06 July 2026
European Society without European Private Law?
Integration Through Law was and remains, in various forms, the major driver of European integration. Constitutional Pluralism arose out of constitutionalisation, counterbalancing the move to neoliberalism in the new millennium. In Commission v Hungary, the Court recognised European society “in which pluralism prevails” as a legal concept. The Court radiates judicial authority at a time when Europe is again in crisis, politically through populism, economically through competitiveness and sustainability, and technologically through dependence on US companies. Continue reading >>
0 
06 July 2026
Private International Law and European Society
Can one speak of a European society without speaking about private relations? Recent scholarship on European society has largely approached the concept through the lens of public law. Yet societies are constituted at least as much by the horizontal relations between individuals and groups as by public institutions. This blogpost turns to EU private international law (PIL) and will argue that EU PIL brings into view the importance of coordination frameworks for organising a mode of integration based not on unification, but on interdependence. Continue reading >>
0
30 June 2026
A Queer(er) European Society?
The CJEU’s judgment in Commission v Hungary undeniably marked a monumental advancement of EU law. While acknowledging the magnitude of the case seems unproblematic, identifying its impact and its beneficiaries is a less straightforward task. In this contribution, I raise questions from a critical queer perspective while centering on the concept of a value-based European society. I argue that the Court’s underdeveloped elaboration on the politics of values eschews material structures of oppression and exploitation and thus risks foreclosing actual transformative legal interventions. Continue reading >>
0
29 June 2026
On Red (Funding) Lines
One of the conceptually most significant innovations by the Court of Justice in Commission v. Hungary is its invocation of European society as a normative referent of the EU legal order, and the characterisation of that society through pluralism. This conceptual step has consequences that reach well beyond the judgement. I argue that it could place the Court on a potential collision course with the European Commission’s recent proposal to explicitly link EU civil society funding to compliance with the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU. Continue reading >>
0
26 June 2026
European Society Between Facts and Norms
Article 2 TEU values, such as pluralism, oscillate between descriptive claims, legal normativity, and appeals to European society as a source of authority. From a Habermasian perspective, the democratic legitimacy of EU values enforcement remains difficult to justify in the absence of a robust pan-European deliberative process through which those values can be articulated and contested. At the same time, Commission v Hungary constitutes a legitimate restorative intervention in a dysfunctional democratic process distorted by the stigmatisation of LGBTQ+ persons. Continue reading >>
0
25 June 2026
In Search of Reflective Equilibrium
In her academic writings, Advocate General Tamara Ćapeta has observed that many EU rights have been developing on a case-by-case basis, but so far without “a general and comprehensive explanation that they form part of a liberal and tolerant democratic society”. Drawing on this observation, and against the backdrop of the Court’s ruling in the Hungarian case, I will argue in this contribution that “pluralistic European society” is not only a sociological concept but also plays an important normative role as an organising regulative concept in EU constitutional-legal interpretation. Continue reading >>
0
25 June 2026
Taking Pluralism Seriously
If there is anything we can say about European society, it is that it is pluralistic. My suggestion is to understand pluralism in light of Isaiah Berlin's philosophy of value pluralism. A pluralistic society may be understood as a particular liberal model of the good society, or as an irreducible plurality of incommensurable visions that must coexist. The former risks turning Article 2 TEU into a mandate for convergence towards one substantive vision of a good society. Continue reading >>
0
27 May 2026
On the Renewal of Media Regulation
The opposition’s two-thirds electoral victory has opened the way for a comprehensive renewal of media regulation. Although the legislator must respond to the legacy of the past sixteen years, lasting success can only be achieved if we are also able to learn from the thirty years of experience with Hungarian media governance. Then the harder part will begin: ensuring that the system of media governance operates in accordance with an institutional culture committed to pluralism, dialogue, constitutional values, and sound public policy. Continue reading >>
0
12 January 2026
Religiously Sensitive Union Law in Fundamental-Rights Pluralism
“Doomsday” did not occur. The ghastly fascination with this legal conflict, shared by some observers in the media and in legal scholarship, has not been given new fuel. With its long-awaited order in the Egenberger case, the German Federal Constitutional Court has delivered a prudent and balanced decision. It has neither musealized ecclesiastical labour law and abandoned its established case law, nor initiated a trial of strength with the Court of Justice of the European Union by denying the primacy of Union law. Continue reading >>
0