#Scholactivism
What is the relationship between scholarship and activism? Is there a role morality requiring scholars to refrain from work motivated by specific material impacts? Tarunabh Khaitan argues in the International Journal of Constitutional Law that there are systemic, professional, and personal dangers to „scholactivism“ in constitutional studies. We asked scholars for responses to this claim – and received many of them.
All (but one) responses to my reflections on the ethics of activism as scholars in this blog symposium have been thoughtful, engaged, and charitable. For them, I am very grateful. If my rule-consequentialist worries have any truth to them, we should worry more rather than less about having the relevant motivation I castigate. When the moral stakes are higher (such as in vast areas of the Global South), one has to be even more careful about not making moral mistakes. The debate is not about whether one should be moral (by definition, we should be). It is about what is the most effective means in which the constitutional studies academy can contribute to a more just world.
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At a time in which a worrying number of risks conspire to threaten the end of democracy and humanity – from climate change to uncontrolled new technologies –, to confine the remit of the legal scholar to the narrow boundaries of academic purity appears ahistorical at best, irresponsible at worst.
Continue reading >>What’s wrong with good “scholactivism”?
There is a fine line between suspicion based on the nature of the motivation (seeking direct material change), and the substance of the motivation (commitment to a particular normative position). Once the “scholactivist” label gets thrown around, it may be hard to maintain that distinction. And it is to normative positions which advocate new ideas or change – including those that are reflective or well-considered – to which the label is most likely to attach.
Continue reading >>In the past decade, the U.K. has seen the overwhelming influence of the populist right. It manifests most famously in the Brexit process, but also in continuous calls for a reversal of liberal constitutionalism. Notably this process is bolstered by a group of scholars, many of whom were in my own faculty at Oxford, who serve as legitimation of government policy and spur its development. Importantly, though clearly highly effective ‘scholactivists’, these scholars would never describe themselves as such. We need to follow the money, we need to follow its route to power and to understand the role the academy plays in legitimating and building these ideological (and often religious) positions.
Continue reading >>Tarunabh Khaitan’s article “On scholactivism in constitutional studies: Skeptical thoughts” has prompted us to make a number of observations. It is a welcome intervention insofar as it may perhaps provide an impetus for a much needed debate within constitutional studies, which on the one hand seeks to lay bare certain kinds of privilege that undergirds the positionality of scholars arguing against Scholactivism, and on the other hand also makes the case for empirically grounded and interdisciplinary engagement in constitutional studies. Yet, to those of us located in, writing from and about the Global South—which includes both the geographical South as well as pockets of it in the Global North (including racialised and Indigenous populations)—this contention raises several concerns.
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My claim and critique of Khaitan’s position is that constitutional law scholars must produce actual answers to questions of legality, constitutionality or feasibility. Scholars may differ in whether or not they start their inquiry with a ‘material outcome’ as their hypothesis but the quality of work by both ‘activist’ and ‘non-activist’ scholars is to be assessed on the basis of the outcome and their academic integrity.
Continue reading >>Tarunabh Khaitan’s editorial comment in ICON on the perils of letting activist inclinations influence one’s scholarship, resulting in an unsavoury “scholactivism” blend, is thought-provoking. Professor Khaitan calls for rigorous adherence to the ethical demands of a search for truth in our research, even as we might, he suggests, become or remain activists for causes we believe in a range of other activities. In my view, however, Professor Khaitan’s critique misses the mark. He is asking too much of individuals and not enough of institutions.
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Professor Khaitan has written a powerful analysis and defense of the role of scholars in pursuing knowledge; he raises many more important issues than I have space to address here. I write in full agreement with several of the attitudes towards scholarly work that Khaitan emphasizes, especially the need for independence of judgment and an openness to revision, but find his “scholactivism” category too broadly conceptualized. Universities and their scholars must focus primarily on knowledge – its production, preservation, and dissemination – but good scholarship can be directed to material change in the world as well as to changes in understanding.
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Tarunabh Khaitan’s editorial in the International Journal of Constitutional Law presents insightful remarks about the risk that scholactivism may fail both as scholarship and as activism. I largely share Khaitan’s discomfort with scholactivism, which confuses two different goals: advancing human knowledge and advancing a political goal. However, I wonder whether the instrumentalist argument that Khaitan develops is really the decisive one. In this blog, I present some doubts about this instrumentalist argument before suggesting another line of argument, based on the intrinsic nature of academic research.
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There is no general reason to suppose that constitutional law scholars should refrain from engaging in politics, and I think that a scholar’s motivation to achieve a certain political goal does not affect the value, quality, or credibility of the conclusions of her inquiry. Moreover, the austere research ethics underlying the arguments of Komárek and Khaitan imposes on constitutional law scholars a set of role obligations that are in tension with some dispositions and epistemic attitudes that are often necessary to be a competent scholar in value-laden disciplines like political philosophy and constitutional law.
Continue reading >>Professor Tarunabh Khaitan’s ICON editorial on “scholactivism”, as well as his September 2021 Letten Prize lecture on "The Role of the Legal Scholar in the World" are unsettling. Although stepping aside and standing by may feel satisfactorily pure and avoids tensions as well as personal attacks in a post-truth world, it is not neutral – simply because any activity relating to constitutional law, active or passive, is inevitably a statement about politics and power. Instead, constitutional lawyers have a professional obligation to explicate in the public debate what forms the implicit basis of all conversation between them: the very relevance of the law to power and politics.
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A scholar motivated to achieve specific outcomes in her lifetime might be reasonably thought to bring a serious-mindedness, persistence and focus that arises from really caring about real-world effects of her work. And beyond scholarly energy, there is reason to suppose that the passion, commitment and even anger at injustice that often attends a scholactivist mindset might bring insight.
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