Does the EU Have What it Takes to Counter American Plutocratic Power?

Our symposium ‘Musk, Power, and the EU’ has evolved in parallel with the inauguration of the new US administration and has been marked by numerous and unprecedented attacks on the European Union. Amid a flurry of announcements challenging the status quo – often with brutal disregard, even against traditional allies – the European Union, along with the way it exercises power, suddenly appears as the antithesis of the new America. 

Yet does the EU have what it takes to resist such an expansionist and plutocratic projection of power, which now threatens Europe’s security, lifestyle and overall existence? 

This is the question addressed by the many symposium contributions, and to which there is no single answer. Yet if one has to find a common message across the various responses provided by the symposium, this message seems to tilt toward skepticism. At present, the EU does not seem well-positioned to deal with this unprecedented and multifaceted form of state power weaponised by corporate power and epitomized by the “Muskification” of government. Addressing this challenge would require progressive, sometimes creative, interpretations and bold enforcement of existing legal frameworks, ranging from digital rights to competition law, and  public integrity frameworks that were not designed to address what Anna Gerbrandy describes as “Modern Bigness” – a combination of market power, data power, and technological capabilities. 

More critically, this new form of power necessitates the repurposing of mechanisms – from sanctions to foreign interference measures – or adopting complementary instruments, such as anti-coercion tools specifically designed to tackle these threats. For instance, neither the DSA nor the EU Transparency Register have been designed to address and tame the unprecedented plutocratic force stemming from the promiscuous merger between the US administration and its economic champions and political donors, as symbolized by the current Muskified White House. 

This concluding contribution to the symposium aims to identify further avenues for EU action and lay down a preliminary research agenda for those interested in how the Union can address novel forms of expansionist and plutocratic power across the Atlantic. 

Blind spots and further areas for research

Corruption and lobbying: Wading into broader democratic issues

If the relationship between corruption and lobbying has always been complex, there is general agreement that while lobbying is a legitimate part of the democratic process, it can lead to corruption if not properly regulated and monitored. Yet today, when facing the exercise of influence over EU authorities by business entities such as Musk’s suite of companies, it appears impossible to delineate where legitimate business representation ends and corrupt practices may begin, due to the unqualified position he covers within the US administration. Zinnbauer characterized this as a ‘full–frontal brash attack right on the public stage’, highlighting how Plutocracy 2025 is different from any of its previous manifestations. This has given rise to questions and considerations about whether not only EU competition law and in particular the new platform regulations adopted in that context – the DSA and DMA – but also existing EU public integrity law (as embodied by the EU Transparency Registry) are sufficient to address democratic issues that arise in relation to actions by the exercise of plutocratic power.

The Role of Civil Society in Holding Tech Giants Accountable

While contributions to this symposium largely focused on the role of lawmakers and regulators in this uphill battle, we should not underestimate the role that civil society organisations, business competitors, and other stakeholders may have to play in holding these new forms of plutocratic power to account. Indeed, independent watchdogs, advocacy groups, journalists, and whistleblowers have historically played an important role in exposing harmful practices of digital platforms and their owners, as well as major public integrity breaches, such as the Uber Files. 

When it comes to digital platforms, for example, a former Facebook employee leaked files to the media revealing that Meta was aware of the harmful effects of its platforms, prompting congressional hearings and increasing demands for regulation. In the EU, the Schrems cases forced companies to reassess their data transfer practices and highlighted the need for stronger safeguards in the protection of EU citizens’ data. Likewise, as alluded to in some contributions to this symposium (here and here), private enforcement of rules – particularly competition law – may have an important role to play in protecting EU democracy. 

However, for civil society to play a fully-fledged role in countering plutocratic forces, it requires an attentive and responsive public opinion. Yet, as recently noted by Anne Applebaum, “The court of public opinion, which over the past decade has seen and heard everything, no longer cares. US elections are now a political Las Vegas: Anything goes”. Unfortunately, this observation appears to hold true in the EU as well. Despite the initial public reaction to the Qatargate scandal, the overall response has remained limited and did not lead to major structural reforms aimed at ensuring the protection of public integrity in the long term. 

Can EU Sanctions Target Digital Oligarchs?

Another possibility not explored in this blog series relates to EU sanctions. Under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), sanctions can be introduced via Article 29 TEU and Article 215 TFEU, including measures ‘against natural or legal persons and groups or non-State entities’ (Article 215(2) TFEU). In fact, ‘most sanctions adopted by the EU are targeted at individuals and entities, and consist of asset freezes, travel bans, and the prohibition to make funds and economic resources available to listed entities or individuals,’ as seen in the case of the Russia-related sanctions. Hence, under the Council decision concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities, Member States must take measures necessary to prevent entry or transit by listed natural persons ‘responsible for, implementing, supporting, or benefitting from actions or policies by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union’ (Article 1). Persons engaged in such undermining or threats shall also have their funds frozen (Article 2).

Of particular relevance might be the recently adopted Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI), which could serve as a tool to “Trump- and China-proof” the EU’s trade policy framework.

While this mechanism has not yet been used (and what qualifies as ‘coercion’ remains to be defined), the Parliament presented it as ‘a tool to counter trade conflicts rather than foreign and security policy conflicts’. What renders this instrument particularly promising in the current geopolitical scenario – characterised by an expansionist and antagonist US Administration – is the provision in Article 7 of the ACI Regulation allowing the EU to cooperate with third countries similarly affected by economic coercion, including through coordinated responses. Unlike restrictive measures under the CFSP, which require Council unanimity, the Commission plays a major role, as pointed out by Verellen. In any event, reliance on such an instrument requires a qualified majority vote, a rather high threshold to attain among EU Member States given their diverging stance vis-à-vis the new US Administration. Moreover, there is mounting agreement that the ACI cannot be deployed if the aim of Trump’s tariffs is not punitive or if their adoption is made conditional on policy changes by the EU and its Member States.

