Another Thread in the Spider Web

On April 14th 2025, the Hungarian parliament passed the 15th Amendment to the Fundamental Law, which includes new provisions allowing for the suspension of citizenship – a measure described as “unprecedented and barely intelligible” by Péter Szigeti. Alongside the newly introduced Citizenship Suspension Law, the framework’s vague and expansive criteria provide the government with a powerful instrument to strip political opponents of their right to vote ahead of the 2026 parliamentary election, despite official claims to the contrary.

The new framework

Article G, paragraph (3) of the Fundamental Law now contains the possibility of suspension of citizenship for dual citizens. As the Preamble of the 15th Amendment states, this rule does not apply to individuals enjoying the EU’s right to free movement and residence which means that EU citizens will not be affected. This serves a clear political purpose: it is designed to avoid further confrontation with the European Union. The government is keen to prevent even the appearance of an additional violation of EU law, particularly given that the new measure builds on the 2023 Sovereignty Protection Act, which is already the subject of an ongoing infringement procedure. It also remains to be seen how other EU member states – and, most importantly, the Court of Justice of the European Union – will decide regarding EU citizenship itself. EU citizenship is generally derived from Hungarian nationality – which raises complex questions, such as whether the suspension of Hungarian citizenship would also entail the suspension of EU citizenship. If that were the case, it would push EU law into uncharted territory.

So, as things stand, the group targeted and most affected by this new framework are dual citizens from other nationalities, who now face the possibility of having their Hungarian citizenship suspended. A prominent and important example of this is Péter Márki-Zay, the opposition’s candidate for prime minister in 2022, who holds both Canadian and Hungarian citizenship.

The amendment and its principle are concretised in the newly introduced Citizenship Suspension Law which was brought forward as an individual motion amending two existing simple statutes on the topic on April 1, 2025, and is likely to carry the constitutional amendment’s main effects. It defines the concrete conditions for suspension of citizenship, such as the existence of another non-EEA or non-candidate country citizenship, and the fact that the basis of suspension shall be a direct threat to Hungary’s public policy, public order, and national security. These latter categories include several subcategories, such as serving in another state’s army, serving the aims of a foreign country, a foreign organisation, or a foreign power, and participating in or supporting a terrorist organisation. The most concerning condition, in this context, is that citizenship can be suspended when a person acts in a manner “incompatible with Hungarian citizenship” and “on behalf of a foreign power or foreign organisation”, or “carries out the objectives of a foreign power or foreign organisation”.

Hidden authorities and the illusion of compliance

The Preamble of the law declares that one of its central aims is to strengthen the existing instruments for safeguarding “national sovereignty.” It further asserts that Hungarian citizenship must be understood in conjunction with the preservation of a “democratic order” and the “protection of state sovereignty.” Yet, despite the use of liberal and democratic terminology, it is evident that the true objective of the new provisions is to restrict and monitor individuals whose political opinion differs from that of the Orbán government.

Indeed, the institutional framework enabling the enforcement of the rules of Citizenship Suspension Law is already firmly in place. Although the law does not explicitly reference the Protection of National Sovereignty Act (Act LXXXVIII of 2023) – a piece of legislation strongly criticised by the Venice Commission – it is evident that the Sovereignty Protection Office, established under that Act, plays a central role in the broader sovereignty protection framework. The Office’s mandate is defined in vague and expansive terms and has recently gained renewed significance through the introduction of the Hungarian Transparency Bill which further strengthens the state’s sovereignty apparatus. This expansion has triggered serious tensions with the European Union: 26 Members of the European Parliament have called on the European Commission to suspend all financial transfers to Hungary, and the concerns surrounding the Sovereignty Protection Office have already led the Court of Justice of the European Union to expedite proceedings back in February 2025.

In this context, the Citizenship Suspension Law’s silence on the Sovereignty Protection Office appears strategic. By omitting any direct reference to the Office, the Orbán government likely seeks to obscure its involvement and avoid drawing legal scrutiny – a tactic it has used before. As we previously demonstrated in our blog post with Kim Lane Scheppele, the Integrity Authority’s dependence on another body (EUTAF) was hidden in a similar manner: the relevant law never mentioned EUTAF by name, making it difficult to identify through standard legal research. A comparable strategy is now being employed: the Citizenship Suspension Law repeatedly invokes the importance of “sovereignty” without naming the very authority tasked with enforcing it. As a result, identifying the responsible body requires prior knowledge and circumvents conventional transparency, allowing the government to maintain a façade of EU compliance while subverting it in practice.

The resurgence of a denunciation culture

The mandate of this Sovereignty Protection Office is outlined in Article 3 of the Protection of National Sovereignty Act, stating that it is tasked with exploring and investigating activities aimed at “influencing democratic discourse and state and social decision-making.” The Office shall particularly focus on individuals who exercise public authority and hold responsibilities on behalf of a foreign state, organ, or organisation, in case their actions threaten to jeopardize Hungary’s sovereignty. It is headed by Tamás Lánczi – Orbán’s former speechwriter and the author of the infamous Figyelő list that collected and named the so-called “Soros agents”. The Office has already targeted opposition MEPs, NGOs, and journalists, leaving little doubt as to which actors may be labeled “foreign.” For dual citizens associated with such organisations, the suspension of Hungarian citizenship under the new rules becomes a tangible threat.

