23 June 2026
No Kings, No Queens in European Society
Armin von Bogdandy discovered the concept of society in Article 2 of the EU Treaty, theorised it as European society and brought it to the forefront of European legal scholarship and practice. The proposition of a European society stands or falls with the assumption that the Treaty of Lisbon has established a new framework. However, there are good reasons, particularly based on the history of Article 2 TEU and its structure, to take the exact opposite view. Continue reading >>
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23 June 2026
EU Law as the Law of European Society
In its decision Commission v Hungary, the CJEU’s plenary qualified EU law as the “common legal order of a society in which pluralism prevails”. Leaving pluralism aside, this blogpost explores possible meanings of the “of” in the first part of that formula. My exploration sketches four ever more foundational understandings: European society as the social field of EU law; EU law as expressing deep structures of that society; European society as generating EU law; and European society as the source of EU law’s authority. Continue reading >>22 June 2026
European Society After Commission v Hungary
Since the CJEU published its monumental decision Commission v Hungary on April 21, scholars have already produced an impressive number of analyses. This symposium on ‘European Society after Commission v Hungary’ aims to add to this debate by focusing on the deeper, structural, and so far overlooked implications of this decision for the concept of European society. In this introductory post, we adopt a genealogical approach to the emergence of the research interest in European society and elaborate on its implications and challenges. Continue reading >>
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19 June 2026
The Hungarian Transition’s Meaning for European Constitutionalism
The Hungarian transition is not only a Hungarian event. It is a European constitutional moment. The contributions to this symposium have shown how demanding the repair of constitutional democracy after a hybrid regime will be: a new government must restore constitutional supremacy, reconsider cardinal laws, guarantee judicial and prosecutorial independence, reopen markets, reestablish media pluralism, and counter corruption. But there is more. The Hungarian transition can play a crucial role in the development of European constitutionalism itself. Continue reading >>
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11 May 2026
Wesensgehalt, Würde, Werte
Wesensgehalt, Würde, Werte – so lautet der magische Dreiklang, mit dem der EuGH das ungarische Anti-LGBTQ-Gesetz zu Fall bringt. Dass es sich um Verletzungen absoluter, d.h. keiner Rechtfertigung zugänglicher verfassungsrechtlicher Garantien der Union handelt, verdeutlicht den Ausnahmecharakter des Falles. Der vorliegende Beitrag widmet sich den Fragen der Maßstäbe für Wesensgehalts-, Würde- und Werteverstöße. Der EuGH wartet dabei mit einem neuen Ansatz auf – doch hinsichtlich der Werte des Art. 2 S. 1 EUV beginnt die Suche nach passenden Maßstäben gerade erst. Continue reading >>30 April 2026
The Red Lines of European Society
The Court of Justice ruled on 21 April 2026 that the Hungarian law portraying non-heterosexual and non-cisgender persons as dangerous violates the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU. The decision is historic. We focus on what we see as its two central innovations. First, after years of academic controversy, there is now clarity: Article 2 TEU itself is a justiciable provision that sets enforceable red lines as a separate ground in infringement proceedings. And second, the Court advances a collective singular to which it attributes the EU legal order: European society. Continue reading >>
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24 April 2026
A Constitutional Court without a Constitutional Compass
The ruling in the case of the Commission v. Hungary was eagerly awaited by many, but it will have come as a surprise to few. Public statements by prominent members of the EU Court of Justice indicated a clear desire to extend the applicability of Article 2 TEU. The Court’s findings regarding the Commission’s pleas concerning infringements of the various acts of secondary law are well-motivated, but its reasoning on Article 2 TEU clearly demonstrates the suffocating grip of EU constitutional orthodoxy. Continue reading >>
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