International Law Under Pressure

The adage that a leader who ‘saves’ their country cannot break the law—often misattributed to Napoleon—stands in stark contrast to the reality of international legal obligations. Not only can a nation breach international law, but under certain circumstances, such actions may constitute international crimes. As Emanuel Celler astutely observed, “illegality will never solve the problem of political lawlessness.” With this principle in mind, we find it necessary to document and analyse the numerous apparent breaches of international law that have occurred within the first six weeks of the 2025 Trump administration.

What began as an informal discussion at the Lauterpacht Centre for International Law has evolved into this analytical overview. We believe this documentation serves both academic purposes and potentially supports future legal proceedings. While defenders of these actions will undoubtedly offer justifications for what we identify as clear breaches of international law, our analysis aims to provide an assessment based on established international legal principles.

Our methodology focuses primarily on Executive Orders where available, but also includes official statements and social media pronouncements by President Trump. It is worth noting that the International Court of Justice has implicitly rejected arguments that social media statements do not reflect official government policy, as evidenced in the South Africa v. Israel case (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel), Provisional Measures, Order of 26 January 2024, I.C.J. Reports 2024, p. 18). When a Head of State expresses a view, that view constitutes government policy and must be taken at face value. As Head of State under international law we cannot agree that President Trump should be taken “seriously but not literally.”

In this overview, we aim to distinguish between three categories of actions: (1) clear violations of international law with strong consensus among legal scholars; (2) actions that potentially violate international law but where legal interpretation remains contested; and (3) statements or policies that raise significant concerns though may not constitute violations in themselves. Each entry in our analysis is clearly categorized to provide readers with appropriate context for assessing the legal implications.

As a clarificatory note, regarding statements alone, such as referring to Canada as the ’51st state’: while mere rhetoric may not directly violate substantive obligations, certain statements by Heads of State can constitute violations when they directly threaten territorial integrity, sovereign equality, or represent a clear intent to violate peremptory norms. The ICJ and other international tribunals have increasingly recognized that official statements, particularly when made repeatedly or in concert with other actions, can constitute evidence of intent or policy positions relevant to determining violations of international law.

We have identified contestable issues in international law within this brief period. This pattern should concern international legal scholars globally. We acknowledge that many U.S.-based international lawyers share these concerns, compounded by their additional worries regarding potential violations of the U.S. Constitution.

We intend to update this overview quarterly to maintain a record of the administration’s actions vis-à-vis international legal obligations.

Threats to Territorial Integrity

1. Threats Against Canada, Panama, and Greenland

President Trump has repeatedly referred to Canada as the “future 51st State,” claimed in his State of the Union address that the U.S. will “have Greenland, one way or another,” and asserted that the Panama Canal “still belongs to the U.S.”

These statements appear to violate both the peremptory norm (jus cogens) of international law prohibiting aggression and Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which explicitly states:“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”

The prohibition against aggression, including threats thereof, is widely recognized as a jus cogens norm—a peremptory norm from which no derogation is permitted. This principle has been affirmed by the International Court of Justice in multiple cases, including Nicaragua v. United States, the International Law Commission’s work on state responsibility, and widespread state practice and opinio juris.

2. Specific Threats Regarding Greenland

President Trump’s March 4th speech, in which he stated the U.S. will have Greenland “one way or another,” raises additional concerns regarding the jus cogens violation of self-determination. This principle is enshrined in numerous international instruments, including the UN Charter (Articles 1 and 55) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

3. Statements Regarding Gaza

President Trump’s threat to “take over” Gaza potentially violates Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and the Palestinian right to self-determination. Additionally, depending on the context and implementation, such actions could potentially constitute ethnic cleansing or even genocide under international criminal law.

The Palestinian right to self-determination is widely recognized in international law, including numerous UN resolutions and ICJ judgments. Even if Palestine’s full statehood status remains contested, the people of Gaza represent a protected entity under the principle of self-determination.

4. Recognition of Russian Claims to Ukrainian Territory and other Measures with regards to Ukraine

President Trump’s statement that “Russia has all the cards” and that Ukraine should “recognise the reality on the ground” equally constitute violations of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and the Ukrainian’s right to self-determination and the international legal principle of uti possedetis. Additionally, depending on the context and implementation, such actions could potentially constitute ethnic cleansing or even genocide under international criminal law. We note that waging a war of aggression is an international crime.  Aiding and abetting this international crime, could itself amount to an international crime.

