On 25 November 2025, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled in Trojan that EU Member States may not refuse to recognise a same-sex marriage lawfully concluded in another Member State. Such refusal violates the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, read in light of both the right to respect for private and family life and the principle of non-discrimination. It follows that even where a Member State does not allow for same-sex marriage in its national legal system, it must offer some form of procedure for recognising same-sex marriages entered into abroad. Unlike earlier judgments, which were based on a rather restrictive understanding of recognition, the Trojan ruling marks a significant step towards full recognition of legal status across the EU. Hence, the duty of recognition no longer only refers to the formation of a civil status itself, but now also appears to extend to its legal effects.

Facts of the case

Mr Cupriak-Trojan, a Polish and German national, and Mr Trojan, a Polish national, were married in Berlin. At the time of their marriage, they were residing in Germany. Having moved back to Poland, Mr Cupriak-Trojan applied for recognition of their marriage in Poland. More specifically, he sought to have their German marriage certificate transcribed in the Polish civil register. This request was rejected by the Polish authorities on the ground that Polish law does not provide for same-sex marriage and that transcribing a foreign marriage certificate would therefore violate the fundamental principles of the Polish legal system.

The spouses challenged this decision before the Polish courts, arguing, inter alia, that the obligation to protect marriage as a union between a man and a woman, as laid down in the Polish Constitution, did not mean that recognising a same-sex marriage concluded abroad was prohibited. However, the courts dismissed their action claiming that the spouses’ line of reasoning would effectively lead to a coexistence of same-sex and opposite-sex marriages in Poland even though this was not provided for under Polish law. The Supreme Administrative Court of Poland, however, stayed the proceedings and asked the ECJ whether Articles 20 and 21(1) TFEU, read in light of Article 7 and Article 21(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU Charter), preclude the competent authorities of a Member State from refusing to recognise a same-sex marriage lawfully concluded in another Member State.

Reasoning of the Court

The ECJ ruled in favour of the spouses and held that Article 20 and Article 21(1) TFEU, read in the light of Article 7 and Article 21(1) of the EU Charter, must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State which does not permit the recognition of a same-sex marriage lawfully entered into in another Member State (para. 78).

The ECJ points out that while the Member States were free to decide whether or not to introduce same-sex marriage in their national legal systems, they had to comply with EU law, in particular with the right to free movement as enshrined in Article 21(1) TFEU (para. 70). The Court further notes that refusing to recognise a same-sex marriage concluded abroad was likely to create serious obstacles for the persons concerned both in their public and private sphere (para. 53). Such a restriction on free movement could be justified only by objective public-interest considerations (para. 55). In this respect, the Court emphasises that a Member State could only invoke the public policy exception where there was a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society (para. 60). However, regarding the possible obligation to recognise a same-sex marriage concluded abroad, the Court can identify no such fundamental national interest (para. 61 et seq.). Finally, the Court stresses that restricting the right to freedom of movement can only be justified if it complies with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the EU Charter, in particular the right to respect for private and family life and the principle of non-discrimination (para. 63).

Positioning Trojan within prior case law

While the rights of LGBTIQ+ minorities worldwide are increasingly under pressure, the ECJ’s case law in recent years has advanced the rights of rainbow families across Europe. Building on its judgments concerning names (e.g. Garcia Avello or Grunkin Paul), the ECJ has progressively expanded its principles on cross-border recognition to same-sex marriages (Coman), parentage (Pancharevo), and, most recently, gender identity (Mirin). Against the backdrop of this twenty-year-old line of decisions, the Trojan judgment hardly comes as a surprise.

Indeed, the ECJ emphasises that where an obligation to recognise a same-sex marriage already applies when one of the spouses is a third-country national, it must a fortiori apply where both spouses are EU citizens. Moreover, previous case law underlines that any restriction on free movement, even if it pursues a legitimate aim, can only be justified if it complies with European fundamental rights. In this regard, the right to respect for private life under Article 7 of the EU Charter and Article 8 of the ECHR and the corresponding case law by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is increasingly important (see also Santaló Goris).

In Mirin, for example, the focus on Article 8 of the ECHR led the Court to affirm an obligation to recognise a person’s gender identity, noting that the ECtHR had already found Romania in breach of Article 8 of the ECHR for its restrictive requirements on legal gender recognition (X and Y v. Romania). Likewise, in Trojan, the Court now emphasises that the ECtHR already held on three occasions (Przybyszewska and Others v. Poland; Formela and Others v. Poland; and Andersen v. Poland) that Poland has failed to meet its positive obligation under Article 8 of the ECHR to legally recognise same-sex couples, leaving the persons concerned unable to regulate fundamental aspects of their private and family life (para. 66).

A final point, already established in the ECJ’s previous decisions, concerns the Court’s stand on national identity and public policy. As in Coman (para. 45) and Pancharevo (para. 56 et seq.), the ECJ dismisses Poland’s claim that recognising a foreign same-sex marriage could violate national identity or public policy. The Court reiterates that recognising a marriage concluded abroad does not require Member States to introduce same-sex marriage into their own legal systems. Rather, this obligation is confined to ensuring recognition for the purpose of enabling EU citizens to exercise the rights they enjoy under EU law (para. 66).

Towards full recognition

However, it is precisely this aspect of the judgment that gives rise to a number of further questions, in particular regarding the scope of the duty of recognition of same-sex marriages (see also Pasqua; Tryfonidou; Vaigė; Wendland; Wysocka-Bar). Whereas earlier case law was consistently based on a rather restrictive notion of recognition, Trojan moves beyond the narrow approach of earlier case law, requiring more than the mere transcription of a marriage certificate.

On the contrary, the Court expressly refers to the tangible legal effects of marriage under Polish law, such as access to statutory health insurance (para. 50), implications for a person’s name (para. 50), and the ability to invoke marital status vis-à-vis third parties (para. 53). These passages indicate that the ECJ is no longer merely concerned with the recognition of a certain status lawfully acquired abroad, but now seeks to ensure that EU citizens fully benefit from the legal effects arising from that status (see also Vaigė; Wysocka-Bar).

Can Member States circumvent Trojan?

What remains less clear, however, is how Member States are expected to comply with this obligation. As previous case law confirms, EU law does not prescribe a specific method for addressing restrictions on the freedom of movement. Rather, Member States retain a margin of discretion in determining how to implement obligations arising under EU law (cf. para. 69). This raises the question whether a Member State such as Poland could seek to circumvent the judgment’s implications by introducing a system of registered partnerships and transcribing a same-sex marriage validly concluded abroad not as a marriage, but as a registered partnership under domestic law (see also Wysocka-Bar).

The judgment does not explicitly preclude such an approach. However, this path must be reconsidered in light of another feature that distinguishes Trojan from earlier case law: The Court’s emphasis on the prohibition of discrimination enshrined in Article 21 of the EU Charter. In Trojan, the Court expressly holds that, when exercising their discretion, Member States are required to comply with Article 21(1) of the EU Charter (para. 70; see in detail Lamprinoudis). Consequently, where a Member State chooses to establish a single recognition procedure such as, in the present case, the transcription of the marriage certificate in the civil register, it must apply that procedure without discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation (para. 70).

It is also this aspect of non-discrimination which adds a new layer to the debate on the principle of cross-border recognition in the EU. The judgments in Coman, Pancharevo and Mirin already underlined the importance of European fundamental rights and their limiting function on the exercise of national public policy exceptions. Trojan now introduces a new equality law perspective to this debate.

Against this backdrop, recognition as a registered partnership would arguably only be permissible if its legal effects under national law correspond to those of a marriage; as any less could amount to discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation.