18 June 2026

On the Role and Legitimacy of Supranational Courts in a Member State’s Retransition

The last decade has demonstrated what role the Union and in particular the Court of Justice can play in keeping a Member State “within the orbit” of the rule of law. Within that process, the case law of such bodies established numerous red lines as to what practices are not acceptable in a rule of law governed liberal democracy. But will the same red lines now be applicable also to the “good guys”? If yes/no, what will that mean for the legitimacy of those bodies, in particular the European Union? Continue reading >>
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25 May 2026
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Unfreezing EU Funds Without Melting the Rule of Law

Three years ago, we wrote Frozen, a story about how EU institutions had blocked billions of euros in EU funds on rule of law grounds for Poland and Hungary. After the recent Hungarian parliamentary elections, a much happier scenario is visible in Budapest and Brussels: unfreezing those same funds. But how can this be speedily achieved while honouring the rule of law? This is far from straightforward. Continue reading >>
12 May 2026

Polish Lessons for the Hungarian Transition

The victory of Péter Magyar and TISZA Party in the parliamentary elections of 12 April 2026 may be seen as a useful illustration of the theory of competitive authoritarianism developed by Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way. It suggests that even under uneven political conditions, electoral victory remains possible when an opposition movement is well organized, presents a credible program, and effectively capitalizes on the weaknesses and mistakes of the incumbent government. Consequently, claims about the demise of liberal democracy appear to be premature. Continue reading >>
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08 May 2026

But First, Implementation

Hungary's future Prime Minister Péter Magyar called on Chief Justice András Zs. Varga to resign, claiming that, together with the President of the Republic, the Prosecutor General, and other leaders of key state institutions, he is a “puppet” of Orbán’s regime. The claim to end Chief Justice Varga’s mandate is legitimate and the proper way to do so is by implementing the ECtHR's Baka judgment Continue reading >>
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29 April 2026

Heavy Artillery, Light Reasoning

In its judgment of 21 April 2026 in Commission v. Hungary (C-769/22), the CJEU took the decisive step: its “value turn”. The Court for the first time applied Article 2 TEU as an autonomous and standalone review standard. The judgment deploys what might be called heavy artillery. Yet, the firepower of the instrument stands in uneasy tension with the lightness of the reasoning marshalled to justify its use. Nonetheless, the critical observations advanced by Riedl ultimately underestimate both the structural logic of the EU legal order and the functional mandate of the Court. Continue reading >>
11 April 2026
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Neither What Italy Needed, Nor What it Deserved

On 22 and 23 March 2026, the Italian electorate rejected a constitutional reform of the judiciary. This vote, while unlikely to deal a decisive blow to Meloni’s government, has already had notable political repercussions – most prominently, the resignations of two key figures within the Ministry of Justice. However, when situating the reform in the broader Italian political context, it goes too far to conclude that it would have pushed Italy in a direction similar to Hungary’s. Continue reading >>
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02 April 2026

Poland’s “Illegal Judges”

For the first time, the CJEU has called for a “legislative framework” to remedy the systemic problem of irregularly appointed judges in Poland’s judicial system in its judgment of 24 March 2026 in Case C-521/21. Until such time, the CJEU has ruled that neo-judges attached to ordinary courts may only be recused on a case-by-case basis. However, such an individual assessment is not required for the neo-judges appointed to courts of last resort. The CJEU’s twofold approach prioritises system stability over the individual right to effective judicial protection. Continue reading >>
02 March 2026

The Pseudo-Technical Purge

In January 2026, Serbia adopted a package of amendments to core judicial statutes, informally labelled the “Mrdić laws”, that together recalibrate key elements of the country’s prosecutorial and judicial framework. At the centre of the reform lies the restructuring of the Public Prosecutor’s Office for Organised Crime. The “Mrdić laws” illustrate a contemporary mode of rule-of-law erosion in which formal guarantees of independence remain textually intact, even as the functional capacity of key institutions is deliberately weakened. Continue reading >>
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19 February 2026

Text Is Not Enough

Advocate General Ćapeta’s Opinion in Case C-225/24, of 12 February 2026, clarifies that, in contexts of systemic rule-of-law deterioration, compliance cannot be measured solely by legislative text, while also explaining the constraints of discretionary power in EU fund cases. Rule-of-law compliance must be assessed through effective implementation and attention to the broader constitutional environment. The Opinion articulates an evaluative logic for EU rule-of-law governance that is particularly significant in backsliding settings and foreshadows the standards required for constitutional reconstruction after illiberal rule. Continue reading >>
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13 February 2026

Frontex Under Scrutiny

In the evolving landscape of EU border accountability, the Court of Justice of the European Union delivered its ruling in Hamoudi v Frontex (C-136/24 P) on 18 December 2025. This Grand Chamber decision not only reversed the General Court’s dismissal but also fundamentally recalibrated the evidentiary standards for establishing Frontex’s liability for fundamental rights violations. As FM v Frontex (T-511/24), a closely related case, awaits its judgment, Hamoudi’s legacy in establishing Frontex’s accountability and lowering the burden of proof for vulnerable migrants, promises to reshape its outcome. Continue reading >>
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