Not supporting Ukraine militarily also violates their 2024 Bilateral Security Agreement between Ukraine and the USA (known as the 10-Year Agreement) which was signed in June 2024 and contains a six-month termination clause, which, to our knowledge, has not been triggered by the USA. The obvious violations by the USA of these treaty obligations give rise to international responsibility by the US and compensation for Ukraine.

The halting of intelligence sharing also violates the 2003 US-Ukraine Agreement on the protection of Classified Defense Information, which entered into force on July 14, 2004, and has not been terminated.

Finally, the draft US Minerals Agreement with Ukraine in our view constitutes a breach of existing treaty obligations by the US towards Ukraine. It violates the customary international legal right to sovereignty over natural resource and their sustainable use. The way this agreement has been imposed on Ukraine could constitute coercion in international law and makes any resulting agreement latently invalid.

Trade Relations and Economic Measure

1. Tariffs on Canada and Mexico (25%)

The imposition of 25% tariffs on imports from Canada and Mexico raises significant concerns regarding compliance with the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) and World Trade Organization (WTO) obligations.

While the administration has invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), citing national security concerns related to illegal immigration and drug trafficking, this justification appears tenuous under international trade law standards.

The WTO has developed substantial jurisprudence on security exceptions in recent cases:

• Russia — Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit (DS512, 2019): The panel determined that Article XXI is not entirely “self-judging” and that WTO panels have authority to review security exception claims.
• Saudi Arabia — Protection of IPR (DS567, 2020): The panel established that security exceptions must have a plausible connection to claimed security interests.
• United States — Steel and Aluminium (Multiple DS numbers, 2022): The panel rejected the U.S. position that Article XXI is entirely self-judging and found that the U.S. failed to demonstrate that the measures were taken “in time of war or other emergency in international relations.”

Canada has announced plans to file a WTO claim, arguing these tariffs constitute protectionist measures rather than legitimate security actions.

2. Tariffs on Chinese and Hong Kong Goods (20%)

The 20% tariffs imposed on Chinese and Hong Kong goods represent a significant escalation in trade tensions and raise serious questions under WTO law. The WTO ruled in 2020 that previous similar tariffs violated global trade rules, specifically determining that the U.S. failed to provide sufficient justification under the claimed “public morals” exception of Article XX(a) of GATT 1994.

These tariffs appear to violate several core WTO principles:

a. Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) principle (GATT Article I): By singling out China and Hong Kong for differential treatment, the tariffs contradict the fundamental requirement that trade advantages granted to one WTO member must be extended to all members.

b. Tariff bindings (GATT Article II): The tariffs likely exceed the bound rates the U.S. has committed to in its WTO Schedule of Concessions.

c. Proportionality: Even if the U.S. could justify these measures under a WTO exception, the comprehensive scope and significant rate suggest they are not “necessary” as required under exception provisions.

The inclusion of Hong Kong in these tariff measures raises additional concerns. Despite China’s increased control over Hong Kong in recent years, Hong Kong remains a separate customs territory within the WTO. Treating Hong Kong identically to mainland China for tariff purposes potentially undermines its distinct status under the WTO framework, an important consideration in light of the “one country, two systems” principle that still nominally applies.

A 2023 WTO panel report addressing similar measures emphasised that “public morals” exceptions cannot serve as a blank check for protectionist measures disguised as moral concerns. Without a clearly articulated, evidence-based nexus between the tariffs and specific moral objectives, these measures appear to constitute ordinary trade protectionism rather than legitimate exceptions under WTO law.

3. Threatened Tariffs on European Union (25%)

The administration’s threat to impose 25% tariffs on European Union goods presents substantial legal concerns beyond mere WTO violations. These threatened measures would contravene:

a. WTO Agreements: Like the Chinese tariffs, these would violate MFN principles and tariff binding commitments. The fact that these are threatened rather than implemented does not eliminate legal concerns, as the WTO’s jurisprudence has evolved to recognize that “mandatory legislation” that requires future WTO-inconsistent action can be challenged before implementation.

b. Good Faith Principle: Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties establishes that “Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.” The threats undermine the good faith principle that underpins international agreements.

c. Trade Predictability: A cornerstone of the WTO system is creating predictable trade environments. The United States — Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products panel report (2022) emphasized that unpredictable tariff threats create market uncertainty that itself harms the trading system.