Article 9/C paragraph (3) of the Citizenship Suspension Law states that anyone can file a report to the minister – appointed in the government’s decree and responsible for the suspension of citizenship – regarding suspicious citizens. As the reporter is not considered a customer, the names of these people or organisations would never be known. As the mentioned Sovereignty Protection Office becomes the most empowered state administration organ, it will undoubtedly play a crucial role in reporting the members of “foreign powers and organisations”.

In Hungary, where the recent politics of Orbán significantly divided society, the prospect of anonymous reporting risks becoming a vehicle for personal vendettas, driven by hatred or envy. It evokes unsettling parallels with the country’s socialist past, when so-called “enemies of communism” were secretly denounced to the authorities in acts of private revenge. Yet the most troubling element of this provision lies in its final sentence, which empowers the minister to withhold notification of the proceedings from the individual concerned – citing “public and national security” as justification. This grants the minister unchecked discretionary authority to conceal the initiation of legal action, a practice fundamentally at odds with the principles of due process and the right to a fair hearing.

Institutional in(ter)dependencies

This threat is exacerbated by institutionally significant provisions concealed deeply within the Law’s dense and highly technical procedural rules. Under the Citizenship Suspension Law, the decision on suspension – which, according to the previously mentioned rule, could be the first moment the person concered is actually informed about the process – is ordered by the minister. Suspension may last until the person is “no longer dangerous” for the public order and national security, but for a maximum of ten years.

The Law, then, introduces a unique procedural rule that could significantly affect the final decision of the Kúria (Supreme Court of Hungary) which may annul, but cannot modify, the minister’s decision. This decision must at once be communicated to the person affected by the suspension and be published in the Hivatalos Értesítő, which is an annex to the National Gazette. It is only within 30 days after the publication of the suspension that the decision may be challenged. If the Kúria, in response, annuls the suspension – which has initially been proclaimed in official terms by the minister – this decision must also appear in the Hivatalos Értesítő. By mandating such public announcements, the law ensures that any conflict between the executive and the judiciary is not merely transparent but actively staged.

While in a constitutional democracy with strong judicial independence this might appear benign, in Hungary’s current context, it raises serious concerns. The likely purpose of this rule is to make judges’ disagreement with the minister publicly visible in advance, thereby exerting pressure on them before a decision is even rendered. This risk is particularly acute in a judiciary that has been progressively hollowed out – most recently through the appointment of the Fidesz loyalist chief judge András Zs. Varga, who is likely to exercise significant influence over the outcome of individual cases surrounding the suspension of citizenship if needed. Indeed, Varga has a past record of aligning with the Orbán’s government motivation efforts to restrict independent judicial decision-making in politically sensitive cases. In his 2025 New Year’s address, he threatened judges advocating for judicial independence; during the 2022 Parliamentary elections, he warned of an impending constitutional coup, defending the regime’s one-party constitution. At the end of 2023, he dissolved a panel within the Kúria’s administrative department and reassigned its judges – likely in response to some of their individual judgments that had challenged the regime. He is a Chief Judge who appears unwilling to tolerate professional criticism of his conduct. This was most evident shortly before last Christmas, when he sanctioned two of his staff members – both with impeccable professional records – seemingly in an effort to silence dissent. Under these circumstances, there is little doubt that Varga will continue to use his administrative and personnel powers to ensure that judicial outcomes align with government policy.

Weaving an intricate web, again and again …

The Citizenship Suspension Law, in conjunction with the 15th Amendment, constructs what can only be described as a legal zone of indifference – a space of deliberate ambiguity between inclusion and exclusion, between citizen and non-citizen. According to the relevant provisions of the new law, dual citizens whose Hungarian citizenship is suspended crucially also lose their political rights, including the right to vote and to stand for public office. Yet paradoxically, these “suspended citizens” remain citizens in name, as the suspension is time-limited and cannot exceed ten years. This legal limbo effectively empties citizenship of its core democratic functions. The law thus enables the Orbán government to disenfranchise political dissenters without resorting to formal denaturalization, using the veneer of legality to suppress opposition.

Although not explicitly named in the legislation, the Sovereignty Protection Office is poised to play a central, clandestine role in determining whose rights are suspended. Nominally vested with a narrow investigative mandate, the Office in fact operates under overly broad and vaguely defined legal authority – allowing it to function as a political instrument against regime critics. It already plays a vital role in identifying and targeting so-called enemies of the state, and it could easily emerge as the key institution responsible for determining whose citizenship – and thus whose political agency – is suspended. In the lead-up to the 2026 parliamentary elections, this silent yet powerful role carries grave democratic consequences: by enabling the disenfranchisement of “suspicious citizens,” the Sovereignty Protection Office may serve not only to suppress dissent but to help engineer the outcome of the electoral process itself.

The author expresses his gratitude to Petra Bárd and Gábor Halmai for their valuable comments on a draft of this piece.

Research for this post was supported by a Grant from the German-Israeli Foundation for Scientific Research and Development (GIF, Grant number 1557).