary under Péter Magyar and the TISZA party is to learn from the democratic repair pursued under Donald Tusk in Poland since December 2023, it is that a comprehensive and swift reform of the media ecosystem is crucial. Such reform does not simply entail taking control of public service media but rather transforming the broader ecosystem to enhance media freedom and pluralism. Crucially, the reform should not only be lawful but also perceived as legitimate.
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Muskan Kakkar
Like many Iranians in 1979, Shirin Ebadi had hoped the revolution would bring something better. The regime that emerged gave her a lifetime’s work proving it had not. Ebadi is an Iranian lawyer, jurist, and human rights activist who became the first Muslim woman and the first Iranian to receive the Nobel Peace Prize in 2003. Her life is a testament to how legal training can be transformed into a means of resistance and how an individual, despite being stripped of institutional power, can still use the law as a tool for justice.
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László Detre
On 12 April 2026, Hungarian voters rendered their judgment on the regime that could be described in many ways, but certainly not as a well-functioning liberal democratic constitutional order. Today, the constituent power shall aim at restoring liberal democratic constitutionalism, and more narrowly, constitutional justice. The root of the problem is the current composition of the constitutional court stemming from the winner-takes-all approach of the previous regime. The problematic question, however, is how this can be addressed in line with European constitutionalism.
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David Kosař
Péter Magyar swept away Fidesz and won a constitutional majority. Yet Orbán packed the courts with his people in the meantime. Should Magyar resort to another round of court-packing? First, legitimate court-packing must have a just cause and must be proportional. Second, the proportionality of such reactive court-packing should in general respect the “paired effect”, although a stronger response may sometimes be justified. Finally, Magyar should not aim just for returning to the status quo but should innovate and build a resilient judiciary that enjoys the trust of the Hungarian people.
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Bernát Török
The opposition’s two-thirds electoral victory has opened the way for a comprehensive renewal of media regulation. Although the legislator must respond to the legacy of the past sixteen years, lasting success can only be achieved if we are also able to learn from the thirty years of experience with Hungarian media governance. Then the harder part will begin: ensuring that the system of media governance operates in accordance with an institutional culture committed to pluralism, dialogue, constitutional values, and sound public policy.
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Maciej Bernatt
Public discourse on the repair of constitutional democracy tends to focus on its political dimensions. The Fidesz period, however, demonstrated that markets and democratic governance are deeply interconnected. The restoration of constitutional democracy, which will inevitably involve the reorganisation of the economy, should therefore prompt reflection in public law discourse on the ways in which markets ought to be structured in democratic societies. Public law scholars must engage seriously with the role that competition law reform can play in this process.
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