The European Commission has already indicated it would respond with counterbalancing measures if these tariffs were implemented, raising the spectre of a trade war that would further erode the rules-based trading system. The Commission has cited the WTO-authorised retaliation framework established following the 2004 US — Foreign Sales Corporations case as precedent for its approach.

4. “Reciprocal” Tariffs Threat

The administration’s proposal for “reciprocal” tariffs—matching other countries’ tariff rates on a product-by-product basis—represents a fundamental misunderstanding or rejection of the core WTO framework. This approach presents several distinct legal problems:

a. Disregard for Negotiated Concessions: The WTO system is built on negotiated tariff schedules, where countries make different concessions based on their economic needs and priorities. A unilateral “reciprocal” approach effectively nullifies the outcomes of decades of multilateral negotiations.

b. Non-Discrimination Principles: WTO law requires equal treatment of “like products” from all trading partners (MFN principle, GATT Article I) and equal treatment between imported and domestic products (National Treatment, GATT Article III). A “reciprocal” approach that varies by country explicitly violates these principles.

c. Procedural Violations: The WTO has established procedures for addressing perceived unfair trade practices, including consultations, dispute settlement, and authorized retaliation. Unilateral “reciprocal” tariffs bypass these procedures, violating the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).

d. Nature of WTO Obligations: The Japan — Alcoholic Beverages II case established that WTO obligations represent a “balance of concessions” among members. Unilateral modification of this balance through reciprocal tariffs undermines the contractual nature of WTO commitments.

The proposed approach also potentially violates the 14 US Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with 20 countries in force, which typically establish zero or bound tariffs for substantially all trade between parties. A “reciprocal” tariff policy that targets individual countries would likely violate provisions in agreements, including USMCA, U.S.-Korea FTA, and others that prohibit new or increased duties.

5. Steel and Aluminium Tariffs

The reintroduction of steel and aluminium tariffs (25% on steel, 10% on aluminium) justified on national security grounds represents a particularly troubling case for the international trading system. The legal concerns are multi-layered:

a. WTO Jurisprudence: The WTO panel in United States — Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products(2022) definitively rejected the U.S. position that Article XXI (security exceptions) is entirely “self-judging.” The panel:

• Found that “time of war or other emergency in international relations” is an objective condition subject to panel review
• Determined that economic concerns about industrial capacity do not constitute an “emergency in international relations”
• Concluded the previous tariffs violated WTO obligations and were not justified under Article XXI

b.Res Judicata Considerations: The reintroduction of substantially similar measures already ruled against creates a potential res judicata situation. The principle that a matter already judged should not be relitigated is recognized in international law, as affirmed in the ICJ’s Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal advisory opinion.

c. Systemic Implications: The Russia — Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit case (DS512) established that while states have discretion to define their “essential security interests,” this discretion is not unlimited and must meet “minimum requirements of plausibility and coherence.” The panel emphasized a “good faith” obligation when invoking security exceptions.

d. Economic Rationale vs. Security Claims: Evidence suggests these tariffs primarily serve economic rather than security purposes. The measures appear designed to protect domestic industries from competition rather than address genuine security threats. The WTO Appellate Body has consistently required that measures match their stated justifications, as in Brazil — Retreaded Tyres.

The administration’s reintroduction of these tariffs despite previous adverse WTO rulings demonstrates a concerning pattern of disregard for multilateral adjudication, undermining the rules-based order that has facilitated global economic growth for decades.

International Cooperation and Multilateral Commitments

6. Suspension of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)

The administration’s 180-day pause on FCPA investigations and enforcement actions represents a significant departure from international anti-corruption commitments. This suspension raises several specific legal concerns:

a. United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) Violations: The U.S. is a party to UNCAC, which creates binding obligations to criminalize and enforce anti-corruption measures. The suspension potentially violates multiple provisions in Chapter III (“Criminalization and Law Enforcement”), particularly:

• Article 15 on bribery of national public officials
• Article 16 on bribery of foreign public officials
• Article 26 on liability of legal persons
• Article 30 on prosecution and enforcement

b. OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: The suspension likely violates the U.S. commitment under the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, which requires parties to “take such measures as may be necessary to establish that it is a criminal offence under its law for any person intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage” to foreign public officials.

c. Customary International Law: The consistent practice of states criminalizing foreign corruption has potentially elevated anti-corruption measures to the status of customary international law. The International Law Commission’s work on the “Prevention and Punishment of Corruption” supports this view.

d. Rule of Law Implications: Even a temporary suspension signals that U.S. companies may engage in corruption with impunity during the suspension period, creating a dangerous precedent that undermines the rule of law in international business transactions.

