30 June 2026
Envisioning a Gender-Equal European Society
Among the manifold analyses of Commission v Hungary and a flourishing debate on the realization of a European society based on values, the question of gender has been largely overlooked. We argue that the understanding of a European society which aims to uphold the values of Art. 2 TEU has to be anti-patriarchal. In the following contribution, we apply a feminist methodology – feminist re-writing/re-reading – to the Court’s arguments to carve out hypothetical future orientations for creating a non-patriarchal European society. Continue reading >>
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29 June 2026
A Society of Trust
This contribution investigates a still underexplored element of Commission v Hungary. The judgment undoubtedly matters in terms of the enforceability of Article 2 TEU. Yet its significance reaches further. The Court also recalled that the Union’s common values are linked to one of the central mechanisms of EU law: the principle of mutual trust. I submit that mutual trust should not be understood merely as a technical rule of inter-state recognition but as the horizontal institutional grammar of interdependence within European society. Continue reading >>
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29 June 2026
On Red (Funding) Lines
One of the conceptually most significant innovations by the Court of Justice in Commission v. Hungary is its invocation of European society as a normative referent of the EU legal order, and the characterisation of that society through pluralism. This conceptual step has consequences that reach well beyond the judgement. I argue that it could place the Court on a potential collision course with the European Commission’s recent proposal to explicitly link EU civil society funding to compliance with the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU. Continue reading >>
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26 June 2026
The Dangerous Idea of a European Society Based on Common Values
The CJEU began to treat the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU as justiciable legal norms in its ASJP judgment from 2018. In its 2026 judgment in Commission v Hungary, it took the further step of treating those values as justiciable stand-alone norms and justified that step by invoking the existence of a European society. This contribution approaches the matter from a social-science point of view. I argue that the Article-2-TEU claim of a European society is theoretically unconvincing, empirically untenable, and politically dangerous. Continue reading >>
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26 June 2026
European Society Between Facts and Norms
Article 2 TEU values, such as pluralism, oscillate between descriptive claims, legal normativity, and appeals to European society as a source of authority. From a Habermasian perspective, the democratic legitimacy of EU values enforcement remains difficult to justify in the absence of a robust pan-European deliberative process through which those values can be articulated and contested. At the same time, Commission v Hungary constitutes a legitimate restorative intervention in a dysfunctional democratic process distorted by the stigmatisation of LGBTQ+ persons. Continue reading >>
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25 June 2026
In Search of Reflective Equilibrium
In her academic writings, Advocate General Tamara Ćapeta has observed that many EU rights have been developing on a case-by-case basis, but so far without “a general and comprehensive explanation that they form part of a liberal and tolerant democratic society”. Drawing on this observation, and against the backdrop of the Court’s ruling in the Hungarian case, I will argue in this contribution that “pluralistic European society” is not only a sociological concept but also plays an important normative role as an organising regulative concept in EU constitutional-legal interpretation. Continue reading >>
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25 June 2026
Taking Pluralism Seriously
If there is anything we can say about European society, it is that it is pluralistic. My suggestion is to understand pluralism in light of Isaiah Berlin's philosophy of value pluralism. A pluralistic society may be understood as a particular liberal model of the good society, or as an irreducible plurality of incommensurable visions that must coexist. The former risks turning Article 2 TEU into a mandate for convergence towards one substantive vision of a good society. Continue reading >>
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24 June 2026
The Politics of European Society
Commission v Hungary marks the remarkable ascent of the European society discourse. A closer look, however, reveals that there is little transformative in the Court’s Article 2 TEU case law or its invocation of European society. Beneath the rhetoric of transformation, the institutional adaptation of the society discourse is above all conservative in nature, seeking to protect the authority of the EU. The hope that the Court will pursue a transformative agenda is unfounded. Rather, the notion of European society is instrumental in legitimising the status quo. Continue reading >>
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24 June 2026
European Society at the Italian Constitutional Court
In its recent judgment No. 63/2026, the Italian Constitutional Court acknowledged the existence of a European society grounded on the values in Article 2 TEU. The judgment appears to be the first explicit reference by a constitutional court of an EU Member State to the emergence of a European society. Judgment concerned the constitutionality of recent legislation restricting access to Italian citizenship for descendants of Italians abroad. The passage on European society is an obiter dictum. I argue that its real significance lies in the question: Who belongs to European society? Continue reading >>
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23 June 2026