Dr. Uladzislau Belavusau is Senior Researcher in European Law at the T.M.C. Asser Institute (The Hague) - University of Amsterdam and a Principal Researcher in the "Memory Laws in European and Comparative Perspective" (MELA) project.
Das System in Weißrussland schwankt. Die Belarussen wollen ihren Staatschef Lukaschenko loswerden. Nehmen wir an, sie würden ihren Plan erfolgreich in die Tat umsetzen: Wie ginge es dann mit Belarus weiter? Was würde aus der Verfassung Weißrusslands? Und welche Auswirkungen hatte die bereits verstrichene Amtszeit des angeblich “letzten Diktators Europas” auf umliegende Staaten wie Polen, Serbien oder Ungarn? Uladzislau Belavusau hat Antworten – die er mit Max Steinbeis im Podcast-Interview teilt.
In contrast to the ‘illiberal democracies’ of Hungary and Poland, Belarus in its response to COVID-19 appears to be playing the role of a perfectly ‘liberal’ state with almost a laissez-faire solution, where people’s choice is prioritized and rights are respected as no severe measures are introduced to close businesses or restrict free movement. This image is inevitably misleading, as democratic institutions in Belarus have been brought to heel long ago, and alternative information about the state of affairs in Belarus regarding the virus remains suppressed.
After a pretty disappointing and self-contradictory judgement on the wedding cakes delivered yesterday by the US Supreme Court, the CJEU came up today with the long-awaited decision in the Coman case – putting a thick full stop on a long debate about the interpretation of the term ‘spouses’ under the EU Free Movement Directive. In short, the Court held that the term does cover spouses of the same sex moving to an EU Member State where a gay marriage remains unrecognized. This simple YES is a huge step forward in federalizing the EU constitutional space in a time of multiple crises.
Twelve scholars from eight countries have offered their critical perspectives on the legal governance of historical memory, categorised under the common heading of “memory laws”. One aspect crystalized by this symposium is that despite their multiple forms (punitive and declarative, constitutional and administrative, legislative and judicial, etc.), the adoption of such memory regulations has been on a tremendous rise in Europe.
Memory politics and protection of ethnic minorities have not received enough attention in the discussion on the decline of the rule of law in Poland and Hungary. Poland has recently supplied a paradigmatic example.
In its recent Grand Chamber decision “Perinçek v Switzerland” the ECtHR, once again, declares Armenian genocide denial protected against criminal prosecution by the right to free speech. The Court substantially disregards the specific atmosphere of denialism and gross violations of the rights of minorities in Turkey, moving central attention instead to Switzerland where – supposedly – no tensions are possible on the anti-Armenian grounds. The Court has failed to acknowledge the existence of the anti-Armenianism as a specific ideology prevalent amongst Turkish and Azeri nationalists, including those scattered in huge Turkish diasporas in Europe these days.
In its recent Grand Chamber decision “Perinçek v Switzerland” the ECtHR, once again, declares Armenian genocide denial protected against criminal prosecution by the right to free speech. The Court substantially disregards the specific atmosphere of denialism and gross violations of the rights of minorities in Turkey, moving central attention instead to Switzerland where – supposedly – no tensions are possible on the anti-Armenian grounds. The Court has failed to acknowledge the existence of the anti-Armenianism as a specific ideology prevalent amongst Turkish and Azeri nationalists, including those scattered in huge Turkish diasporas in Europe these days.
Literally a week ago any scholar daring to advocate “less power for the EU Parliament” and “hands off the Commission” would have faced a storm of dramatic accusations from all sorts of legal and political scientists. EU academia is deeply infected by a virus called “democratic deficit”. Last week parliamentary elections in Europe revealed the need to challenge this virus and explain why politicising the Commission (the direction enthusiastically advanced in recent EU scholarship) is largely erroneous and potentially mortal for the EU immune system.
Literally a week ago any scholar daring to advocate “less power for the EU Parliament” and “hands off the Commission” would have faced a storm of dramatic accusations from all sorts of legal and political scientists. EU academia is deeply infected by a virus called “democratic deficit”. Last week parliamentary elections in Europe revealed the need to challenge this virus and explain why politicising the Commission (the direction enthusiastically advanced in recent EU scholarship) is largely erroneous and potentially mortal for the EU immune system.
At the end of 2013, the European Court of Human Rights delivered an impressively extensive judgement in the case Perinçek v. Switzerland. The condemnation of a Turkish politician for the denial of Armenian genocide by Swiss courts violated freedom of expression. Along with many human rights scholars, I would hardly shake hands with a Holocaust or an Armenian genocide denier. Yet I will be equally sceptical of courtrooms being appropriate sites to qualify historical truth. For a summary of that position, see my recent paper (“Historical Revisionism: Law, Politics, and Surrogate Mourning”). At first glance, the outcome of Perinçek is a victory for civil rights. Limiting historical discussion by criminal prosecution is clearly an anachronism in the 21st century. However, on a deeper reading, this decision reveals yet another judicial pitfall which substantially undermines its outcome for freedom of speech in Europe. This pitfall stems from a sort of legal hypocrisy embedded in the Court’s distinction between the Holocaust and other mass atrocities of the 20th century.At the end of 2013, the European Court of Human Rights delivered an impressively extensive judgement in the case Perinçek v. Switzerland. The condemnation of a Turkish politician for the denial of Armenian genocide by Swiss courts violated freedom of expression. Along with many human rights scholars, I would hardly shake hands with a Holocaust or an Armenian genocide denier. Yet I will be equally sceptical of courtrooms being appropriate sites to qualify historical truth. For a summary of that position, see my recent paper (“Historical Revisionism: Law, Politics, and Surrogate Mourning”). At first glance, the outcome of Perinçek is a victory for civil rights. Limiting historical discussion by criminal prosecution is clearly an anachronism in the 21st century. However, on a deeper reading, this decision reveals yet another judicial pitfall which substantially undermines its outcome for freedom of speech in Europe. This pitfall stems from a sort of legal hypocrisy embedded in the Court’s distinction between the Holocaust and other mass atrocities of the 20th century.