The UNCAC’s Article 30(3) explicitly requires that each State Party shall “ensure that any discretionary legal powers under its domestic law relating to the prosecution of persons for offences established in accordance with this Convention are exercised to maximize the effectiveness of law enforcement measures.” A wholesale suspension of enforcement appears to contradict this obligation directly.

7. Paris Climate Agreement Withdrawal

The administration’s announced withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement creates a complex legal situation with significant international implications:

a. Procedural Requirements: While the normal withdrawal clause will apply, which means that the withdrawal can only take effect after “expiry of one year from the date of receipt by the Depositary of the notification of withdrawal, or on such later date as may be specified in the notification of withdrawal.” This means the current Executive Order, which declares the withdrawal to be immediately effective, violates the Paris Agreement and should lead the PAIC to investigate. Legally the withdrawal does not take effect until 22 Jan 2026.

b. Pacta Sunt Servanda: Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties codifies the principle that “every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.” The U.S. remains legally bound by the Paris Agreement until proper withdrawal procedures are completed.

c. Emerging Customary International Law: Recent decisions suggest climate action obligations may be crystallising as customary international law:

• The legal arguments before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for the Advisory Opinion on Climate Change recognised states’ duty to protect the environment and prevent significant harm. This due diligence obligation means compliance with the Paris Agreement constitutes a floor of obligations, and refusing to combat climate change violates customary international law.
• The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in its COSIS Opinion highlighted that due diligence obligations exist for climate change independently of the Paris Agreement.
• The Inter-American Court of Human Rights Advisory Opinion OC-23/17 recognized the right to a healthy environment, and arguments before the IACHR for the advisory opinion on climate change requested by Chile and Colombia confirm the customary international legal obligation to combat climate change.

d. Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs): The U.S. submitted enhanced NDCs in 2021, creating specific commitments that remain binding until formal withdrawal takes effect. Early disengagement from these commitments potentially constitutes a treaty violation.

e. Treaty Implementation Laws: Domestic legislation implementing Paris Agreement commitments remains in force until repealed, creating a dual-track legal situation where international commitments are being violated while domestic implementation measures theoretically remain valid.

8. Disengagement from the UN Human Rights Council

The administration’s disengagement from the UN Human Rights Council carries significant legal implications beyond merely undermining collaborative efforts:

a. UN Charter Obligations: Article 56 of the UN Charter commits all members to “take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55,” which includes “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms.” Disengagement from the primary UN human rights body potentially violates this commitment.

b. Institutional Framework Obligations: While membership in the Human Rights Council is voluntary, the U.S. has committed to the broader UN human rights framework through ratification of treaties that rely on Council mechanisms for monitoring and implementation, including:

• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
• Convention Against Torture (CAT)
• International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD)

c. Good Faith Principle: The principle of good faith in international relations requires engagement with institutional mechanisms designed to fulfil treaty obligations. The ICJ emphasized in the Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France) that “trust and confidence are inherent in international co-operation.”

d. Effectiveness of Human Rights Mechanisms: The Council relies on state participation to function effectively. The U.S. disengagement undermines the Universal Periodic Review process, special procedures mandates, and complaint procedures that are essential to global human rights protection.

The Human Rights Council resolution 5/1 established procedures that rely on member state participation. By disengaging, the U.S. potentially undermines these procedures, constituting a form of obstructionism that conflicts with its general human rights obligations under customary international law and specific treaty commitments.