One of the most interesting questions is therefore to identify which type of measure – conventional sanctions or the ACI – may be more appropriate to counter democratic threats posed by natural persons and their businesses from third countries. While under the traditional CFSP sanctions regime, third-country actions that threaten democracy and the rule of law (Art 21 TEU) may give rise to sanctions, democracy is not mentioned in the ACI Regulation. Nevertheless, actions with democratic implications – such as Meta’s lobbying of the US government to pressure EU lawmakers to revise their newly adopted rules on digital platforms – may fall under the ACI, not to mention the repeated threat to retaliate against EU interests should the EU apply its laws, such as the DSA, to US companies close to the current US Administration.

Hence, the EU recently announced plans to target US industries, including digital platforms, through the ACI. The ACI regulation includes restrictions on the right to participate in public procurement tender procedure, restrictions on licences, as well as restrictions on trade in services and trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights.

A combination of sanctions could therefore be adopted under both the conventional sanction rules and the ACI when trade issues come into play, thus bypassing the many unintended consequences prompted by a rise in tariffs. Yet this begs the question of how the EU would respond to non-coercive trade measures such as an unconditional, across-the-board tariff on all or a significant share of EU imports into the US, as threatened by President Trump. 

The illusion of free speech in the digital age

As digital platforms and their principals position themselves as champions of freedom of speech – while simultaneously advancing American interests – this blog symposium emphasised the substantial risks they pose to the exercise of that very freedom. 

Modern tech oligarchs control the primary channels of political engagement in the digital age by determining which voices are amplified and which are silenced via opaque, commercially-driven and largely unaccountable algorithms. This set them apart from older forms of plutocratic power such as that of Rockefeller or even the more recent Murdoch’s News Corporation, and can be seen in Elon Musk’s reinstatement of banned accounts and the de-prioritisation of critical voices, raising alarms about the role of personal bias in shaping global political narratives. The dominance of billionaires over digital communication platforms is already becoming a destabilising force, including in the EU and individual Member States such as Germany ahead of its national elections, unless – as argued by van de Kerkhof – the former finds the political courage to apply its existing arsenal after over five years spent building it.

Conclusion: A Call for Vigilance and Innovation in the Face of Digital Threats

While the digital age has given rise to opportunities for unprecedented levels of communication and political engagement, it has also introduced significant threats to democratic values, including in the EU. As demonstrated in our symposium, the concentration of power and wealth in the hands of a few digital platform owners poses a profound threat to democratic integrity. 

Generations before us have long been concerned by the political meddling of the wealthy. In a translation and adaptation of Aristotle’s Politics, late XIVth-century philosopher Nicole Oresme wrote: 

The super-rich are so unequal and exceed and overcome the others regarding their political power so much that it is reasonable to think that they are among the others as God is among men… The cities which are governed democratically, should relegate these people, i.e. they should send them into exile or banish them…

Despite the EU taking progressive steps to tame the undue influence exercised by digital platforms and foreign influence, the measures outlined here and in the symposium alone may not be sufficient. The chilling effect exerted by the Trump administration – threatening retaliation against EU authorities should their laws be enforced against its closest corporate allies, whose platforms continue to support and advance US interests in the world – remains a very serious, largely unprecedented, challenge. 

For the EU legal framework to make a difference, not only progressive interpretation and bold enforcement but also a degree of political courage is required Yet this is precisely what EU leaders seem to lack these days. Once again, as during the first Trump administration eight years ago, they have been caught off guard by the flurry of announcements and threats coming from the White House.

Ultimately, one of the most neglected levers of resistance to the new plutocratic power lies in civil society. The role of non-public actors in protecting democracy – including EU democracy and that of its member states – cannot be overstated, as they have proven essential in holding tech giants accountable and exposing harmful practices. They also play a crucial role in the private enforcement of competition laws and other regulatory measures and will remain critical in safeguarding democratic principles. 

And yet, despite being increasingly entrusted by several EU legislative frameworks to monitor and enforce regulations – from digital rights to environmental legislation – civil society organisations face unprecedented pushback, with their funding being curtailed and their role compressed. This paradoxical situation in which the EU entrusts civil society with a watchdog role essential for the proper functioning of its regulatory regimes while weakening and delegitimizing it on a daily basis must be exposed and confronted. 

Last but not least, the use of EU sanctions and the anti-coercion instrument appears as one of the most promising avenues for addressing the actions of problematic private actors. With the EU’s democratic foundations ‘being put to the test’, ultimately, the fight to preserve EU democracy in the digital age demands a multifaceted approach, as called for by Robertson. It requires both strong public enforcement and complementary action by non-public actors, as well as further targeted measures.

Will the EU ‘accept being stuck between oligarchies and autocracies?’ asked Italian President Sergio Mattarella (translated) – or will it act? 

A Muskified US administration is likely to accelerate the ongoing debate within the EU about whether and how to turn the Union from a community of values to a geostrategic player – without abandoning what the Union stands for and is built upon: the rule of law. 

Compromising on the rule of law in pursuit of geostrategic goals would be not only lethal but also self-defeating to the European Union.