9. Defunding the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR)

The administration’s defunding of UNHCR raises profound concerns regarding international refugee protection obligations:

a. 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees: While the U.S. is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, it is bound by the 1967 Protocol, which incorporates the substantive provisions of the 1951 Convention. Article II of the Protocol commits states to “co-operate with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees… in the exercise of its functions.”

b. Financial Obligation Principles: In the Certain Expenses of the United Nations advisory opinion, the ICJ established that UN members have financial obligations toward the organisation’s operations. While discretionary funding is permitted, the wholesale defunding of a critical agency potentially violates the spirit of this principle.

c. Burden-Sharing Obligations: The principle of burden-sharing in refugee protection has evolved into a norm of customary international law, as recognized in the 2018 Global Compact on Refugees, which the U.S. initially supported. The ICJ has recognised that widespread acceptance of soft law instruments can crystallise into customary obligations.

d. Extraterritorial Impact: The European Court of Human Rights in Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy recognised that states can be responsible for human rights violations that occur outside their territories but result from their actions. U.S. defunding could trigger such extraterritorial violations.

The significant U.S. contribution to UNHCR (historically providing approximately 40% of the agency’s budget) means that withdrawal creates immediate protection gaps that directly impact refugee rights guaranteed under international law, creating a direct causal link between the defunding and rights violations.

10. World Health Organization Withdrawal

The administration’s withdrawal from the WHO raises significant legal concerns related to global health governance:

a. WHO Constitution Obligations: Article 56 of the WHO Constitution requires one year’s notice for withdrawal, during which time all legal obligations continue. Any immediate cessation of participation or financial support constitutes a violation of these procedural requirements.

b. International Health Regulations (2005): As a legally binding instrument under Article 21 of the WHO Constitution, the IHR creates continuing obligations regarding disease surveillance, reporting, and response. U.S. withdrawal undermines these obligations, particularly:

• Article 44 on collaboration and assistance
• Articles 5-9 on surveillance and reporting
• Articles 13-17 on public health response

c. Right to Health Obligations: The right to health is enshrined in multiple international instruments, including:

• The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) Article 12
• The Convention on the Rights of the Child Article 24
• The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Article 25

While the US is not a Party to any of these Treaties, it has signed them and thus has a good faith obligation not to violate the object and purpose of these treaties, which arguably includes the right to health.

d. Cross-Border Health Implications: In the 2021 Report on the Right to Health, the UN Special Rapporteur emphasised that “States have extraterritorial obligations to respect, protect and fulfil the right to health beyond their borders.” WHO withdrawal undermines these obligations.

e. Global Health Security: The International Court of Justice recognised in its Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons that threats to health can implicate the right to life. By withdrawing from the primary global health governance body, the U.S. potentially undermines the right to life which is binding upon the US through the ICCPR and UNHRD.

The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated that effective response to global health threats requires coordinated multilateral action. The WHO’s Director-General has emphasised that withdrawal during ongoing and emerging health crises constitutes a violation of the principle of solidarity that underpins international health law.

11. Sanctions on ICC Prosecutor

The administration’s imposition of sanctions on the International Criminal Court’s Chief Prosecutor represents a troubling interference with international justice mechanisms:

a. UN Charter Violations: These sanctions potentially violate Article 2(5) of the UN Charter, which requires members to “give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter.” The ICC, while independent, works in close cooperation with the UN system.

b. Security Council Resolution 1593: This resolution, which referred the Darfur situation to the ICC, calls on all states to cooperate fully with the Court. U.S. sanctions on the Prosecutor directly contradict this obligation by actively impeding the Court’s functioning.

c. Rome Statute Principles: While the U.S. is not a party to the Rome Statute, customary international law normally prohibits interference with judicial independence. The sanctions appear designed to obstruct justice rather than advance legitimate national interests.

d. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations: The Chief Prosecutor enjoys certain immunities and privileges under international law. Sanctions that impede official functions potentially violate these protections, which have customary international law status.

e. Interference with Judicial Proceedings: The International Court of Justice in the LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States) established that interference with international judicial proceedings can itself constitute an international wrong. The sanctions appear designed specifically to obstruct ICC investigations, particularly those based on Security Council Resolutions.

The Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Court has previously emphasised that attacks on the Court’s independence constitute a threat to the international rule of law. In the situation in Afghanistan, the Court noted that external pressure on judicial officials undermines the Rome Statute’s object and purpose.

12. Review of Ratified Treaties

The administration’s ordered comprehensive review of ratified U.S. treaties with an apparent intent to withdraw from or ignore obligations has profound implications for the international legal order. The US has entered over 18.000 international treaties since its founding, with many still in force. The US also acts as depositary for over 200 multilateral treaties, while this does not prevent withdrawal, it should be seen as a highly unusual act in international law:

a. Pacta Sunt Servanda Violation: This principle, codified in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, establishes that “every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.” A systematic review aimed at non-compliance directly contradicts this foundational principle. It should categorically be clarified that a simple change in Government or parliamentary majorities is no justification for non-compliance with international treaty obligations.

b. Treaty Withdrawal Procedures: International law establishes specific procedures for treaty withdrawal, varying by treaty. Bypassing these procedures through executive action would constitute procedural violations of each affected treaty.

c. Legitimate Expectations Doctrine: The ICJ in the Nuclear Tests Case established that states may create legitimate expectations through their conduct. The systematic review undermines the legitimate expectations of treaty partners regarding U.S. compliance.

d. Estoppel in International Law: The principle that a state cannot benefit from its own inconsistency (venire contra factum proprium) is well-established in international jurisprudence. The U.S., having previously committed to these treaties, is potentially estopped from claiming they are no longer binding without proper withdrawal.

e. Constitutional Considerations with International Implications: Under U.S. constitutional law, treaties are the “supreme Law of the Land” (Article VI). Executive disregard for ratified treaties raises complex separation of powers questions with international implications, as foreign partners must determine whether to recognise executive actions that potentially contradict constitutional requirements.

The International Law Commission’s work on unilateral acts of States emphasises that public statements by authorised officials create legal expectations. The administration’s public questioning of treaty commitments, even before formal withdrawal, potentially undermines the legal certainty that international law seeks to establish.

Immigration and Refugee Policies

13. “Invasion” Declaration and Asylum Restrictions

The administration’s declaration of an “invasion” of “aliens” and subsequent barring of asylum seekers from entering U.S. territory raises profound concerns under international refugee and human rights law:

a. Non-Refoulement Principle: This cornerstone of refugee protection, enshrined in Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention and incorporated by reference in the 1967 Protocol (to which the U.S. is a party), prohibits returning refugees to territories where they face persecution. The blanket barring of asylum seekers violates this principle by preventing the assessment of protection needs.

b. Right to Seek Asylum: Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights establishes that “everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.” While the UDHR is not itself a treaty, this provision has acquired the status of customary international law through consistent state practice and opinio juris.

c. Legal Terminology Misuse: The characterisation of migration as an “invasion” misapplies terminology with specific legal meaning under international humanitarian law. The International Court of Justice in the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo case established strict criteria for what constitutes an “invasion,” none of which apply to civilian migration.

d. State Responsibility for International Wrongful Acts: The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility establish that states cannot justify breaches of international obligations through domestic legal categorisations. The “invasion” declaration appears designed precisely to circumvent international obligations.

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees has emphasised that “the right to seek asylum is a fundamental human right” and that policies preventing access to asylum procedures, regardless of how they are framed domestically, constitute violations of international refugee law. The wholesale barring of asylum seekers based on a legally dubious “invasion” declaration represents a particularly clear example of such a violation.

14. Mandatory Detention of Migrants

The administration’s implementation of mandatory detention for all illegal immigrants, including those seeking asylum, presents multiple violations of international human rights and refugee law:

a. Arbitrary Detention Prohibition: Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which the U.S. has ratified, prohibits arbitrary detention. The UN Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 35 clarifies that detention must be reasonable, necessary, and proportionate to be non-arbitrary. Blanket mandatory detention fails this test by eliminating individualized assessment.

b. Special Protections for Vulnerable Groups: International law provides enhanced protections for vulnerable migrants:

• The Convention on the Rights of the Child (though not ratified by the U.S.) reflects customary international law regarding child detention
• The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities establishes special protections for migrants with disabilities
• The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women has identified specific protections for migrant women.

c. Detention Conditions Standards: The UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the “Nelson Mandela Rules”) and the UN Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners (the “Bangkok Rules”) establish minimum standards that appear inconsistent with mass detention facilities.

d. Procedural Guarantees: The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has established that migrants in detention must have access to:

• Judicial review of detention
• Legal representation
• Information about rights in a language they understand
• Communication with family members
• Consular notification (Vienna Convention on Consular Relations)

e. Proportionality Principle: The European Court of Human Rights in Saadi v. United Kingdom established that detention of asylum seekers must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Mass mandatory detention without individualized assessment fails this proportionality test.

The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has specifically criticized mandatory detention policies, concluding in its 2018 report that “mandatory or automatic detention of migrants, especially asylum seekers, is arbitrary as it deprives them of an individual assessment of the necessity and proportionality of detention.” The administration’s policy directly contradicts this established interpretation of international human rights law.

15. Threatened Return of Ukrainian Refugees

The administration’s threat to return all Ukrainian refugees based in the USA raises significant concerns regarding compliance with international protection obligations:

a. Non-Refoulement Under the 1967 Protocol: While the United States is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, it is bound by the 1967 Protocol, which incorporates by reference the substantive provisions of the Convention, including Article 33 on non-refoulement. This creates a binding legal obligation not to return refugees to territories where they face persecution.

b. Complementary Protection Obligations: Beyond the Refugee Convention/Protocol, the U.S. has complementary protection obligations under:

• The Convention Against Torture (CAT), Article 3, which prohibits return to torture
• The ICCPR, which the Human Rights Committee has interpreted to prohibit return to serious human rights violations
• Customary international law, which increasingly recognizes broader non-refoulement obligations

c. Prima Facie Refugee Status: The UNHCR has recognized Ukrainians fleeing the conflict as prima facie refugees, creating a presumption of refugee status. Mass return without individualized assessment would violate the procedural requirements inherent in non-refoulement protection.

d. Temporary Protected Status (TPS) Obligations: The U.S. has designated Ukraine for TPS, creating domestic legal obligations that align with international protection principles. Premature termination of this status without changed conditions in Ukraine would constitute both a domestic and international law violation.

e. Country Conditions Assessment: Current evidence indicates that Ukraine remains an active conflict zone with ongoing risks to civilian safety. The ICJ in the Ukraine v. Russian Federation case has recognized the severe humanitarian situation. Return under these conditions would likely constitute refoulement under international law standards.

The UNHCR’s Conclusion No. 25 emphasises that the principle of non-refoulement applies “irrespective of whether or not individuals have been formally recognized as refugees.” This means that even Ukrainians who have not completed asylum procedures are protected against return to danger, making the blanket return threat particularly problematic under international law.

Diplomatic Relations and Security Agreements

16. Threatened Exclusion of Canada from Five Eyes

The administration’s threat to exclude Canada from the Five Eyes intelligence alliance raises complex questions regarding treaty obligations and international institutional law:

a. Informal Agreement Status: While the Five Eyes arrangement (comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK, and the US) is not formalised in a single treaty document, it has evolved into a network of binding agreements that create legitimate expectations under international law. The ICJ in the Nuclear Tests Case established that informal arrangements can create binding obligations when they demonstrate a clear intention to be bound.

b. NATO Treaty Implications: Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty commits members to “maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack” through “continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid.” Intelligence sharing represents a critical component of this collective capacity. The threat to exclude a NATO ally from established intelligence channels potentially undermines this treaty obligation.

c. UKUSA Agreement Framework: The 1946 UKUSA Agreement (declassified in 2010) and its subsequent amendments form the legal basis for Five Eyes cooperation. Unilateral exclusion of a member without following established procedures would violate the procedural requirements of this agreement system.

d. Good Faith Principle: Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties codifies the principle that agreements must be performed in good faith. The International Court of Justice in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case emphasized that “the principle of good faith obliges the Parties to apply [a treaty] in a reasonable way and in such a manner that its purpose can be realized.” The threatened exclusion appears to violate this principle.

e. Intelligence Community Customary Practice: While not formally codified, the intelligence sharing community has developed customary practices that have acquired the status of binding norms through consistent application and opinio juris. The sudden threatened exclusion of a founding member violates these established practices.

The exclusion threat specifically undermines the “Special Relationship Collection Program” and the “STONEGHOST” network that form the technical backbone of Five Eyes intelligence sharing. The International Law Commission’s work on unilateral acts of states suggests that threats to withdraw from longstanding security arrangements can themselves create international legal consequences.

Conclusion

The pattern of apparent breaches of international law documented above should concern all who value the international rules-based order. The notion that “other countries do the same” provides no valid defense under international law—a violation remains a violation regardless of parallel breaches by other states.

This analysis is offered not as a political statement but as a legal assessment. We invite further scholarly discussion and recognize that different interpretations may exist for some of these actions. Nevertheless, the cumulative effect of these measures appears to constitute a significant challenge to the international legal system.